An Empirical Investigation of Value-at-Risk in Long and Short Trading Positions

This paper uses the Value-at-Risk approach to define the risk in both long and short trading positions. The investigation is done on some major market indices(Japanese, UK, German and US). The performance of models that takes into account skewness and fat-tails are compared to symmetric models in relation to both the specific model for estimating the variance, and the distribution of the variance estimate used as input in the VaR estimation. The results indicate that more flexible models not necessarily perform better in predicting the VaR forecast; the reason for this is most probably the complexity of these models. A general result is that different methods for estimating the variance are needed for different confidence levels of the VaR, and for the different indices. Also, different models are to be used for the left respectively the right tail of the distribution.

Short-Horizon Asymmetric Mean-Reversion and Overreactions: Evidence from the Nordic Stock Markets

This paper examines the asymmetric behavior of conditional mean and variance. Short-horizon mean-reversion behavior in mean is modeled with an asymmetric nonlinear autoregressive model, and the variance is modeled with an Exponential GARCH in Mean model. The results of the empirical investigation of the Nordic stock markets indicates that negative returns revert faster to positive returns when positive returns generally persist longer. Asymmetry in both mean and variance can be seen on all included markets and are fairly similar. Volatility rises following negative returns more than following positive returns which is an indication of overreactions. Negative returns lead to increased variance and positive returns leads even to decreased variance.

Monetary Policy, Stock Price Misalignments and Macroeconomic Instability

Perhaps the most fundamental prediction of financial theory is that the expected returns on financial assets are determined by the amount of risk contained in their payoffs. Assets with a riskier payoff pattern should provide higher expected returns than assets that are otherwise similar but provide payoffs that contain less risk. Financial theory also predicts that not all types of risks should be compensated with higher expected returns. It is well-known that the asset-specific risk can be diversified away, whereas the systematic component of risk that affects all assets remains even in large portfolios. Thus, the asset-specific risk that the investor can easily get rid of by diversification should not lead to higher expected returns, and only the shared movement of individual asset returns – the sensitivity of these assets to a set of systematic risk factors – should matter for asset pricing. It is within this framework that this thesis is situated. The first essay proposes a new systematic risk factor, hypothesized to be correlated with changes in investor risk aversion, which manages to explain a large fraction of the return variation in the cross-section of stock returns. The second and third essays investigate the pricing of asset-specific risk, uncorrelated with commonly used risk factors, in the cross-section of stock returns. The three essays mentioned above use stock market data from the U.S. The fourth essay presents a new total return stock market index for the Finnish stock market beginning from the opening of the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1912 and ending in 1969 when other total return indices become available. Because a total return stock market index for the period prior to 1970 has not been available before, academics and stock market participants have not known the historical return that stock market investors in Finland could have achieved on their investments. The new stock market index presented in essay 4 makes it possible, for the first time, to calculate the historical average return on the Finnish stock market and to conduct further studies that require long time-series of data.

Do Analysts Leak Information to Preferred Customers?

Inspired by the recent debate in the financial press, we set out to investigate if financial analysts warn their preferred customers of possible earnings forecast revisions. The issue is explored by monitoring investors’ trading behavior during the weeks prior to analyst earnings forecast revisions, using the unique official stock transactions data set from Finland. In summary, we do not find evidence of large investors systematically being warned of earnings forecast revisions. However, the results indicate that the very largest investors show trading behavior partly consistent with being informed of future earnings forecast revisions.

Cobreaking of Stock Prices and Contagion

Financial crises have shown that dramatic movements in one financial market can have a powerful impact on other markets. The paper proposes to use cobreaking to model comovements between financial markets during crises and to test for conta-gion. It finds evidence of cobreaking between stock returns in developed markets. Finding cobreaking has implications for the diversification of international investments. For emerging mar-ket stock returns the evidence of cobreaking is mainly due to the non-financial event of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. Fi-nancial crises originating in one emerging market do not spread to other markets, i.e., no contagion.

The impact of stock option incentives on investment and firm value

This paper analyzes the relations among firm-level stock option portfolio incentives, investment, and firm value based on a sample of Finnish firms during the time period 1987 – 2000. Utilizing exact and complete information regarding stock option portfolio characteristics, we find some evidence that firm investment is increasing in the incentives to increase stock price (delta) and risk (vega). Furthermore, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between both incentive effects and firm value (Tobin’s Q). In contrast, when we allow for stock option incentives, investment, and firm value to be simultaneously determined, we find no evidence that investment is increasing in incentives. However, even after controlling for endogeneity, we find that both incentive effects arising from stock option compensation display a positive and significant effect on firm value. Finally, in contradiction to earlier findings, we observe that neither Tobin’s Q nor investment drives incentives.