The Impact of Emissions Trading on the Price of Electricity in Nord Pool : Market Power and Price Determination in the Nordic Electricity Market

The objective of this thesis is to find out how dominant firms in a liberalised electricity market will react when they face an increase in the level of costs due to emissions trading, and how this will effect the price of electricity. The Nordic electricity market is chosen as the setting in which to examine the question, since recent studies on the subject suggest that interaction between electricity markets and emissions trading is very much dependent on conditions specific to each market area. There is reason to believe that imperfect competition prevails in the Nordic market, thus the issue is approached through the theory of oligopolistic competition. The generation capacity available at the market, marginal cost of electricity production and seasonal levels of demand form the data based on which the dominant firms are modelled using the Cournot model of competition. The calculations are made for two levels of demand, high and low, and with several values of demand elasticity. The producers are first modelled under no carbon costs and then by adding the cost of carbon dioxide at 20€/t to those technologies subject to carbon regulation. In all cases the situation under perfect competition is determined as a comparison point for the results of the Cournot game. The results imply that the potential for market power does exist on the Nordic market, but the possibility for exercising market power depends on the demand level. In season of high demand the dominant firms may raise the price significantly above competitive levels, and the situation is aggravated when the cost of carbon dioixide is accounted for. Under low demand leves there is no difference between perfect and imperfect competition. The results are highly dependent on the price elasticity of demand.