Tiede ja tutkijan sosiaalinen vastuu : Joseph Ben-Davidin, Roger Sperryn ja Knut Erik Tranøyn käsitykset tieteestä ja tutkijan sosiaalisesta vastuusta

Science and the Scientist's Social Responsibility. Joseph Ben-David's, Roger Sperry's and Knut Erik Tranøy's Views of Science and the Scientist's Social Responsibility The aim of the study was to investigate, whether or not there is any connection between Jewish sociologist Joseph Ben-David's, American neuroscientist Roger Sperry's and Norwegian philosopher Knut Erik Tranøy's views of science and views of the scientist's social responsibility. The sources of information were their writings concerning this topic. Ben-David has a classical view of science. He thinks that the Mertonian norms of scientific activity, first written in 1942, are still valid in modern science. With the help of these norms Ben-David defends the view that science is morally neutral. Ben-David thinks that a scientist has a limited social responsibility. A scientist only reports on the new results, but he is not responsible for applying the results. In any case Ben-David's ideas are no longer valid. Sperry has a scientistic view of science. According to Sperry, science is the source of moral norms and also the best guide for moral action. The methods of natural sciences "show" how to solve moral problems. A scientist's personal views of science and social responsibility are not important. However Sperry's view is very problematic on the ethical side. Tranøy stresses the scientist's social responsibility. A scientist has common norms with the society from with he or she comes. This is why a scientist has the right, and also the responsibility, to discuss social and ethical questions between science and society. Tranøy's view has some ethical and practical problems, but it is valid in principle. Finally, Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's views of both science and the scientist's social responsibility have a connection: the view of science corresponds to the certain view of scientist's social responsibility. The result of this study is: Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's view of science have an ethical starting point as its fundamental presupposition, which include certain views of scientific knowledge, good and the scientist's ethical responsibilities. The connection between Ben-David's, Sperry's and Tranøy's views of science and views of the scientist's social responsibility means that their views of epistemology, meta-ethics and the scientist's ethical responsibilities have a connection to their views of the scientist's social responsibility. The results of this study can help the scientific community to organize the social responsibility of a scientist and deepen the conversation concerning the scientist's social responsibility.

The Guide-Dog Approach:

In ecology the central problem is not the lack of theory or the lack of data but the lack of research able to link them systematically and critically. The description and analysis of such an integrated research process is the focus of the present study. Our approach is called the Guide-Dog approach, because we hope that it is able to guide all those who are blinded or perplexed by the increasing technical sophistication and fragmentation of modern science.

Logic as the Universal Science : Bertrand Russell's Early Conception of Logic and Its Philosophical Context

Bertrand Russell (1872 1970) introduced the English-speaking philosophical world to modern, mathematical logic and foundational study of mathematics. The present study concerns the conception of logic that underlies his early logicist philosophy of mathematics, formulated in The Principles of Mathematics (1903). In 1967, Jean van Heijenoort published a paper, Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus, in which he argued that the early development of modern logic (roughly the period 1879 1930) can be understood, when considered in the light of a distinction between two essentially different perspectives on logic. According to the view of logic as language, logic constitutes the general framework for all rational discourse, or meaningful use of language, whereas the conception of logic as calculus regards logic more as a symbolism which is subject to reinterpretation. The calculus-view paves the way for systematic metatheory, where logic itself becomes a subject of mathematical study (model-theory). Several scholars have interpreted Russell s views on logic with the help of the interpretative tool introduced by van Heijenoort,. They have commonly argued that Russell s is a clear-cut case of the view of logic as language. In the present study a detailed reconstruction of the view and its implications is provided, and it is argued that the interpretation is seriously misleading as to what he really thought about logic. I argue that Russell s conception is best understood by setting it in its proper philosophical context. This is constituted by Immanuel Kant s theory of mathematics. Kant had argued that purely conceptual thought basically, the logical forms recognised in Aristotelian logic cannot capture the content of mathematical judgments and reasonings. Mathematical cognition is not grounded in logic but in space and time as the pure forms of intuition. As against this view, Russell argued that once logic is developed into a proper tool which can be applied to mathematical theories, Kant s views turn out to be completely wrong. In the present work the view is defended that Russell s logicist philosophy of mathematics, or the view that mathematics is really only logic, is based on what I term the Bolzanian account of logic . According to this conception, (i) the distinction between form and content is not explanatory in logic; (ii) the propositions of logic have genuine content; (iii) this content is conferred upon them by special entities, logical constants . The Bolzanian account, it is argued, is both historically important and throws genuine light on Russell s conception of logic.