At the Limits of Presentation : Coming-into-Presence and its Aesthetic Relevance in Jean-Luc Nancy's Philosophy

This study investigates the significance of art in Jean-Luc Nancy s philosophy. I argue that the notion of art contributes to some of Nancy s central ontological ideas. Therefore, I consider art s importance in its own right whether art does have ontological significance, and if so, how one should describe this with respect to the theme of presentation. According to my central argument, with his thinking on art Nancy attempts to give one viewpoint to what is called the metaphysics of presence and to its deconstruction. On which grounds, as I propose, may one say that art is not reducible to philosophy? The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part, Presentation as a Philosophical Theme, is a historical genesis of the central concepts associated with the birth of presentation in Nancy s philosophy. I examine this from the viewpoint of the differentiation between the ontological notions of presentation and representation by concentrating on the influence of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, as well as of Hegel and Kant. I give an overview of the way in which being or sense for Nancy is to be described as a coming-into-presence or presentation . Therefore, being takes place in its singular plurality. I argue that Nancy redevelops Heidegger s account of being in two principal ways: first, in rethinking the ontico-ontological difference, and secondly, by striving to radicalize the Heideggerian concept of Mitsein, being-with . I equally wish to show the importance of Derrida s notion of différance and its inherence in Nancy s questioning of being that rests on the unfoundedness of existence. The second part, From Ontology to Art, draws on the importance of art and the aesthetic. If, in Nancy, the question of art touches upon its own limit as the limit of nothingness, how is art able to open its own strangeness and our exposure to this strangeness? My aim is to investigate how Nancy s thinking on art finds its place within the conceptual realm of its inherent difference and interval. My central concern is the thought of originary ungroundedness and the plurality of art and of the arts. As for the question of the difference between art and philosophy, I wish to show that what differentiates art from thought is the fact that art exposes what is obvious but not apparent, if apparent is understood in the sense of givenness. As for art s ability to deconstruct Nancy s ontological notions, I suggest that in question in art is its original heterogeneity and diversity. Art is a matter of differing art occurs singularly, as a local difference. With this in mind, I point out that in reflecting on art in terms of spacing and interval, as a thinker of difference Nancy comes closer to Derrida and his idea of différance than to the structure of Heidegger s ontological difference.

Constructing Ethical Patterns in Times of Globalization : Hans Küng's Global Ethic Project and Beyond

The purpose of this study is to evaluate contemporary philosophical models for global ethics in light of the Catholic theologian Hans Küng s Global Ethic Project (Projekt Weltethos). Küng s project starts with the motto, No survival without world ethos. No global peace without peace between religions. I will use the philosophically multidimensional potential of Projekt Weltethos in terms of its possible philosophical interpretations to evaluate the general discussion of global ethics within political philosophy today. This is important in its own right, but also because through it, opportunities will emerge to articulate Küng s relatively general argument in a way that leaves less room for mutually contradictory concretizations of what global ethics ultimately should be like. The most important question in this study is the problem of religious and ideological exclusivism and its relation to the ethically consistent articulation of global ethics. I will first explore the question of the role of religion as the basis for ethics in general and what Küng may mean by his claim that only the unconditional can oblige unconditionally. I will reconstruct two different overall philosophical interpretations of the relationship between religious faith and human rationality, each having two different sub-divisions: a liberal interpretation amounts to either a Kantian-Scheiermacherian or a Jaspersian view, whereas what I call postliberal interpretation amounts to either an Aristotelian-Thomistic or an Augustinian view. Thereafter, I will further clarify how Küng views the nature of ethics beyond the question of its principal foundation in religious faith: Küng searches for a middle way between consequentialist and non-consequentialist ethics, a way in which the latter dimension has the final stake. I will then set out to concretize further this more or less general notion of the theoretical potential of Projekt Weltethos in terms of certain precise philosophico-political models. I categorize these models according to their liberal or postliberal orientation. The liberal concretization leads me to consider a wide spectrum of post-Kantian and post-Hegelian models from Rawls to Derrida, while the alternative concretization opens up my ultimate argument in favor of a postliberal type of modus vivendi. I will suggest that the only theoretically and practically plausible way to promote global ethics, in itself a major imperative today, is the recognition of a fundamental and necessary contest between mutually exclusive ideologies in the public sphere. On this basis I will proceed to my postliberal proposal, namely, that a constructive and peaceful encountering of exclusive difference as an ethical vantage point for an intercultural and inter-religious peace dialogue is the most acute challenge for global ethics today.

Paluu paratiisiin : Polkuja hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen Martti Lutherin ja Friedrich Nietzschen perinteissä

Tutkimukseni tarkoitus on paikallistaa polkuja hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen. Tutkimukseni termit hyvä ja paha määrittyvät moraalisesti. Täten tutkimusaiheeni on ihmisen ja moraalin välinen suhde. Tutkin ihmisen moraalista olotilaa, siinä tapahtuvaa muutosta ja tämän muutoksen ehtoja. Tutkimuksellani on kaksi pääkysymystä: kuinka on mahdollista päästä hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen ja miksi meidän tulisi siirtyä hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen. Polut hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen vievät myös etiikan tuolle puolen. Tutkimukseni pyrkii selvittämään mitä vikaa etiikassa on ja kuinka on mahdollista perustella toimintaa ilman etiikkaa. Tutkimukseni metodi on systemaattinen analyysi. Johdanto-osassa käsittelen yleisesti moraalia, sen vaikutuspiiriä ja niitä syitä, joiden vuoksi se täytyy hylätä. Tarkastelen myös etiikkaa ja selvitän sitä laajempaa kontekstia mihin se liittyy. Ensimmäisessä luvussa käsittelen Martti Lutherin teologiaa. Lutherilla moraalia edustaa Jumalan laki, jonka alaisuudesta kristitty pääsee vapaaksi kun Jeesus ottaa ristinkuolemassaan ihmisten synnin itselleen ja kärsii Jumalan lain mukaisen kuolemanrangaistuksen. Uskon yhteydessä Kristukseen kristitty kohoaa lain ulkopuolelle tekemään rakkauden tekoja. Toinen luku on omistettu Søren Kierkegaardin kristilliselle eksistentialismille. Kierkegaardin eksistenssitasojen filosofiassa uskonnollinen olemisen taso paljastuu korkeammaksi kuin eettinen. Tässä nousee tärkeäksi Kierkegaardin kirja Pelko ja vavistus. Kierkegaard tutkii Raamatun kertomusta Aabrahamista, jolle Jumala antaa käskyn uhrata oma poikansa Iisak. Kierkegaardille tarina on esimerkki eettistä korkeammasta ja sitä tilapäisesti vastustavasta olemisen tavasta. Kolmannessa luvussa käsittelen Dietrich Bonhoefferin teologiaa. Bonhoefferin mukaan Jeesus kutsuu ihmisiä seuraamaan häntä. Tämä on kutsu hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen paratiisin viattomuuteen, joka rikkoo eettisyyden ihmisen ja Jeesuksen välillä. Neljännessä luvussa tarkastelen Friedrich Nietzschen filosofiaa ja pyrin ymmärtämään mitä hänen ohjelmansa hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen tarkoittaa. Nietzschen vallantahdon filosofiassa moraali on heikkojen keino alistaa vahvat. Tarkastelen Nietzschen käsitystä moraalin synnystä ja sen haitallisuudesta ja pyrin selvittämään kuinka herrat elävät hyvän ja pahan tuolla puolen. Viidennessä luvussa tutkin Jaques Derridan grammatologiaa. Derridan mukaan teksti on suljettu tila, jonka ulkopuolelle on mahdoton päästä. Derrida sanoittaa kuitenkin sanoittamatonta tilattomuutta tekstin tuolla puolen. Tästä ei-paikasta käsin hypereettinen dekonstruktio purkaa perinteistä etiikkaa. Kuudennessa luvussa tarkastelen Mark C. Taylorin epä/teologiaa. Taylorille olotilan muutosta kuvaa termi harhautuminen , joka vie ihmisen lainsuojattomuuteen hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen. Selvitän mitä harhautuminen tarkoittaa ja miten se liittyy Taylorin Jumalan kuoleman epä/teologiaan. Johtopäätösluvussa tuon esiin tutkimustuloksia, nostan esille joitain pääluvuissa esiintyviä teemoja ja vertaan tutkimuskohteitteni näkemyksiä toisiinsa. Lutherin ja Nietzschen perinteissä on paljon yhteistä, mutta pohjimmiltaan ne sotivat toisiaan vastaan. Hyvän ja pahan tuolle puolen johtaa kaksi polkua. Toinen niistä vie paratiisiin, toinen tuhoon.

Despairing Justice and the Ethics of Legal Interpretation

This study discusses legal interpretation. The question is how legal texts, for instance laws, statutes and regulations, can and do have meaning. Language makes interpretation difficult as it holds no definite meanings. When the theoretical connection between semantics and legal meaning is loosened and we realise that language cannot be a means of justifying legal decisions, the responsibility inherent in legal interpretation can be seen in full. We are thus compelled to search for ways to analyse this responsibility. The main argument of the book is that the responsibility of legal interpretation contains a responsibility towards the text that is interpreted (and through the mediation of the text also towards the legal system), but not only this. It is not simply a responsibility to read and read well, but it transcends on a broader scale. It includes responsibility for the effects of the interpretation in a particular situation and with regard to the people whose case is decided. Ultimately, it is a responsibility to do justice. These two aspects of responsibility are conceptualised here as the two dimensions of the ethics of legal interpretation: the textual and the situational. The basic conception of language presented here is provided by Ludwig Wittgenstein s later philosophy, but the argument is not committed to only one philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein can be counterpointed in interesting ways by Jacques Derrida s ideas on language and meaning. Derrida s work also functions as a contrast to hermeneutic theories. It is argued that the seed to an answer to the question of meaning lies in the inter-personal and situated activity of interpretation and communication, an idea that can be discerned in different ways in the works of Wittgenstein, Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This way the question of meaning naturally leads us to think about ethics, which is approached here through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. His thinking, focusing on topics such as otherness, friendship and hospitality, provides possibilities for answering some of the questions posed in this book. However, at the same time we move inside a normativity where ethics and politics come together in many ways. The responsibility of legal interpretation is connected to the political and this has to be acknowledged lest we forget that law always implies force. But it is argued here that the political can be explored in positive terms as it does not have to mean only power or violence.