Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

Rwanda Crisis and Genocide in Case Law of Rwanda Tribunal

After the Second World War the public was shocked to learn about the horrors perpetrated. As a response to the Holocaust, the newly established United Nations adopted the Genocide Convention of 1948 to prevent future genocides and to punish the perpetrators. The Convention remained, however, almost dead letter until the present day. In 1994, the long-lasted tension between the major groups of Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda erupted in mass scale violence towards the Tutsi ethnic group. The purpose was to eradicate the Tutsi population of Rwanda. The international community did not halt the genocide. It stood by idle, failing to follow the swearing-in of the past. The United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the ICTR) to bring to justice persons responsible for the genocide. Ever since its creation the ICTR has delivered a wealth of judgements elucidating the legal ingredients of the crime of genocide. The case law on determining the membership of national, ethnic, racial or religious groups has gradually shifted from the objective to subjective position. The membership of a group is seen as a subjective rather than objective concept. However, a totally subjective approach is not accepted. Therefore, it is necessary to determine some objective existence of a group. The provision on the underlying offences is not so difficult to interpret compared to the corresponding one on the protected groups and the mental element of genocide. The case law examined, e.g., whether there is any difference between the words killing and meurtre, the nature of mental harm caused by the perpetrator and sexual violence in the conflict. The mental element of genocide or dolus specialis of genocide is not thoroughly examined in the case law of the ICTR. In this regard, reference in made, in addition, to the case law of the other ad hoc Tribunal. The ICTR has made a significant contribution to the law of genocide and international criminal justice in general. The corpus of procedural and substantive law constitutes a basis for subsequent trials in international and hybrid tribunals. For national jurisdictions the jurisprudence on substantive law is useful while prosecuting international crimes.

Essays on Banking Crises

This thesis aims at finding the role of deposit insurance scheme and central bank (CB) in keeping the banking system safe. The thesis also studies the factors associated with long-lasting banking crises. The first essay analyzes the effect of using explicit deposit insurance scheme (EDIS), instead of using implicit deposit insurance scheme (IDIS), on banking crises. The panel data for the period of 1980-2003 includes all countries for which the data on EDIS or IDIS exist. 70% of the countries in the sample are less developed countries (LDCs). About 55% of the countries adopting EDIS also come from LDCs. The major finding is that the using of EDIS increases the crisis probability at a strong significance level. This probability is greater if the EDIS is inefficiently designed allowing higher scope of moral hazard problem. Specifically, the probability is greater if the EDIS provides higher coverage to deposits and if it is less powerful from the legal point of view. This study also finds that the less developed a country is to handle EDIS, the higher the chance of banking crisis. Once the underdevelopment of an economy handling the EDIS is controlled, the EDIS separately is no longer a significant factor of banking crises. The second essay aims at determining whether a country s powerful CB can lessen the instability of the banking sector by minimizing the likelihood of a banking crisis. The data used include indicators of the CB s autonomy for a set of countries over the period of 1980-89. The study finds that in aggregate a more powerful CB lessens the probability of banking crisis. When the CB s authority is disentangled with respect to its responsibilities, the study finds that the longer tenure of CB s chief executive officer and the greater power of CB in assigning interest rate on government loans are necessary for reducing the probability of banking crisis. The study also finds that the probability of crisis reduces more if an autonomous CB can perform its duties in a country with stronger law and order tradition. The costs of long-lasting banking crises are high because both the depositors and the investors lose confidence in the banking system. For a rapid recovery of a crisis, the government very often undertakes one or more crisis resolution policy (CRP) measures. The third essay examines the CRP and other explanatory variables correlated with the durations of banking crises. The major finding is that the CRP measure allowing the regulation forbearance to keep the insolvent banks operative and the public debt relief program are respectively strongly and weakly significant to increase the durations of crises. Some other explanatory variables, which were found by previous studies to be related with the probability of crises to occur, are also correlated with the durations of crises.

European Union and the developing nations' external debt : EU-15's debt policy, 1960–2008

This Master's Thesis defines the debt policy of the current European Union Member States towards the developing nations. Since no official policy for debt exists in the EU, it is defined to include debt practices (loans and debt relief in development cooperation) and debt within the EU development policy framework. This study (1) describes how the issue of external debt appears in the development policy framework, (2) compares EU Member States' given loans and debt relief to grants for the developing nations (1960s to the 2000s), and (3) measures the current orientation in ODA of each EU Member State between grant aid and loan aid using the Grant-Loan Index (GLI). Theoretical aspects include reasons for selecting between loans (Bouchet 1987) and grants (Odedokun 2004, O'Brien and Williams 2007), policy context of the EU (Van Reisen 2007) and the meaning of external debt in the set-up between the North and the South. In terms of history, the events and impact of the colonial period (where loans have originated) are overviewed and compared in light of today's policies. Development assistance statistics are derived from the OECD DAC statistics portal and EU development policy framework documents from the EU portal. Methodologically, the structure of this study is from policy analysis (Barrien 1999, Hill 2008, Berndtson 2008), but it has been modified to fit the needs of studying a non-official policy. EU Member States are divided into three groups by Carbone (2007a), the Big-3, Northern and Southern donors, based on common development assistance characteristics. The Grant-Loan Index is used to compare Carbone's model, which measures quality of aid, to the GLI measuring the structure of aid. Results indicate that EU- 15 countries (active in debt practices) differ in terms of timing, stability and equality of debt practices in the long-term (1960s to the 2000s). In terms of current practices, (2000-2008), it is noted that there lies a disparity between the actual practices and the way in which external debt is represented in the development policy framework, although debt practices form a relevant portion of total ODA practices for many EU-15 Member States, the issue itself plays a minor role in development policy documents. Carbone’s group division applies well to the Grant – Loan Index’s results, indicating that countries with similar development policy behaviour have similarities in debt policy behaviour, with one exception: Greece. On the basis of this study, it is concluded that EU development policy framework content in terms of external debt and debt practices are not congruent. The understanding of this disparity between the policy outline and differences in long-term practices is relevant in both, reaching the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, and in the actual process of developing development aid.

Corporate Funding on the European Debt Capital Market

The integrated European debt capital market has undoubtedly broadened the possibilities for companies to access funding from the public and challenged investors to cope with an ever increasing complexity of its market participants. Well into the Euro-era, it is clear that the unified market has created potential for all involved parties, where investment opportunities are able to meet a supply of funds from a broad geographical area now summoned under a single currency. Europe’s traditionally heavy dependency on bank lending as a source of debt capital has thus been easing as corporate residents are able to tap into a deep and liquid capital market to satisfy their funding needs. As national barriers eroded with the inauguration of the Euro and interest rates for the EMU-members converged towards over-all lower yields, a new source of debt capital emerged to the vast majority of corporate residents under the new currency and gave an alternative to the traditionally more maturity-restricted bank debt. With increased sophistication came also an improved knowledge and understanding of the market and its participants. Further, investors became more willing to bear credit risk, which opened the market for firms of ever lower creditworthiness. In the process, the market as a whole saw a change in the profile of issuers, as non-financial firms increasingly sought their funding directly from the bond market. This thesis consists of three separate empirical studies on how corporates fund themselves on the European debt capital markets. The analysis focuses on a firm’s access to and behaviour on the capital market, subsequent the decision to raise capital through the issuance of arm’s length debt on the bond market. The specific areas considered are contributing to our knowledge in the fields of corporate finance and financial markets by considering explicitly firms’ primary market activities within the new market area. The first essay explores how reputation of an issuer affects its debt issuance. Essay two examines the choice of interest rate exposure on newly issued debt and the third and final essay explores pricing anomalies on corporate debt issues.

Personnel Managers and Crisis Situations. Emotion-handling Strategies

This study focuses on personnel managers in crisis situations. The interviewed personnel managers referred to emotions as a central element to be dealt with in a crisis. However, until recently, the exploration of emotions in organisational life has been de-emphasised or ignored. This study aims to bring to the surface aspects of personnel work that have so far been neglected or remained invisible. It specifically examines how personnel managers handle employees’ and their own emotions in a crisis. Based on the interviews, a number of emotional episodes were constructed. They describe the type and context of the crisis and the person(s) whose emotions are handled. The main findings of the study are the five emotion-handling strategies that could be constructed from the data. The negotiation-like manner in which personnel managers handled emotions in crisis situations proved especially interesting. They were actually negotiating emotional value for their organisations. Further, they handled their own emotions within the frame of two logics of appropriateness labelled mothering and guide-following. The episodes described also enabled identification of the values enacted by the personnel managers in handling emotions. The study provides descriptive information on emotion handling, a current and relevant feature in the practice of personnel management. It seeks to offer a frame for developing practical principles that can be helpful in a crisis. It also offers the opportunity to consider a variety of difficult situations that personnel managers may confront in their work.

With Good Reputation Size Does not Matter: Issue Frequency and the Determinants of Debt Maturity

This paper examines empirically the effect firm reputation has on the determinants of debt maturity. Utilising data from European primary bond market between 1999 and 2005, I find that the maturity choice of issuers with a higher reputation is less sensitive to macroeconomic conditions, market credit risk-premiums, prevailing firm credit quality and size of the debt issue. The annualised coupon payments are shown to be a significant factor in determining the debt maturity and reveal a monotonously increasing relationship between credit quality and debt maturity once controlled for. Finally, I show that issuers lacking a credit rating have an implied credit quality positioned between investment-grade and speculative-grade debt.

Narrative, Memory and the Crisis of Mimesis: the Case of Adam Elsheimer and Giordano Bruno

The triangular space between memory, narrative and pictorial representation is the terrain on which this article is developed. Taking the art of memory developed by Giordano Bruno (1548 – 1600) and the art of painting subtly revolutionised by Adam Elsheimer (1578 – 1610) as test-cases, it is shown how both subvert the norms of mimesis and narration prevalent throughout the Renaissance, how disrupted memory creates “incoherent” narratives, and how perspective and the notion of “place” are questioned in a corollary way. Two paintings by Elsheimer are analysed and shown to include, in spite of their supposed “realism”, numerous incoherencies, aporias and strange elements – often overlooked. Thus, they do not conform to two of the basic rules governing both the classical art of memory and the humanist art of painting: well-defined places and the exhaustive translatability of words into images (and vice-versa). In the work of Bruno, both his philosophical claims and the literary devices he uses are analysed as hints for a similar (and contemporaneous) undermining of conventions about the transparency and immediacy of representation.