Non-reductive Physicalism, Irreducibility of the Mental and the Problem of Mental Causation : A study of Donald Davidson's and Georg Henrik von Wright's positions in the philosophy of mind

In this study I consider what kind of perspective on the mind body problem is taken and can be taken by a philosophical position called non-reductive physicalism. Many positions fall under this label. The form of non-reductive physicalism which I discuss is in essential respects the position taken by Donald Davidson (1917-2003) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003). I defend their positions and discuss the unrecognized similarities between their views. Non-reductive physicalism combines two theses: (a) Everything that exists is physical; (b) Mental phenomena cannot be reduced to the states of the brain. This means that according to non-reductive physicalism the mental aspect of humans (be it a soul, mind, or spirit) is an irreducible part of the human condition. Also Davidson and von Wright claim that, in some important sense, the mental aspect of a human being does not reduce to the physical aspect, that there is a gap between these aspects that cannot be closed. I claim that their arguments for this conclusion are convincing. I also argue that whereas von Wright and Davidson give interesting arguments for the irreducibility of the mental, their physicalism is unwarranted. These philosophers do not give good reasons for believing that reality is thoroughly physical. Notwithstanding the materialistic consensus in the contemporary philosophy of mind the ontology of mind is still an uncharted territory where real breakthroughs are not to be expected until a radically new ontological position is developed. The third main claim of this work is that the problem of mental causation cannot be solved from the Davidsonian - von Wrightian perspective. The problem of mental causation is the problem of how mental phenomena like beliefs can cause physical movements of the body. As I see it, the essential point of non-reductive physicalism - the irreducibility of the mental - and the problem of mental causation are closely related. If mental phenomena do not reduce to causally effective states of the brain, then what justifies the belief that mental phenomena have causal powers? If mental causes do not reduce to physical causes, then how to tell when - or whether - the mental causes in terms of which human actions are explained are actually effective? I argue that this - how to decide when mental causes really are effective - is the real problem of mental causation. The motivation to explore and defend a non-reductive position stems from the belief that reductive physicalism leads to serious ethical problems. My claim is that Davidson's and von Wright's ultimate reason to defend a non-reductive view comes back to their belief that a reductive understanding of human nature would be a narrow and possibly harmful perspective. The final conclusion of my thesis is that von Wright's and Davidson's positions provide a starting point from which the current scientistic philosophy of mind can be critically further explored in the future.

Jumping numbers of a simple complete ideal in a two-dimensional regular local ring

The multiplier ideals of an ideal in a regular local ring form a family of ideals parametrized by non-negative rational numbers. As the rational number increases the corresponding multiplier ideal remains unchanged until at some point it gets strictly smaller. A rational number where this kind of diminishing occurs is called a jumping number of the ideal. In this manuscript we shall give an explicit formula for the jumping numbers of a simple complete ideal in a two dimensional regular local ring. In particular, we obtain a formula for the jumping numbers of an analytically irreducible plane curve. We then show that the jumping numbers determine the equisingularity class of the curve.

The Home of Hearing : George Lindbeck's understanding of community

The aim of this thesis was to examine the understanding of community in George Lindbeck s The Nature of Doctrine. Intrinsic to this question was also examining how Lindbeck understands the relation between the text and the world which both meet in a Christian community. Thirdly this study also aimed at understanding what the persuasiveness of this understanding depends on. The method applied for this task was systematic analysis. The study was conducted by first providing an orientation into the nontheological substance of the ND which was assumed useful with respect to the aim of this study. The study then went on to explore Lindbeck in his own context of postliberal theology in order to see how the ND was received. It also attempted to provide a picture of how the ND relates to Lindbeck as a theologian. The third chapter was a descriptive analysis into the cultural-linguistic perspective, which is understood as being directly proportional to his understanding of community. The fourth chapter was an analysis into how the cultural-linguistic perspective sees the relation between the text and the world. When religion is understood from a cultural-linguistic perspective, it presents itself as a cultural-linguistic entity, which Lindbeck understands as a comprehensive interpretive scheme which structures human experience and understanding of oneself and the world in which one lives. When one exists in this entity, it is the entity which shapes the subjectivities of all those who are at home in this entity which makes participation in the life of a cultural linguistic entity a condition for understanding it. Religion is above all an external word that moulds and shapes our religious existence and experience. Understanding faith then as coming from hearing, is something that correlates with the cultural-linguistic depiction of reality. Religion informs us of a religious reality, it does not originate in any way from ourselves. This externality linked to the axiomatic nature of religion is also something that distinguishes Lindbeck sharply from liberalist tendencies, which understand religion as ultimately expressing the prereflective depths of the inner self. Language is the central analogy to understanding the medium in which one moves when inhabiting a cultural-linguistic system because language is the transmitting medium in which the cultural-linguistic system is embodied. The realism entailed in Lindbeck s understanding of a community is that we are fundamentally on the receiving end when it comes to our identities whether cultural or religious. We always witness to something. Its persuasiveness rests on the fact that we never exist in an unpersuaded reality. The language of Christ is a self-sustaining and irreducible cultural-linguistic entity, which is ontologically founded upon Christ. It transmits the reality of a new being. The basic relation to the world for a Christian is that of witnessing salvation in Christ: witnessing Christ as the home of hearing the message of salvation, which is the God-willed way. Following this logic, the relation of the world and the text is one of relating to the world from the text, i.e. In Christ through the word (text) for the world, because it assumes it s logic from the way Christ ontologically relates to us.