A Historical Approach to Children s Physics Education : Modelling of DC-circuit Phenomena in a Small Group

This three-phase design research describes the modelling processes for DC-circuit phenomena. The first phase presents an analysis of the development of the DC-circuit historical models in the context of constructing Volta s pile at the turn of the 18th century. The second phase involves the designing of a teaching experiment for comprehensive school third graders. Among other considerations, the design work utilises the results of the first phase and research literature of pupils mental models for DC-circuit phenomena. The third phase of the research was concerned with the realisation of the planned teaching experiment. The aim of this phase was to study the development of the external representations of DC-circuit phenomena in a small group of third graders. The aim of the study has been to search for new ways to guide pupils to learn DC-circuit phenomena while emphasing understanding at the qualitative level. Thus, electricity, which has been perceived as a difficult and abstract subject, could be learnt more comprehensively. Especially, the research of younger pupils learning of electricity concepts has not been of great interest at the international level, although DC-circuit phenomena are also taught in the lower classes of comprehensive schools. The results of this study are important, because there has tended to be more teaching of natural sciences in the lower classes of comprehensive schools, and attempts are being made to develop this trend in Finland. In the theoretical part of the research an Experimental-centred representation approach, which emphasises the role of experimentalism in the development of pupil s representations, is created. According to this approach learning at the qualitative level consists of empirical operations like experimenting, observations, perception, and prequantification of nature phenomena, and modelling operations like explaining and reasoning. Besides planning teaching, the new approach can be used as an analysis tool in describing both historical modelling and the development of pupils representations. In the first phase of the study, the research question was: How did the historical models of DC-circuit phenomena develop in Volta s time? The analysis uncovered three qualitative historical models associated with the historical concept formation process. The models include conceptions of the electric circuit as a scene in the DC-circuit phenomena, the comparative electric-current phenomenon as a cause of different observable effect phenomena, and the strength of the battery as a cause of the electric-current phenomenon. These models describe the concept formation process and its phases in Volta s time. The models are portrayed in the analysis using fragments of the models, where observation-based fragments and theoretical fragements are distinguished from each other. The results emphasise the significance of the qualitative concept formation and the meaning of language in the historical modelling of DC-circuit phenomena. For this reason these viewpoints are stressed in planning the teaching experiment in the second phase of the research. In addition, the design process utilised the experimentation behind the historical models of DC-circuit phenomena In the third phase of the study the research question is as follows: How will the small group s external representations of DC-circuit phenomena develop during the teaching experiment? The main question is divided into the following two sub questions: What kind of talk exists in the small group s learning? What kinds of external representations for DC-circuit phenomena exist in the small group discourse during the teaching experiment? The analysis revealed that the teaching experiment of the small group succeeded in its aim to activate talk in the small group. The designed connection cards proved especially successful in activating talk. The connection cards are cards that represent the components of the electric circuit. In the teaching experiment the pupils constructed different connections with the connection cards and discussed, what kinds of DC-circuit phenomena would take place in the corresponding real connections. The talk of the small group was analysed by comparing two situations, firstly, when the small group discussed using connections made with the connection cards and secondly with the same connections using real components. According to the results the talk of the small group included more higher-order thinking when using the connection cards than with similar real components. In order to answer the second sub question concerning the small group s external representations that appeared in the talk during the teaching experiment; student talk was visualised by the fragment maps which incorporate the electric circuit, the electric current and the source voltage. The fragment maps represent the gradual development of the external representations of DC-circuit phenomena in the small group during the teaching experiment. The results of the study challenge the results of previous research into the abstractness and difficulty of electricity concepts. According to this research, the external representations of DC-circuit phenomena clearly developed in the small group of third graders. Furthermore, the fragment maps uncover that although the theoretical explanations of DC-circuit phenomena, which have been obtained as results of typical mental model studies, remain undeveloped, learning at the qualitative level of understanding does take place.

Itämafia : Uhkakuvapolitiikka, rikosilmiöt ja kulttuuriset merkitykset

The Eastern Mafia Threat policy, crime phenomena, and cultural meanings An interdisciplinary research on the crime phenomena and the threat policy relating to the organized crime and the mafia of Russia and Estonia is based on 151 expert interviews, statistics, documents, research literature, and press material. The main part of the material consists of interviews of the Finnish, Estonian and Russian police authorities specialized in the problem of organized crime, and the reports on the crime situation drawn up in the Finnish diplomatic representations in Tallinn and St Petersburg. The interviews have been gathered in the years 1996-2001. The main theoretical tools of the research are constructivist research on social problems, and political psychology. Definitional processes of social problems and cultural semantic structures behind them are identified in the analysis and connected to the analysis of the crime cases. Both in the Anglo-American and Russian cultural frames there appears an inflated and exaggerated talk, according to which the mafia rules everything in Russia and is spreading everywhere. There is the traditional anti-Semitic paranoia in the core of this cultural symbiosis produced by Russian legal nihilism, the theory of totalitarianism of Sovietology, and the inertia of Russian anti-capitalism. To equate the Sicilian Mafia with Russia is an anachronism, since no empirical proof of systematic uncontrolled violence or absolute power vacuum in Russia can be found. In the Anglo-American policy of threat images, "the Russian mafia" was seen as a commodified conspiracy theory, which the police, the media, and the research took advantage of, blurring the line between fact and fiction. In Finland, the evolution of the policy of threat images proceeded in three phases: Initially, extensive rolling of refugees and criminals from Russia to Finland was emphasized in the beginning of the 1990's. In the second phase, the eastern mafia was said to infiltrate all over Finnish society and administration. Finland was, however, found immune to this kind of spreading. In the third phase, in the 21st century, the organized crime of Finland was said to be lead from abroad. In Finland, the policy of threat images was especially canalised to moral panics connected to "eastern prostitution". In Estonia, the policy of threat images emphasized the crime organized by the Russian authorities and politicians in order to weaken Estonia. In Russia, the policy of threat images emphasized the total criminalizing of society caused by criminal capitalism. In every country, the policy of threat images was affected by a so-called large-group identity, a term by Vamik Volkan, in which a so-called chosen trauma caused a political paranoia of an outer and inner danger. In Finland, procuring, car theft, and narcotics crimes were at their widest arranged by the Finnish often with the help of the Estonians. The Russians had no influence in the most serious violent crimes in Finland, although the number of assassinations were at least 5, 000 in Russia in the 1990's. In Russia, the assassinations were on one hand connected to marital problems, on the other hand to the pursuit of public attention and a hoped-for effect by the aid of the murder of an influential person. In the white-collar crime phenomena between Finland and Russia, the Finnish state and Finnish corporations gained remarkable benefit of the frauds aimed at the states of the Soviet Union and Russia in 1980's-21st century. The situation of Estonia was very difficult compared to that of Russia in the 1990's, which was manifested in the stagnation of the Estonian police and judicial authorities, the crimes of the police and the voluntary paramilitary organization, bomb explosions, the rebellion called "the jaeger crisis" in the voluntary paramilitary organization, and the "blood autumn" of Eastern Virumaa, in other words terror. The situation of Estonia had a powerful effect on the crime situation of Finland and on the security of the Finnish diplomats. In the continuum of the Finnish policy of threat images, Russia and the Russians were, however, presented as a source of a marked danger.

The phenomenon of oligarchy in Russia and its impact on Russian transition

Nowadays any analysis of Russian economy is incomplete without taking into account the phenomenon of oligarchy. Russian oligarchs appeared after the fall of the Soviet Union and are represented by wealthy businessmen who control a huge part of natural resources enterprises and have a big political influence. Oligarchs’ shares in some natural resources industries reach even 70-80%. Their role in Russian economy is big without any doubts, however there has been very little economic analysis done. The aim of this work is to examine Russian oligarchy on micro and macro levels, its role in Russia’s transition and the possible positive and negative outcomes from this phenomenon. For this purpose the work presents two theoretical models. The first part of this thesis work examines the role of oligarchs on micro level, concentrating on the question whether the oligarchs can be more productive owners than other types of owners. To answer the question this part presents a model based on the article “Are oligarchs productive? Theory and evidence” by Y. Gorodnichenko and Y. Grygorenko. It is followed by empirical test based on the works of S. Guriev and A. Rachinsky. The model predicts oligarchs to invest more in the productivity of their enterprises and have higher returns on capital, therefore be more productive owners. According to the empirical test, oligarchs were found to outperform other types of owners, however it is not defined whether the productivity gains offset losses in tax revenue. The second part of the work concentrates on the role of oligarchy on macro level. More precisely, it examines the assumption that the depression after 1998 crises in Russia was caused by the oligarchs’ behavior. This part presents a theoretical model based on the article “A macroeconomic model of Russian transition: The role of oligarchic property rights” by S. Braguinsky and R. Myerson, where the special type of property rights is introduced. After the 1998 crises oligarchs started to invest all their resources abroad to protect themselves from political risks, which resulted in the long depression phase. The macroeconomic model shows, that better protection of property rights (smaller political risk) or/and higher outside investing could reduce the depression. Taking into account this result, the government policy can change the oligarchs’ behavior to be more beneficial for the Russian economy and make the transition faster.

Kuviteltu aatelismies : Aateluus viholliskuvana ja itseymmärryksenä 1800-luvun Suomessa

An imagined nobleman Nobility as an enemy image and in-group identity in nineteenth-century Finland The focal point of this study is the difficult relationship between two seemingly very different 19th-century elite groups, the upwardly mobile bourgeois intelligentsia and the slowly declining traditional nobility. In the thinking of the bourgeois contender the two emerged as exact opposites, styled as conflicting ideal types: an outdated, exclusive, degenerate hereditary aristocracy versus a dynamic and progressive new force in society, recruited solely on the basis of personal merit, originating from the common people and representing the nation. The appearance of an important 19th-century novelty, print publicity, coincided with the emergence of the bourgeois intelligentsia. The institutions of the developing publishing industry were manned by the aspiring new group. The strengthening flow of progressive, democratic, nationalist ideas distributed via the printing presses carried an undercurrent of self-promotion. It transmitted to the developing readership the self-image of the new cultural bourgeoisie as the defender and benevolent educator of the nation. Having won the contest over the media, the intelligentsia was free to present its predecessor and rival as an enemy of the people. In its politics the nobility emerged as an ideal scapegoat, represented as the source for existing social evils, all if which would promptly go away after its disappearance. It also served as a black backcloth, against which the democratic, national, progressive bourgeois intelligentsia would shine more brightly. In order to shed light on the 19th-century process of (re)modelling the image of nobility as a public enemy I have used four different types of source materials. These include three genres of print publicity, ranging from popular historical and contemporary fiction to nonfictional presentations of national history and the news and political commentaries of the daily papers, complemented by another, originally oral type of publicity, the discussion protocols of the Finnish four-estate parliament. To counterpoint these I also analysed the public self-image of the nobility, particularly vis-à-vis the nationalist and democratic ethos of the modernising politics.

Paimen vailla hiippakuntaa : Kenttäpiispan viran synty ja vaikutus sotilaspapiston asemaan Suomen puolustusvoimissa ja kirkossa vuosina 1939 - 1944

The main purpose of this research is to shed light on the factors that gave rise to the office of Field Bishop in the years 1939-1944. How did military bishophood affect the status of the head of military pastoral care and military clergy during these years? The main sources of my research are the collections in the Finnish National Archives, and I use a historical-qualitative method. The position of the military clergy was debated within both the Church and the Defence Forces before 1939. At that stage, Church law did not yet recognize the office of the leading military priest, the Field Dean. There had been a motion in 1932 to introduce the office of a military bishop, but the bishops' synod blocked it. The concept of Field Bishop appeared for the first time in 1927 in a Finnish military document, which dealt with pastoral care in the Polish military. The Field Dean in Finland had regularly proposed improvements to the salary of the military clergy before the Winter War. After the Winter War, arguments were made for strengthening the position of the military clergy: these arguments were based on the increased respect shown towards this clergy, especially due to their role in the care of the fallen, which had become their task during the war. Younger members of the military clergy in particular supported the demands to improve their position within the Church and the army. The creation of a Field Bishop was perceived as strengthening the whole military clergy, as the Field Bishop was envisioned as a bishop within the Church and a general within the Defence Forces. During that time the Field Dean was still without any military rank. The idea of a Field Bishop was recommended to Mannerheim in June 1940, after which the Defence Forces lent their support to the cause. The status of the military clergy, in Church law, made it to the agenda of the Church council in January 1941, thanks largely to the younger priests' group influence and Mannerheim's leverage. The bishops opposed the notion of a Field Bishop mostly on theological grounds but were ready to concede that the position the Field Dean in Church law required further defining. The creation of the office of Field Bishop was blocked in the Church law committee report issued close to the beginning of the Continuation War. The onset of that war, however, changed the course of events, as the President of the Republic appointed Field Dean Johannes Björklund as Field Bishop. Speculation has abounded about Mannerheim's role in the appointment, but the truth of the matter is not clear. The title of Field Bishop was used to put pressure on the Church, and, at the same time, Mannerheim could remain detached from the matter. Later, in September 1941, the Church council approved the use of the Field Bishop title to denote the head of military pastoral care in Church law, and Field Bishops were assigned some of the duties formerly pertaining to bishops. Despite all expectations and hopes, the new office of Field Bishop did not affect the status of the military clergy within the Defence Forces, as no ranks were established for them, and their salary did not improve. However the office of the Field Bishop within Army HQ was transformed from a bureau into a department in the summer of 1942. At the beginning of the Continuation War, the Field Bishop was criticized by certain military and Church clergy for favouring Russian Orthodox Christians in Eastern Karelia. Björklund agreed in principle with most of the Lutheran clergy on the necessity of Lutheranizing East Karelia but had to take into account the realities at Army HQ. As well, at the same time the majority of the younger clergy were serving in the army, and there was a lack of parish priests on the home front. Bishop Lehtonen had actually expressed the wish that more priests could have been released from the front to serve in local parishes. In his notes Lehtonen accused Björklund of trying to achieve the position of Field Bishop by all possible means. However, research has revealed a varied group of people behind the creation of the office of Field Bishop, including in particular younger clergy and the Defence Forces.

Pulp and Paper Fiction: On the Discursive Legitimation of Global Industrial Restructuring

Despite the central role of legitimacy in social and organizational life, we know little of the subtle meaning-making processes through which organizational phenomena, such as industrial restructuring, are legitimated in contemporary society. Therefore, this paper examines the discursive legitimation strategies used when making sense of global industrial restructuring in the media. Based on a critical discourse analysis of extensive media coverage of a revolutionary pulp and paper sector merger, we distinguish and analyze five legitimation strategies: (1) normalization, (2) authorization, (3) rationalization, (4) moralization, and (5) narrativization. We argue that while these specific legitimation strategies appear in individual texts, their recurring use in the intertextual totality of the public discussion establishes the core elements of the emerging legitimating discourse.

World parliament – fact or fiction? On the feasibility of world parliamentary models

Cosmopolitan ideals have been on the philosophical agenda for several millennia but the end of the Cold War started a new discussion on state sovereignty, global democracy, the role of international law and global institutions. The Westphalian state system in practice since the 17th century is transforming and the democracy deficit needs new solutions. An impetus has been the fact that in the present world, an international body representing global citizens does not exist. In this Master’s thesis, the possibility of establishing a world parliament is examined. In a case analysis, 17 models on world parliament from two journals, a volume of essays and two other publications are discussed. Based on general observations, the models are divided into four thematic groups. The models are analyzed with an emphasis on feasible and probable elements. Further, a new scenario with a time frame of thirty years is proposed based on the methodology of normative futures studies, taking special interest in causal relationships and actions leading to change. The scenario presents three gradual steps that each need to be realized before a sustainable world parliament is established. The theoretical framework is based on social constructivism, and changes in international and multi-level governance are examined with the concepts of globalization, democracy and sovereignty. A feasible, desirable and credible world parliament is constituted gradually by implying electoral, democratic and legal measures for members initially from exclusively democratic states, parliamentarians, non-governmental organizations and other groups. The parliament should be located outside the United Nations context, since a new body avoids the problem of inefficiency currently prevailing in the UN. The main objectives of the world parliament are to safeguard peace and international law and to offer legal advice in cases when international law has been violated. A feasible world parliament is advisory in the beginning but it is granted legislative powers in the future. The number of members in the world parliament could also be extended following the example of the EU enlargement process.

“Empire is a state of mind” – Imagining Eurasia in Russia –

Työssäni tarkastelen venäläistä neo-euraasianistista liikettä ja tapoja joilla liikkeen aktivistit rakentavat Euraasiasta yhtenäistä kokonaisuutta ja imperiumia. Keskeisiä tutkimuskysymyksiäni ovat: Mikä imperiumi on ja mitkä ovat sen keskeisiä motivaatioita ja teemoja? Kuinka imperiumin idea rakentuu tai käsitetään ja tämän voi tulkita? Minkälaisia seurauksia voi tulkita heidän tavallaan Euraasia nähdä olevan? Materiaalina käytän haastatteluja, jotka on kerätty Moskovassa keväällä 2008, ja liikkeen kirjallisia tuotoksia (lehdet ja Internet -sivut). Neo-euraasianistisella liikkeellä tarkoitan tässä työssä Kansainvälistä Euraasianistista liikettä (Meždunarodnoe Evrazijskoe Dviženie) ja sen alahaaraa Euraasianistista Nuorisoliittoa (Evrazijskij Sojuz Molodëži). Liike perustettiin virallisesti 2003, mutta rakentaa vahvasti historiallista yhteyttä 1930 -luvun klassiseen eurasianismiin. Tämän lisäksi sen diskurssissa on paljon neuvostoliittolaisia, fasistisia, uuskonservatiivisia ja nationalistisia piirteitä. Liikkeen johtohahmo on filosofi-geopoliitikko Alexandr Dugin. Työn tausta-ajatuksena minua kiinnostaa etenkin nk. älymystön tai intelligenttien vaikutus nationalismiin tai sosiaalisia ryhmiä määrittelevien diskurssien kehitykseen ja muutokseen.Tarkastelen materiaalia diskurssianalyyttisesta näkökulmasta. Näen diskurssianalyysin sen tutkimisena, miten sosiaalista todellisuutta tuotetaan erilaisissa sosiaalisissa käytännöissä. Samalla näiden diskurssien tutkiminen, foucautlaisen perinteen myötä, tarkastelee kriittisesti niiden tuottamia (aktualisoituneita sekä potentiaalisia) valtasuhteita. Käytän työssäni myös Benedict Andersonin kuvitellun yhteisön (imagined communities) käsitettä, joka auttaa hahmottamaan tapaa, jolla tutkimuskohteeni rakentavat imperiumia yhteisönä. Aktivistien puheessa imperiumi (imperiâ) tulee esiin pääasiallisesti positiivisesti ja ”heidän omanaan,” kun taas termi imperialismi (imperializm) pääosin negatiivisena, liittyen etenkin keskeisenä vihollisena pidettyihin Yhdysvaltoihin. Esiin nousee monta toisiinsa liittyvää teemaa, jotka jaottelen viideksi pääteemaksi. Näistä tarkastelen lähemmin imperiumia ”kaikkien kansojen hyväntekijänä (poliittinen puoli)”, ulkoisen voiman lähteenä (historiallis-geopoliittinen puoli) sekä kollektiivisen subjektin luojana (imperialistis-nationalistinen puoli). Pyrin kontekstualisoimaan diskurssin ja tarkastelemaan tapoja, joilla se ammentaa motiiveja myös historiallis-kulttuurisista tavoista hahmottaa aluetta ja sen asukkaita. Käsittelen myös kansan, kansakunnan, etnoksen ja nationalismin käsitteitä ja sitä, miten ne nousevat neo-eurasianistisessa diskursissa esiin. Imperiaalisen nationalismin (imperskij nacionalizm) käsite auttaa ymmärtämään niitä tapoja, jolla liike tekee sekä pesäeroa nationalismiin että samalla hyödyntää monia nationalistisen diskurssin perusteemoja. Eräs liikkeen diskurssin keskeisistä eroista niin sanottuun nationalismin valtavirtaan on ”kansakunnan (naciâ)” käsitteen vahva negatiivinen konnotaatio. Sen vastakohtana esiin nostetaan vahvasti kansan (narod) käsite. Samalla kuitenkin etnisen venäläisen (russkij) käsitettä käytetään tavallista laajemmin ja kattavammin kuin tavallisesti, ja ennen kaikkea Venäjä nousee imperiumin keskeisimmäksi tekijäksi. Euraasialaiseen imperiumiin liitetyistä positiivistista mielikuvista käsittelen tarkemmin monikansallisuuden ja kansojen kodin ideaa, joka nousee mielestäni huomattavaksi retoriseksi taustaksi kaikessa materiaalissa. Tähän liittyy vahvasti myös saman teeman sivujuonne, eli imperiumin ”vapauttava” rooli. Tulkitsen, että liikkeen imperiumi -diskurssilla on instrumentaalinen luonne: se legitimoi aktivistien vaatimuksia varsinkin entisen Neuvostoliiton alueen suhteen. ”Euraasialaisen kansan” ajatus toimii mahdollisena Euraasiaa yhteisenä tekijänä ”Neuvostokansan” tilalla. Sen taustalla materiaalistani päätellen siintävät kuitenkin enemmänkin Venäjä ja venäläis -spesifit vaateet kuin koko Euraasia. Pohdin myös kansakunnan (nation) hyljeksimisen syitä ja käsitteen sopivuutta Venäjälle, kuten myös venäläisyyden käsitteiden kerrostuneisuutta. Kokonaisuudessaan imperiumi tuli esiin abstraktina, utopistisena ja ”totaalisena” kokonaisuutena.

The British Intervention in South Russia 1918-1920

Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, a three-year civil war broke out in Russia. As in many other civil wars, foreign powers intervened in the conflict. Britain played a leading role in this intervention and had a significant effect on the course of the war. Without this intervention on the White side, the superiority of numbers in manpower and weaponry of the Bolsheviks would have quickly overwhelmed their opponents. The aim of this dissertation is to explain the nature and role of the British intervention on the southern, and most decisive, front of the Civil War. The political decision making in London is studied as a background, but the focus of the dissertation is on the actual implementation of the British policy in Russia. The British military mission arrived in South Russia in late 1918, and started to provide General Denikin s White army with ample supplies. General Denikin would have not been able to build his army of more than 200,000 men or to make his operation against Moscow without the British matériel. The British mission also organized the training and equipping of the Russian troops with British weapons. This made the material aid much more effective. Many of the British instructors took part in fighting the Bolsheviks despite the orders of their government. The study is based on primary sources produced by British departments of state and members of the British mission and military units in South Russia. Primary sources from the Whites, including the personal collections of several key figures of the White movement and official records of the Armed Forces of South Russia are also used to give a balanced picture of the course of events. It is possible to draw some general conclusions from the White movement and reasons for their defeat from the study of the British intervention. In purely material terms the British aid placed Denikin s army in a far more favourable position than the Bolsheviks in 1919, but other military defects in the White army were numerous. The White commanders were unimaginative, their military thinking was obsolete, and they were incapable of organizing the logistics of their army. There were also fundamental defects in the morale of the White troops. In addition to all political mistakes of Denikin s movement and a general inability to adjust to the complex situation in Revolutionary Russia, the Whites suffered a clear military defeat. In South Russia the Whites were defeated not because of the lack of British aid, but rather in spite of it.