The Nature of Learning about Customers in a Customer Service Setting - A Study of Frontline Contact Persons

The starting point of this thesis is the notion that in order for organisations to understand what customers value and how customers experience service, they need to learn about customers. The first and perhaps most important link in an organisation-wide learning process directed at customers is the frontline contact person. Service- and sales organisations can only learn about customers if the individual frontline contact persons learn about customers. Even though it is commonly recognised that learning about customers is the basis for an organisation’s success, few contributions within marketing investigate the fundamental nature of the phenomenon as it occurs in everyday customer service. Thus, what learning about customers is and how it takes place in a customer-service setting is an issue that is neglected in marketing research. In order to explore these questions, this thesis presents a socio-cultural approach to understanding learning about customers. Hence, instead of considering learning equal to cognitive processes in the mind of the frontline contact person or learning as equal to organisational information processing, the interactive, communication-based, socio-cultural aspect of learning about customers is brought to the fore. Consequently, the theoretical basis of the study can be found both in socio-cultural and practice-oriented lines of reasoning, as well as in the fields of service- and relationship marketing. As it is argued that learning about customers is an integrated part of everyday practices, it is also clear that it should be studied in a naturalistic and holistic way as it occurs in a customer-service setting. This calls for an ethnographic research approach, which involves direct, first-hand experience of the research setting during an extended period of time. Hence, the empirical study employs participant observations, informal discussions and interviews among car salespersons and service advisors at a car retailing company. Finally, as a synthesis of theoretically and empirically gained understanding, a set of concepts are developed and they are integrated into a socio-cultural model of learning about customers.

Legal Reasoning in Context

This study in EU law analyses the reasoning of the Court of Justice (the Court of Justice of the European Union) in a set of its preliminary rulings. Preliminary rulings are answers to national courts questions on the interpretation (and validity) of EU law called preliminary references. These questions concern specific legal issues that have arisen in legal disputes before the national courts. The Court of Justice alone has the ultimate authority to interpret EU law. The preliminary rulings bind the national courts in the cases giving rise to the preliminary reference, and the interpretations of EU law offered in the preliminary rulings are considered generally binding on all instances applying EU law. EU law is often described as a dynamic legal order and the Court of Justice as at the vanguard of developing it. It is generally assumed that the Court of Justice is striving to realise the EU s meta-level purpose (telos): integration. Against this backdrop one can understand the criticism the Court of Justice is often faced with in certain fields of EU law that can be described as developing. This criticism concerns the Court s (negatively) activist way of not just stating the law but developing or even making law. It is difficult to analyse or prove wrong this accusation as it is not in methodological terms clearly established what constitutes judicial activism, or more exactly where the threshold of negative activism lies. Moreover, one popular approach to assessing the role of the Court of Justice described as integration through law has become fairly political, neglecting to take into consideration the special nature of law as both facilitating and constraining action, not merely a medium for furthering integration. This study offers a legal reasoning approach of a more legalist nature, in order to balance the existing mix of approaches to explaining what the Court of Justice does and how. Reliance on legal reasoning is found to offer a working framework for analysis, whereas the tools for an analysis based on activism are found lacking. The legal reasoning approach enables one to assess whether or not the Court of Justice is pertaining to its own established criteria of interpretation of EU law, and if it is not, one should look more in detail at how the interpretation fits with earlier case-law and doctrines of EU law. This study examines the reasoning of the Court of Justice in a set of objectively chosen cases. The emphasis of the study is on analysing how the Court of Justice applies the established criteria of interpretation it has assumed for itself. Moreover, the judgments are assessed not only in terms of reasoning but also for meaningful silences they contain. The analysis is furthermore contextualised by taking into consideration how the cases were commented by legal scholars, their substantive EU law context, and also their larger politico-historical context. In this study, the analysis largely shows that the Court of Justice is interpreting EU law in accordance with its previous practice. Its reasoning retains connection with the linguistic or semiotic criteria of interpretation, while emphasis lies on systemic reasoning. Moreover, although there are a few judgments where the Court of Justice offers clearly dynamic reasoning or what can be considered as substantive reasoning stemming from, for example, common sense or reasonableness, such reasons are most often given in addition to systemic ones. In this sense and even when considered in its broader context, the case-law analysed in this study does not portray a specifically activist image of the Court of Justice. The legal reasoning approach is a valid alternative for explaining how and why the Court of Justice interprets EU law as it does.