“Empire is a state of mind” – Imagining Eurasia in Russia –

Työssäni tarkastelen venäläistä neo-euraasianistista liikettä ja tapoja joilla liikkeen aktivistit rakentavat Euraasiasta yhtenäistä kokonaisuutta ja imperiumia. Keskeisiä tutkimuskysymyksiäni ovat: Mikä imperiumi on ja mitkä ovat sen keskeisiä motivaatioita ja teemoja? Kuinka imperiumin idea rakentuu tai käsitetään ja tämän voi tulkita? Minkälaisia seurauksia voi tulkita heidän tavallaan Euraasia nähdä olevan? Materiaalina käytän haastatteluja, jotka on kerätty Moskovassa keväällä 2008, ja liikkeen kirjallisia tuotoksia (lehdet ja Internet -sivut). Neo-euraasianistisella liikkeellä tarkoitan tässä työssä Kansainvälistä Euraasianistista liikettä (Meždunarodnoe Evrazijskoe Dviženie) ja sen alahaaraa Euraasianistista Nuorisoliittoa (Evrazijskij Sojuz Molodëži). Liike perustettiin virallisesti 2003, mutta rakentaa vahvasti historiallista yhteyttä 1930 -luvun klassiseen eurasianismiin. Tämän lisäksi sen diskurssissa on paljon neuvostoliittolaisia, fasistisia, uuskonservatiivisia ja nationalistisia piirteitä. Liikkeen johtohahmo on filosofi-geopoliitikko Alexandr Dugin. Työn tausta-ajatuksena minua kiinnostaa etenkin nk. älymystön tai intelligenttien vaikutus nationalismiin tai sosiaalisia ryhmiä määrittelevien diskurssien kehitykseen ja muutokseen.Tarkastelen materiaalia diskurssianalyyttisesta näkökulmasta. Näen diskurssianalyysin sen tutkimisena, miten sosiaalista todellisuutta tuotetaan erilaisissa sosiaalisissa käytännöissä. Samalla näiden diskurssien tutkiminen, foucautlaisen perinteen myötä, tarkastelee kriittisesti niiden tuottamia (aktualisoituneita sekä potentiaalisia) valtasuhteita. Käytän työssäni myös Benedict Andersonin kuvitellun yhteisön (imagined communities) käsitettä, joka auttaa hahmottamaan tapaa, jolla tutkimuskohteeni rakentavat imperiumia yhteisönä. Aktivistien puheessa imperiumi (imperiâ) tulee esiin pääasiallisesti positiivisesti ja ”heidän omanaan,” kun taas termi imperialismi (imperializm) pääosin negatiivisena, liittyen etenkin keskeisenä vihollisena pidettyihin Yhdysvaltoihin. Esiin nousee monta toisiinsa liittyvää teemaa, jotka jaottelen viideksi pääteemaksi. Näistä tarkastelen lähemmin imperiumia ”kaikkien kansojen hyväntekijänä (poliittinen puoli)”, ulkoisen voiman lähteenä (historiallis-geopoliittinen puoli) sekä kollektiivisen subjektin luojana (imperialistis-nationalistinen puoli). Pyrin kontekstualisoimaan diskurssin ja tarkastelemaan tapoja, joilla se ammentaa motiiveja myös historiallis-kulttuurisista tavoista hahmottaa aluetta ja sen asukkaita. Käsittelen myös kansan, kansakunnan, etnoksen ja nationalismin käsitteitä ja sitä, miten ne nousevat neo-eurasianistisessa diskursissa esiin. Imperiaalisen nationalismin (imperskij nacionalizm) käsite auttaa ymmärtämään niitä tapoja, jolla liike tekee sekä pesäeroa nationalismiin että samalla hyödyntää monia nationalistisen diskurssin perusteemoja. Eräs liikkeen diskurssin keskeisistä eroista niin sanottuun nationalismin valtavirtaan on ”kansakunnan (naciâ)” käsitteen vahva negatiivinen konnotaatio. Sen vastakohtana esiin nostetaan vahvasti kansan (narod) käsite. Samalla kuitenkin etnisen venäläisen (russkij) käsitettä käytetään tavallista laajemmin ja kattavammin kuin tavallisesti, ja ennen kaikkea Venäjä nousee imperiumin keskeisimmäksi tekijäksi. Euraasialaiseen imperiumiin liitetyistä positiivistista mielikuvista käsittelen tarkemmin monikansallisuuden ja kansojen kodin ideaa, joka nousee mielestäni huomattavaksi retoriseksi taustaksi kaikessa materiaalissa. Tähän liittyy vahvasti myös saman teeman sivujuonne, eli imperiumin ”vapauttava” rooli. Tulkitsen, että liikkeen imperiumi -diskurssilla on instrumentaalinen luonne: se legitimoi aktivistien vaatimuksia varsinkin entisen Neuvostoliiton alueen suhteen. ”Euraasialaisen kansan” ajatus toimii mahdollisena Euraasiaa yhteisenä tekijänä ”Neuvostokansan” tilalla. Sen taustalla materiaalistani päätellen siintävät kuitenkin enemmänkin Venäjä ja venäläis -spesifit vaateet kuin koko Euraasia. Pohdin myös kansakunnan (nation) hyljeksimisen syitä ja käsitteen sopivuutta Venäjälle, kuten myös venäläisyyden käsitteiden kerrostuneisuutta. Kokonaisuudessaan imperiumi tuli esiin abstraktina, utopistisena ja ”totaalisena” kokonaisuutena.

The British Intervention in South Russia 1918-1920

Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, a three-year civil war broke out in Russia. As in many other civil wars, foreign powers intervened in the conflict. Britain played a leading role in this intervention and had a significant effect on the course of the war. Without this intervention on the White side, the superiority of numbers in manpower and weaponry of the Bolsheviks would have quickly overwhelmed their opponents. The aim of this dissertation is to explain the nature and role of the British intervention on the southern, and most decisive, front of the Civil War. The political decision making in London is studied as a background, but the focus of the dissertation is on the actual implementation of the British policy in Russia. The British military mission arrived in South Russia in late 1918, and started to provide General Denikin s White army with ample supplies. General Denikin would have not been able to build his army of more than 200,000 men or to make his operation against Moscow without the British matériel. The British mission also organized the training and equipping of the Russian troops with British weapons. This made the material aid much more effective. Many of the British instructors took part in fighting the Bolsheviks despite the orders of their government. The study is based on primary sources produced by British departments of state and members of the British mission and military units in South Russia. Primary sources from the Whites, including the personal collections of several key figures of the White movement and official records of the Armed Forces of South Russia are also used to give a balanced picture of the course of events. It is possible to draw some general conclusions from the White movement and reasons for their defeat from the study of the British intervention. In purely material terms the British aid placed Denikin s army in a far more favourable position than the Bolsheviks in 1919, but other military defects in the White army were numerous. The White commanders were unimaginative, their military thinking was obsolete, and they were incapable of organizing the logistics of their army. There were also fundamental defects in the morale of the White troops. In addition to all political mistakes of Denikin s movement and a general inability to adjust to the complex situation in Revolutionary Russia, the Whites suffered a clear military defeat. In South Russia the Whites were defeated not because of the lack of British aid, but rather in spite of it.

We Are All Georgians: The Neoconservative Narrative on the Russia-Georgia War

In this thesis I examine the U.S. foreign policy discussion that followed the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. In the politically charged setting that preceded the presidential elections, the subject of the debate was not only Washington's response to the crisis in the Caucasus but, more generally, the direction of U.S. foreign policy after the presidency of George W. Bush. As of November 2010, the reasons for and consequences of the Russia-Georgia war continue to be contested. My thesis demonstrates that there were already a number of different stories about the conflict immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. I want to argue that among these stories one can discern a “neoconservative narrative” that described the war as a confrontation between the East and the West and considered it as a test for Washington’s global leadership. I draw on the theory of securitization, particularly on a framework introduced by Holger Stritzel. Accordingly, I consider statements about the conflict as “threat texts” and analyze these based on the existing discursive context, the performative force of the threat texts and the positional power of the actors presenting them. My thesis suggests that a notion of narrativity can complement Stritzel’s securitization framework and take it further. Threat texts are established as narratives by attaching causal connections, meaning and actorship to the discourse. By focusing on this process I want to shed light on the relationship between the text and the context, capture the time dimension of a speech act articulation and help to explain how some interpretations of the conflict are privileged and others marginalized. I develop the theoretical discussion through an empirical analysis of the neoconservative narrative. Drawing on Stritzel’s framework, I argue that the internal logic of the narrative which was presented as self-evident can be analyzed in its historicity. Asking what was perceived to be at stake in the conflict, how the narrative was formed and what purposes it served also reveals the possibility for alternative explanations. My main source material consists of transcripts of think tank seminars organized in Washington, D.C. in August 2008. In addition, I resort to the foreign policy discussion in the mainstream media.

The phenomenon of oligarchy in Russia and its impact on Russian transition

Nowadays any analysis of Russian economy is incomplete without taking into account the phenomenon of oligarchy. Russian oligarchs appeared after the fall of the Soviet Union and are represented by wealthy businessmen who control a huge part of natural resources enterprises and have a big political influence. Oligarchs’ shares in some natural resources industries reach even 70-80%. Their role in Russian economy is big without any doubts, however there has been very little economic analysis done. The aim of this work is to examine Russian oligarchy on micro and macro levels, its role in Russia’s transition and the possible positive and negative outcomes from this phenomenon. For this purpose the work presents two theoretical models. The first part of this thesis work examines the role of oligarchs on micro level, concentrating on the question whether the oligarchs can be more productive owners than other types of owners. To answer the question this part presents a model based on the article “Are oligarchs productive? Theory and evidence” by Y. Gorodnichenko and Y. Grygorenko. It is followed by empirical test based on the works of S. Guriev and A. Rachinsky. The model predicts oligarchs to invest more in the productivity of their enterprises and have higher returns on capital, therefore be more productive owners. According to the empirical test, oligarchs were found to outperform other types of owners, however it is not defined whether the productivity gains offset losses in tax revenue. The second part of the work concentrates on the role of oligarchy on macro level. More precisely, it examines the assumption that the depression after 1998 crises in Russia was caused by the oligarchs’ behavior. This part presents a theoretical model based on the article “A macroeconomic model of Russian transition: The role of oligarchic property rights” by S. Braguinsky and R. Myerson, where the special type of property rights is introduced. After the 1998 crises oligarchs started to invest all their resources abroad to protect themselves from political risks, which resulted in the long depression phase. The macroeconomic model shows, that better protection of property rights (smaller political risk) or/and higher outside investing could reduce the depression. Taking into account this result, the government policy can change the oligarchs’ behavior to be more beneficial for the Russian economy and make the transition faster.