Ajatuksista operaatioiksi : Suomen armeijan hyökkäysoperaatioiden suunnittelu jatkosodassa

In the research on the Continuation War, interest in the events themselves had exceeded the interest in military planning. Careful consideration has not been given to the planning process and the options that were available. This study shows how the planning of these operations was carried out and identifies the persons responsible. Contrary to earlier research this study shows that persons other than Field-Marshal Carl Gustaf Mannerheim and Quartermaster-General Aksel Airo took part in the planning. Furthermore, the plan was to carry out the operations further east than was ultimately done. The operation plans were coordinated by the Operations Department of Headquarters, which had the opportunity to influence on both Mannerheim and Airo. Part of the actual planning was made outside Headquarters, but final decisions were taken at Headquarters. It is worth observing that many times Mannerheim asked President Risto Ryti for his opinion concerning these operations. The Germans tried to influence the Finnish plans, but the Finns took their decisions independently, although they took German requests into account. It is well-known that the attack by the Finnish forces was stopped at the end of the year 1941. It is less well-known that the Finns planned new attacks until the autumn of 1942. At that point the Finns were convinced that the Germans would lose the war. The Finns were thus prepared to keep advancing should the Germans progress in the direction of Leningrad. This study shows that the Finnish military leaders worked for Finland s own plans and their cooperation with the Germans was directed to achieving this goal. In other words, Finland tried expand eastward with the help of the Germans. This purpose was particularly evident in the planning of the operations in the Hanko district and the Karelian Isthmus in the summer and autumn of 1941, in the Sorokka district in the spring of 1942 and around Lake Ladoga in the summer and autumn of 1942. The Finns reduced their activities when Germans took over responsibility for the operations. However, at the same time the Finns tried to support Germans in passive ways. The Finns justified the decrease in their activities with lack of Finnish forces and numerous defeats. Earlier research has shown that Finland was an active operator in the Continuation War and tried to take back the areas lost in the Winter War. In this study that view becomes more precise and clear especially with regard to Field-Marshal Mannerheim and other high military leaders. There is clear indication that the Finns would have attacked much further east had a German success made such an attack possible.