Monetary Policy Implementation in the Interbank Market

The liquidity crisis that swept through the financial markets in 2007 triggered multi-billion losses and forced buyouts of some large banks. The resulting credit crunch is sometimes compared to the great recession in the early twentieth century. But the crisis also serves as a reminder of the significance of the interbank market and of proper central bank policy in this market. This thesis deals with implementation of monetary policy in the interbank market and examines how central bank tools affect commercial banks' decisions. I answer the following questions: • What is the relationship between the policy setup and interbank interest rate volatility? (averaging reserve requirement reduces the volatility) • What can explain a weak relationship between market liquidity and the interest rate? (high reserve requirement buffer) • What determines banks' decisions on when to satisfy the reserve requirement? (market frictions) • How did the liquidity crisis that began in 2007 affect interbank market behaviour? (resulted in higher credit risk and trading frictions as well as expected liquidity shortage)

Monetary Policy, Stock Price Misalignments and Macroeconomic Instability

Perhaps the most fundamental prediction of financial theory is that the expected returns on financial assets are determined by the amount of risk contained in their payoffs. Assets with a riskier payoff pattern should provide higher expected returns than assets that are otherwise similar but provide payoffs that contain less risk. Financial theory also predicts that not all types of risks should be compensated with higher expected returns. It is well-known that the asset-specific risk can be diversified away, whereas the systematic component of risk that affects all assets remains even in large portfolios. Thus, the asset-specific risk that the investor can easily get rid of by diversification should not lead to higher expected returns, and only the shared movement of individual asset returns – the sensitivity of these assets to a set of systematic risk factors – should matter for asset pricing. It is within this framework that this thesis is situated. The first essay proposes a new systematic risk factor, hypothesized to be correlated with changes in investor risk aversion, which manages to explain a large fraction of the return variation in the cross-section of stock returns. The second and third essays investigate the pricing of asset-specific risk, uncorrelated with commonly used risk factors, in the cross-section of stock returns. The three essays mentioned above use stock market data from the U.S. The fourth essay presents a new total return stock market index for the Finnish stock market beginning from the opening of the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1912 and ending in 1969 when other total return indices become available. Because a total return stock market index for the period prior to 1970 has not been available before, academics and stock market participants have not known the historical return that stock market investors in Finland could have achieved on their investments. The new stock market index presented in essay 4 makes it possible, for the first time, to calculate the historical average return on the Finnish stock market and to conduct further studies that require long time-series of data.