On the Narrative Construction of Multinational Corporations: An Antenarrative Analysis of Legitimation and Resistance in a Cross-Border Merger

Although extant research has highlighted the role of discourse in the cultural construction of organizations, there is a need to elucidate the use of narratives as central discursive resources in unfolding organizational change. Hence, the objective of this article is to develop a new kind of antenarrative approach for the cultural analysis of organizational change. We use merging multinational corporations (MNCs) as a case in point. Our empirical analysis focuses on a revelatory case: the financial services group Nordea, which was built by combining Swedish, Finnish, Danish, and Norwegian corporations. We distinguish three types of antenarrative that provided alternatives for making sense of the merger: globalist, nationalist, and regionalist (Nordic) antenarratives. We focus on how these antenarratives were mobilized in intentional organizational storytelling to legitimate or resist change: globalist storytelling as a means to legitimate the merger and to create MNC identity, nationalist storytelling to relegitimate national identities and interests, Nordic storytelling to create regional identity, and the critical use of the globalist storytelling to challenge the Nordic identity. We conclude that organizational storytelling is characterized by polyphonic, stylistic, chronotopic, and architectonic dialogisms and by a dynamic between centering and decentering forces. This paper contributes to discourse-cultural studies of organizations by explaining how narrative constructions of identities and interests are used to legitimate or resist change. Furthermore, this analysis elucidates the dialogical dynamics of organizational storytelling and thereby opens up new avenues for the cultural analysis of organizations.

Non-industrial private forest landowners’ choices of timber management strategies and potential allowable cut.

In the study, the potential allowable cut in the district of Pohjois-Savo - based on the non-industrial private forest landowners' (NIPF) choices of timber management strategies - was clarified. Alternative timber management strategies were generated, and the choices and factors affecting the choices of timber management strategies by NIPF landowners were studied. The choices of timber management strategies were solved by maximizing the utility functions of the NIPF landowners. The parameters of the utility functions were estimated using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). The level of the potential allowable cut was compared to the cutting budgets based on the 7th and 8th National Forest Inventories (NFI7 and NFI8), to the combining of private forestry plans, and to the realized drain from non-industrial private forests. The potential allowable cut was calculated using the same MELA system as has been used in the calculation of the national cutting budget. The data consisted of the NIPF holdings (from the TASO planning system) that had been inventoried compartmentwise and had forestry plans made during the years 1984-1992. The NIPF landowners' choices of timber management strategies were clarified by a two-phase mail inquiry. The most preferred strategy obtained was "sustainability" (chosen by 62 % of landowners). The second in order of preference was "finance" (17 %) and the third was "saving" (11 %). "No cuttings", and "maximum cuttings" were the least preferred (9 % and 1 %, resp.). The factors promoting the choices of strategies with intensive cuttings were a) "farmer as forest owner" and "owning fields", b) "increase in the size of the forest holding", c) agriculture and forestry orientation in production, d) "decreasing short term stumpage earning expectations", e) "increasing intensity of future cuttings", and f) "choice of forest taxation system based on site productivity". The potential allowable cut defined in the study was 20 % higher than the average of the realized drain during the years 1988-1993, which in turn, was at the same level as the cutting budget based on the combining of forestry plans in eastern Finland. Respectively, the potential allowable cut defined in the study was 12 % lower than the NFI8-based greatest sustained allowable cut for the 1990s. Using the method presented in this study, timber management strategies can be clarified for non-industrial private forest landowners in different parts of Finland. Based on the choices of timber managemet strategies, regular cutting budgets can be calculated more realistically than before.

Non-industrial private forest landowners’ choices of timber management strategies.

The factors affecting the non-industrial, private forest landowners' (hereafter referred to using the acronym NIPF) strategic decisions in management planning are studied. A genetic algorithm is used to induce a set of rules predicting potential cut of the landowners' choices of preferred timber management strategies. The rules are based on variables describing the characteristics of the landowners and their forest holdings. The predictive ability of a genetic algorithm is compared to linear regression analysis using identical data sets. The data are cross-validated seven times applying both genetic algorithm and regression analyses in order to examine the data-sensitivity and robustness of the generated models. The optimal rule set derived from genetic algorithm analyses included the following variables: mean initial volume, landowner's positive price expectations for the next eight years, landowner being classified as farmer, and preference for the recreational use of forest property. When tested with previously unseen test data, the optimal rule set resulted in a relative root mean square error of 0.40. In the regression analyses, the optimal regression equation consisted of the following variables: mean initial volume, proportion of forestry income, intention to cut extensively in future, and positive price expectations for the next two years. The R2 of the optimal regression equation was 0.34 and the relative root mean square error obtained from the test data was 0.38. In both models, mean initial volume and positive stumpage price expectations were entered as significant predictors of potential cut of preferred timber management strategy. When tested with the complete data set of 201 observations, both the optimal rule set and the optimal regression model achieved the same level of accuracy.

Factors affecting partitioning of private forest holdings in Finland.

Questions of the small size of non-industrial private forest (NIPF) holdings in Finland are considered and factors affecting their partitioning are analyzed. This work arises out of Finnish forest policy statements in which the small average size of holdings has been seen to have a negative influence on the economics of forestry. A survey of the literature indicates that the size of holdings is an important factor determining the costs of logging and silvicultural operations, while its influence on the timber supply is slight. The empirical data are based on a sample of 314 holdings collected by interviewing forest owners in the years 1980-86. In 1990-91 the same holdings were resurveyed by means of a postal inquiry and partly by interviewing forest owners. The principal objective in compiling the data is to assist in quantifying ownership factors that influence partitioning among different kinds of NIPF holdings. Thus the mechanism of partitioning were described and a maximum likelihood logistic regression model was constructed using seven independent holding and ownership variables. One out of four holdings had undergone partitioning in conjunction with a change in ownership, one fifth among family owned holdings and nearly a half among jointly owned holdings. The results of the logistic regression model indicate, for instance, that the odds on partitioning is about three times greater for jointly owned holdings than for family owned ones. Also, the probabilities of partitioning were estimated and the impact of independent dichotomous variables on the probability of partitioning ranged between 0.02 and 0.10. The low value of the Hosmer-Lemeshow test statistic indicates a good fit of the model and the rate of correct classification was estimated to be 88 per cent with a cutoff point of 0.5. The average size of holdings undergoing ownership changes decreased from 29.9 ha to 28.7 ha over the approximate interval 1983-90. In addition, the transition probability matrix showed that the trends towards smaller size categories mostly involved in the small size categories, less than 20 ha. The results of the study can be used in considering the effects of the small size of holdings for forestry and if the purpose is to influence partitioning through forest or rural policy.

Effects of forestry extension on the use of allowable cut in non-industrial private forests.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Cost and effectiveness of legal mandates for the practice of forestry on private land.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

The EC context for private forestry incentive evaluation.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Public and private technical assistance programs for non-industrial private forest landowners in the southern United States.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Private and municipal forests and the forestry planning system in Japan - trends and problems after World War II.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Individuals' Responsibility in Corporations

I discuss role responsibly, individual responsibility and collective responsibility in corporate multinational setting. My case study is about minerals used in electronics that come from the Democratic Republic of Congo. What I try to show throughout the thesis is how many things need to be taken into consideration when we discuss the responsibility of individuals in corporations. No easy and simple answers are available. Instead, we must keep in mind the complexity of the situation at all times, judging cases on individual basis, emphasizing the importance of individual judgement and virtue, as well as the responsibility we all share as members of groups and the wider society. I begin by discussing the demands that are placed on us as employees. There is always a potential for a conflict between our different roles and also the wider demands placed on us. Role demands are usually much more specific than the wider question of how we should act as human beings. The terminology of roles can also be misleading as it can create illusions about our work selves being somehow radically separated from our everyday, true selves. The nature of collective decision-making and its implications for responsibility is important too. When discussing the moral responsibility of an employee in a corporate setting, one must take into account arguments from individual and collective responsibility, as well as role ethics. Individual responsibility is not a separate or competing notion from that of collective responsibility. Rather, the two are interlinked. Individuals' responsibilities in collective settings combine both individual responsibility and collective responsibility (which is different from aggregate individual responsibility). In the majority of cases, both will apply in various degrees. Some members might have individual responsibility in addition to the collective responsibility, while others just the collective responsibility. There are also times when no-one bears individual moral responsibility but the members are still responsible for the collective part. My intuition is that collective moral responsibility is strongly linked to the way the collective setting affects individual judgements and moulds the decisions, and how the individuals use the collective setting to further their own ends. Individuals remain the moral agents but responsibility is collective if the actions in question are collective in character. I also explore the impacts of bureaucratic ethic and its influence on the individual. Bureaucracies can compartmentalize work to such a degree that individual human action is reduced to mere behaviour. Responsibility is diffused and the people working in the bureaucracy can come to view their actions to be outside the normal human realm where they would be responsible for what they do. Language games and rules, anonymity, internal power struggles, and the fragmentation of information are just some of the reasons responsibility and morality can get blurry in big institutional settings. Throughout the thesis I defend the following theses: ● People act differently depending on their roles. This is necessary for our society to function, but the more specific role demands should always be kept in check by the wider requirements of being a good human being. ● Acts in corporations (and other large collectives) are not reducible to individual actions, and cannot be explained fully by the behaviour of individual employees. ● Individuals are responsible for the actions that they undertake in the collective as role occupiers and are very rarely off the hook. Hiding behind role demands is usually only an excuse and shows a lack of virtue. ● Individuals in roles can be responsible even when the collective is not. This depends on if the act they performed was corporate in nature or not. ● Bureaucratic structure affects individual thinking and is not always a healthy environment to work in. ● Individual members can share responsibility with the collective and our share of the collective responsibility is strongly linked to our relations. ● Corporations and other collectives can be responsible for harm even when no individual is at fault. The structure and the policies of the collective are crucial. ● Socialization plays an important role in our morality at both work and outside it. We are all responsible for the kind of moral context we create. ● When accepting a role or a position in a collective, we are attaching ourselves with the values of that collective. ● Ethical theories should put more emphasis on good judgement and decision-making instead of vague generalisations. My conclusion is that the individual person is always in the centre when it comes to responsibility, and not so easily off the hook as we sometimes think. What we do, and especially who we choose to associate ourselves with, does matter and we should be more careful when we choose who we work for. Individuals within corporations are responsible for choosing that the corporation they associate with is one that they can ascribe to morally, if not fully, then at least for the most part. Individuals are also inclusively responsible to a varying degree for the collective activities they contribute to, even in overdetermined contexts. We all are responsible for the kind of corporations we choose to support through our actions as consumers, investors and citizens.