Suomen maatalouden tuottamat kasvihuonekaasujen päästöt eri politiikkaskenaarioissa

Climate change is the single biggest environmental problem in the world at the moment. Although the effects are still not fully understood and there is considerable amount of uncertainty, many na-tions have decided to mitigate the change. On the societal level, a planner who tries to find an eco-nomically optimal solution to an environmental pollution problem seeks to reduce pollution from the sources where reductions are most cost-effective. This study aims to find out how effective the instruments of the agricultural policy are in the case of climate change mitigation in Finland. The theoretical base of this study is the neoclassical economic theory that is based on the assumption of a rational economic agent who maximizes his own utility. This theoretical base has been widened towards the direction clearly essential to the matter: the theory of environmental eco-nomics. Deeply relevant to this problem and central in the theory of environmental economics are the concepts of externalities and public goods. What are also relevant are the problems of global pollution and non-point-source pollution. Econometric modelling was the method that was applied to this study. The Finnish part of the AGMEMOD-model, covering the whole EU, was used for the estimation of the development of pollution. This model is a seemingly recursive, partially dynamic partial-equilibrium model that was constructed to predict the development of Finnish agricultural production of the most important products. For the study, I personally updated the model and also widened its scope in some relevant matters. Also, I devised a table that can calculate the emissions of greenhouse gases according to the rules set by the IPCC. With the model I investigated five alternative scenarios in comparison to the base-line scenario of Agenda 2000 agricultural policy. The alternative scenarios were: 1) the CAP reform of 2003, 2) free trade on agricultural commodities, 3) technological change, 4) banning the cultivation of organic soils and 5) the combination of the last three scenarios as the maximal achievement in reduction. The maximal achievement in the alternative scenario 5 was 1/3 of the level achieved on the base-line scenario. CAP reform caused only a minor reduction when com-pared to the base-line scenario. Instead, the free trade scenario and the scenario of technological change alone caused a significant reduction. The biggest single reduction was achieved by banning the cultivation of organic land. However, this was also the most questionable scenario to be real-ized, the reasons for this are further elaborated in the paper. The maximal reduction that can be achieved in the Finnish agricultural sector is about 11 % of the emission reduction that is needed to comply with the Kyoto protocol.

Strategic Information Acquisition: Applications to Herding and Auctions

The information that the economic agents have and regard relevant to their decision making is often assumed to be exogenous in economics. It is assumed that the agents either poses or can observe the payoff relevant information without having to exert any effort to acquire it. In this thesis we relax the assumption of ex-ante fixed information structure and study what happens to the equilibrium behavior when the agents must also decide what information to acquire and when to acquire it. This thesis addresses this question in the two essays on herding and two essays on auction theory. In the first two essays, that are joint work with Klaus Kultti, we study herding models where it is costly to acquire information on the actions that the preceding agents have taken. In our model the agents have to decide both the action that they take and additionally the information that they want to acquire by observing their predecessors. We characterize the equilibrium behavior when the decision to observe preceding agents' actions is endogenous and show how the equilibrium outcome may differ from the standard model, where all preceding agents actions are assumed to be observable. In the latter part of this thesis we study two dynamic auctions: the English and the Dutch auction. We consider a situation where bidder(s) are uninformed about their valuations for the object that is put up for sale and they may acquire this information for a small cost at any point during the auction. We study the case of independent private valuations. In the third essay of the thesis we characterize the equilibrium behavior in an English auction when there are informed and uninformed bidders. We show that the informed bidder may jump bid and signal to the uninformed that he has a high valuation, thus deterring the uninformed from acquiring information and staying in the auction. The uninformed optimally acquires information once the price has passed a particular threshold and the informed has not signalled that his valuation is high. In addition, we provide an example of an information structure where the informed bidder initially waits and then makes multiple jumps. In the fourth essay of this thesis we study the Dutch auction. We consider two cases where all bidders are all initially uninformed. In the first case the information acquisition cost is the same across all bidders and in the second also the cost of information acquisition is independently distributed and private information to the bidders. We characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in the first and a pure strategy equilibrium in the second case. In addition we provide a conjecture of an equilibrium in an asymmetric situation where there is one informed and one uninformed bidder. We compare the revenues that the first price auction and the Dutch auction generate and we find that under some circumstances the Dutch auction outperforms the first price sealed bid auction. The usual first price sealed bid auction and the Dutch auction are strategically equivalent. However, this equivalence breaks down in case information is acquired during the auction.

Trust and Collectives

"Trust and Collectives" is a compilation of articles: (I) "On Rational Trust" (in Meggle, G. (ed.) Social Facts & Collective Intentionality, Dr. Hänsel-Hohenhausen AG (currently Ontos), 2002), (II) "Simulating Rational Social Normative Trust, Predictive Trust, and Predictive Reliance Between Agents" (M.Tuomela and S. Hofmann, Ethics and Information Technology 5, 2003), (III) "A Collective's Trust in a Collective's action" (Protosociology, 18-19, 2003), and (IV) "Cooperation and Trust in Group Contexts" (R. Tuomela and M.Tuomela, Mind and Society 4/1, 2005 ). The articles are tied together by an introduction that dwells deeply on the topic of trust. (I) presents a somewhat general version of (RSNTR) and some basic arguments. (II) offers an application of (RSNTR) for a computer simulation of trust.(III) applies (RSNTR) to Raimo Tuomela's "we-mode"collectives (i.e. The Philosophy of Social Practices, Cambridge University Press, 2002). (IV) analyzes cooperation and trust in the context of acting as a member of a collective. Thus, (IV) elaborates on the topic of collective agency in (III) and puts the trust account (RSNTR) to work in a framework of cooperation. The central aim of this work is to construct a well-argued conceptual and theoretical account of rational trust, viz. a person's subjectively rational trust in another person vis-à-vis his performance of an action, seen from a first-person point of view. The main method is conceptual and theoretical analysis understood along the lines of reflective equilibrium. The account of rational social normative trust (RSNTR), which is argued and defended against other views, is the result of the quest. The introduction stands on its own legs as an argued presentation of an analysis of the concept of rational trust and an analysis of trust itself (RSNTR). It is claimed that (RSNTR) is "genuine" trust and embedded in a relationship of mutual respect for the rights of the other party. This relationship is the growing site for trust, a causal and conceptual ground, but it is not taken as a reason for trusting (viz. predictive "trust"). Relevant themes such as risk, decision, rationality, control, and cooperation are discussed and the topics of the articles are briefly presented. In this work it is argued that genuine trust is to be kept apart from predictive "trust." When we trust a person vis-à-vis his future action that concerns ourselves on the basis of his personal traits and/or features of the specific situation we have a prediction-like attitude. Genuine trust develops in a relationship of mutual respect for the mutual rights of the other party. Such a relationship is formed through interaction where the parties gradually find harmony concerning "the rules of the game." The trust account stands as a contribution to philosophical research on central social notions and it could be used as a theoretical model in social psychology, economical and political science where interaction between persons and groups are in focus. The analysis could also serve as a model for a trust component in computer simulation of human action. In the context of everyday life the account clarifies the difference between predictive "trust" and genuine trust. There are no fast shortcuts to trust. Experiences of mutual respect for mutual rights cannot be had unless there is respect.

Accumulation of point mutations and reassortment of genomic RNA segments are involved in the microevolution of Puumala hantavirus in a bank vole (Myodes glareolus) population

"The genetic diversity of Puumala hantavirus (PUUV) was studied in a local population of its natural host, the bank vole (Myodes glareolus). The trapping area (2.5x2.5 km) at Konnevesi, Central Finland, included 14 trapping sites, at least 500 m apart; altogether, 147 voles were captured during May and October 2005. Partial sequences of the S, M and L viral genome segments were recovered from 40 animals. Seven, 12 and 17 variants were detected for the S, M and L sequences, respectively; these represent new wild-type PUUV strains that belong to the Finnish genetic lineage. The genetic diversity of PUUV strains from Konnevesi was 0.2-4.9% for the S segment, 0.2-4.8% for the M segment and 0.2-9.7% for the L segment. Most nucleotide substitutions were synonymous and most deduced amino acid substitutions were conservative, probably due to strong stabilizing selection operating at the protein level. Based on both sequence markers and phylogenetic clustering, the S, M and L sequences could be assigned to two groups, 'A' and 'B'. Notably, not all bank voles carried S, M and L sequences belonging to the same group, i.e. SAMALA or SBMBLB.. A substantial proportion (8/40, 20%) of the newly characterized PUUV strains possessed reassortant genomes such as SBMALA, SAMBLB or SBMALB. These results suggest that at least some of the PUUV reassortants are viable and can survive in the presence of their parental strains."