Community, Power, and Colonialism: The U.S. Army in Southern Arizona and New Mexico, 1866-1886

Empire is central to U.S. history. When we see the U.S. projecting its influence on a global scale in today s world it is important to understand that U.S. empire has a long history. This dissertation offers a case study of colonialism and U.S. empire by discussing the social worlds, labor regimes, and culture of the U.S. Army during the conquest of southern Arizona and New Mexico (1866-1886). It highlights some of the defining principles, mentalities, and characteristics of U.S. imperialism and shows how U.S. forces have in years past constructed their power and represented themselves, their missions, and the places and peoples that faced U.S. imperialism/colonialism. Using insights from postcolonial studies and whiteness studies, this work balances its attention between discursive representations (army stories) and social experience (army actions), pays attention to silences in the process of historical production, and focuses on collective group mentalities and identities. In the end the army experience reveals an empire in denial constructed on the rule of difference and marked by frustration. White officers, their wives, and the white enlisted men not only wanted the monopoly of violence for the U.S. regime but also colonial (mental/cultural) authority and power, and constructed their identity, authority, and power in discourse and in the social contexts of the everyday through difference. Engaged in warfare against the Apaches, they did not recognize their actions as harmful or acknowledge the U.S. invasion as the bloody colonial conquest it was. White army personnel painted themselves and the army as liberators, represented colonial peoples as racial inferiors, approached colonial terrain in terms of struggle, and claimed that the region was a terrible periphery with little value before the arrival of white civilization. Officers and wives also wanted to place themselves at the top of colonial hierarchies as the refined and respectable class who led the regeneration of the colony by example: they tried to turn army villages into islands of civilization and made journeys, leisure, and domestic life to showcase their class sensibilities and level of sophistication. Often, however, their efforts failed, resulting in frustration and bitterness. Many blamed the colony and its peoples for their failures. The army itself was divided by race and class. All soldiers were treated as laborers unfit for self-government. White enlisted men, frustrated by their failures in colonial warfare and by constant manual labor, constructed worlds of resistance, whereas indigenous soldiers sought to negotiate the effects of colonialism by working in the army. As colonized labor their position was defined by tension between integration and exclusion and between freedom and colonial control.

How terrorist campaigns end : The Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States

This study explores the decline of terrorism by conducting source-based case studies on two left-wing terrorist campaigns in the 1970s, those of the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States. The purpose of the case studies is to bring more light into the interplay of different external and internal factors in the development of terrorist campaigns. This is done by presenting the history of the two chosen campaigns as narratives from the participants’ points of view, based on interviews with participants and extensive archival material. Organizational resources and dynamics clearly influenced the course of the two campaigns, but in different ways. This divergence derives at least partly from dissimilarities in organizational design and the incentive structure. Comparison of even these two cases shows that organizations using terrorism as a strategy can differ significantly, even when they share ideological orientation, are of the same size and operate in the same time period. Theories on the dynamics of terrorist campaigns would benefit from being more sensitive to this. The study also highlights that the demise of a terrorist organization does not necessarily lead to the decline of the terrorist campaign. Therefore, research should look at the development of terrorist activity beyond the lifespan of a single organization. The collective ideological beliefs and goals functioned primarily as a sustaining force, a lens through which the participants interpreted all developments. On the other hand, it appears that the role of ideology should not be overstated. Namely, not all participants in the campaigns under study fully internalized the radical ideology. Rather, their participation was mainly based on their friendship with other participants. Instead of ideology per se, it is more instructive to look at how those involved described their organization, themselves and their role in the revolutionary struggle. In both cases under study, the choice of the terrorist strategy was not merely a result of a cost-benefit calculation, but an important part of the participants’ self-image. Indeed, the way the groups portrayed themselves corresponded closely with the forms of action that they got involved in. Countermeasures and the lack of support were major reasons for the decline of the campaigns. However, what is noteworthy is that the countermeasures would not have had the same kind of impact had it not been for certain weaknesses of the groups themselves. Moreover, besides the direct impact the countermeasures had on the campaign, equally important was how they affected the attitudes of the larger left-wing community and the public in general. In this context, both the attitudes towards the terrorist campaign and the authorities were relevant to the outcome of the campaigns.