Strategies as Discursive Constructions: The Case of Airline Alliances

In this paper, we argue that by examining the discursive elements in strategy talk we can contribute to our understanding of the myriad of microprocesses and practices that make up strategies. We focus on airline alliances as a particularly illustrative case. Based on a critical discourse analysis of an extensive material of strategy talk on airline alliances, we point to five types of discursive practices that characterize strategizing in this context in 1995–2000: (1) problematization of traditional strategies; (2) rationalization, objectification and factualization of alliance benefits; (3) fixation of ambiguous independence concerns; (4) reframing of cooperation problems as ‘implementation’ issues; and (5) naturalization of alliance strategies. While we want to emphasize the context-specificity of these practices, we claim that similar types of discursive practices are also likely to be an inherent part of strategizing in other settings.

Representing the epistemic nature of teachers’ practical knowledge : The case of class teachers’ general pedagogy

The present study addressed the epistemology of teachers’ practical knowledge. Drawing from the literature, teachers’ practical knowledge is defined as all teachers’ cognitions (e.g., beliefs, values, motives, procedural knowing, and declarative knowledge) that guide their practice of teaching. The teachers’ reasoning that lies behind their practical knowledge is addressed to gain insight into its epistemic nature. I studied six class teachers’ practical knowledge; they teach in the metropolitan region of Helsinki. Relying on the assumptions of the phenomenographic inquiry, I collected and analyzed the data. I analyzed the data in two stages where the first stage involved an abductive procedure, and the second stage an inductive procedure for interpretation, and thus developed the system of categories. In the end, a quantitative analysis nested into the qualitative findings to study the patterns of the teachers’’ reasoning. The results indicated that teachers justified their practical knowledge based on morality and efficiency of action; efficiency of action was found to be presented in two different ways: authentic efficiency and naïve efficiency. The epistemic weight of morality was embedded in what I call “moral care”. The core intention of teachers in the moral care was the commitment that they felt about the “whole character” of students. From this perspective the “dignity” and the moral character of the students should not replaced for any other “instrumental price”. “Caring pedagogy” was the epistemic value of teachers’ reasoning in the authentic efficiency. The central idea in the caring pedagogy was teachers’ intentions to improve the “intellectual properties” of “all or most” of the students using “flexible” and “diverse” pedagogies. However, “regulating pedagogy” was the epistemic condition of practice in the cases corresponding to naïve efficiency. Teachers argued that an effective practical knowledge should regulate and manage the classroom activities, but the targets of the practical knowledge were mainly other “issues “or a certain percentage of the students. In these cases, the teachers’ arguments were mainly based on the notion of “what worked” regardless of reflecting on “what did not work”. Drawing from the theoretical background and the data, teachers’ practical knowledge calls for “praxial knowledge” when they used the epistemic conditions of “caring pedagogy” and “moral care”. It however calls for “practicable” epistemic status when teachers use the epistemic condition of regulating pedagogy. As such, praxial knowledge with the dimensions of caring pedagogy and moral care represents the “normative” perspective on teachers’ practical knowledge, and thus reflects a higher epistemic status in comparison to “practicable” knowledge, which represents a “descriptive” perception toward teachers’ practical knowledge and teaching.

On probability-based inference under data missing by design

Whether a statistician wants to complement a probability model for observed data with a prior distribution and carry out fully probabilistic inference, or base the inference only on the likelihood function, may be a fundamental question in theory, but in practice it may well be of less importance if the likelihood contains much more information than the prior. Maximum likelihood inference can be justified as a Gaussian approximation at the posterior mode, using flat priors. However, in situations where parametric assumptions in standard statistical models would be too rigid, more flexible model formulation, combined with fully probabilistic inference, can be achieved using hierarchical Bayesian parametrization. This work includes five articles, all of which apply probability modeling under various problems involving incomplete observation. Three of the papers apply maximum likelihood estimation and two of them hierarchical Bayesian modeling. Because maximum likelihood may be presented as a special case of Bayesian inference, but not the other way round, in the introductory part of this work we present a framework for probability-based inference using only Bayesian concepts. We also re-derive some results presented in the original articles using the toolbox equipped herein, to show that they are also justifiable under this more general framework. Here the assumption of exchangeability and de Finetti's representation theorem are applied repeatedly for justifying the use of standard parametric probability models with conditionally independent likelihood contributions. It is argued that this same reasoning can be applied also under sampling from a finite population. The main emphasis here is in probability-based inference under incomplete observation due to study design. This is illustrated using a generic two-phase cohort sampling design as an example. The alternative approaches presented for analysis of such a design are full likelihood, which utilizes all observed information, and conditional likelihood, which is restricted to a completely observed set, conditioning on the rule that generated that set. Conditional likelihood inference is also applied for a joint analysis of prevalence and incidence data, a situation subject to both left censoring and left truncation. Other topics covered are model uncertainty and causal inference using posterior predictive distributions. We formulate a non-parametric monotonic regression model for one or more covariates and a Bayesian estimation procedure, and apply the model in the context of optimal sequential treatment regimes, demonstrating that inference based on posterior predictive distributions is feasible also in this case.

Legal Reasoning in Context

This study in EU law analyses the reasoning of the Court of Justice (the Court of Justice of the European Union) in a set of its preliminary rulings. Preliminary rulings are answers to national courts questions on the interpretation (and validity) of EU law called preliminary references. These questions concern specific legal issues that have arisen in legal disputes before the national courts. The Court of Justice alone has the ultimate authority to interpret EU law. The preliminary rulings bind the national courts in the cases giving rise to the preliminary reference, and the interpretations of EU law offered in the preliminary rulings are considered generally binding on all instances applying EU law. EU law is often described as a dynamic legal order and the Court of Justice as at the vanguard of developing it. It is generally assumed that the Court of Justice is striving to realise the EU s meta-level purpose (telos): integration. Against this backdrop one can understand the criticism the Court of Justice is often faced with in certain fields of EU law that can be described as developing. This criticism concerns the Court s (negatively) activist way of not just stating the law but developing or even making law. It is difficult to analyse or prove wrong this accusation as it is not in methodological terms clearly established what constitutes judicial activism, or more exactly where the threshold of negative activism lies. Moreover, one popular approach to assessing the role of the Court of Justice described as integration through law has become fairly political, neglecting to take into consideration the special nature of law as both facilitating and constraining action, not merely a medium for furthering integration. This study offers a legal reasoning approach of a more legalist nature, in order to balance the existing mix of approaches to explaining what the Court of Justice does and how. Reliance on legal reasoning is found to offer a working framework for analysis, whereas the tools for an analysis based on activism are found lacking. The legal reasoning approach enables one to assess whether or not the Court of Justice is pertaining to its own established criteria of interpretation of EU law, and if it is not, one should look more in detail at how the interpretation fits with earlier case-law and doctrines of EU law. This study examines the reasoning of the Court of Justice in a set of objectively chosen cases. The emphasis of the study is on analysing how the Court of Justice applies the established criteria of interpretation it has assumed for itself. Moreover, the judgments are assessed not only in terms of reasoning but also for meaningful silences they contain. The analysis is furthermore contextualised by taking into consideration how the cases were commented by legal scholars, their substantive EU law context, and also their larger politico-historical context. In this study, the analysis largely shows that the Court of Justice is interpreting EU law in accordance with its previous practice. Its reasoning retains connection with the linguistic or semiotic criteria of interpretation, while emphasis lies on systemic reasoning. Moreover, although there are a few judgments where the Court of Justice offers clearly dynamic reasoning or what can be considered as substantive reasoning stemming from, for example, common sense or reasonableness, such reasons are most often given in addition to systemic ones. In this sense and even when considered in its broader context, the case-law analysed in this study does not portray a specifically activist image of the Court of Justice. The legal reasoning approach is a valid alternative for explaining how and why the Court of Justice interprets EU law as it does.