Towards Explaining the Use of Control Mechanisms in Foreign Subsidiaries of MNCs (summary section only)

Control is central to management and there is already a considerable body of research on control. However, the emergence and growth of multinational corporations (MNCs) has renewed the interest in control, as MNCs are complex (often large) organizations that face circumstances beyond those of national business organizations. The geographical dispersion of MNC activities means that the headquarters controls subsidiaries that differ with regard to power and that are embedded in different cultural, political, legal and educational systems. Foreign subsidiary control also takes place across language boundaries and physical (i.e. geographical) distances. In face of these challenges, how are foreign subsidiaries controlled? The thesis explores different types of control mechanisms and attempts to explain the degree to which they are used to control foreign subsidiaries. It contributes to existing knowledge on control by exploring how five different control mechanisms are related to each other. Previous research has tended to focus only on one or two control mechanisms and seldom has their effect on each other been explored. The thesis also contributes by including two central aspects of the MNC that have been neglected in much of the research on foreign subsidiary control: language competence of subsidiary staff and physical distance between the headquarters and its subsidiaries. The findings indicate that specific control mechanisms should not be studied in isolation as there are intricate relationships among the different control mechanisms. Language competence of the subsidiary staff can furthermore affect the type and degree of control that the headquarters can exercise over a subsidiary. The findings also indicate that changes in the physical distance between subsidiaries and its headquarters (i.e. a relocation of the headquarters as part of a restructuring process) can have great consequences for the headquarters-subsidiary relationship.

Appropriate Institutions and Economic Growth - one size fits no-one

Modern-day economics is increasingly biased towards believing that institutions matter for growth, an argument that has been further enforced by the recent economic crisis. There is also a wide consensus on what these growth-promoting institutions should look like, and countries are periodically ranked depending on how their institutional structure compares with the best-practice institutions, mostly in place in the developing world. In this paper, it is argued that ”non-desirable” or “second-best” institutions can be beneficial for fostering investment and thus providing a starting point for sustained growth, and that what matters is the appropriateness of institutions to the economy’s distance to the frontier or current phase of development. Anecdotal evidence from Japan and South-Korea is used as a motivation for studying the subject and a model is presented to describe this phenomenon. In the model, the rigidity or non-rigidity of the institutions is described by entrepreneurial selection. It is assumed that entrepreneurs are the ones taking part in the imitation and innovation of technologies, and that decisions on whether or not their projects are refinanced comes from capitalists. The capitalists in turn have no entrepreneurial skills and act merely as financers of projects. The model has two periods, and two kinds of entrepreneurs: those with high skills and those with low skills. The society’s choice of whether an imitation or innovation – based strategy is chosen is modeled as the trade-off between refinancing a low-skill entrepreneur or investing in the selection of the entrepreneurs resulting in a larger fraction of high-skill entrepreneurs with the ability to innovate but less total investment. Finally, a real-world example from India is presented as an initial attempt to test the theory. The data from the example is not included in this paper. It is noted that the model may be lacking explanatory power due to difficulties in testing the predictions, but that this should not be seen as a reason to disregard the theory – the solution might lie in developing better tools, not better just better theories. The conclusion presented is that institutions do matter. There is no one-size-fits-all-solution when it comes to institutional arrangements in different countries, and developing countries should be given space to develop their own institutional structures that cater to their specific needs.

Seasonal fluctuations in blue-green algae, especially in heterocystous species in polluted coastal waters off Helsinki city, in the northern part of the Gulf of Finland

Tiivistelmä

Underemployment and part-time work in the Nordic countries

84 s.

Part-of-Speech Tagging using Parallel Weighted Finite-State Transducers

We use parallel weighted finite-state transducers to implement a part-of-speech tagger, which obtains state-of-the-art accuracy when used to tag the Europarl corpora for Finnish, Swedish and English. Our system consists of a weighted lexicon and a guesser combined with a bigram model factored into two weighted transducers. We use both lemmas and tag sequences in the bigram model, which guarantees reliable bigram estimates.