Shadows of militarism: an ethnography of trauma and resistance among soldiers and veterans in post-9/11 USA.

This thesis critically examines the military disciplining of trauma through a detailed ethnographic study of post-9/11 lower-enlisted soldiers and veterans in the U.S. who have links to a national movement of resistance to, and healing from, militarism. Drawing on 12 months of ethnographic fieldwork at two G.I. coffeehouses and with the post-9/11 veteran anti-militarism movement in U.S., it analyses the journey of joining the military, becoming a soldier, leaving the military and veteran identities. It explores militarism and military power as a cultural process which reproduces and conceals itself within normative conceptions of the everyday, and military trauma as a site of contested power and resistance. In doing so, this research addresses an urgent need to critically engage with military trauma as a means to challenge normalised discourses of militarism. This research reveals a disjuncture between the imagined and lived reality of military identities in the post-9/11 era. It explores the politics of recognition of veterans’ public and private lives, their contested identities, and their constrained relationship to the state. It argues that veterans are silenced and their identities reduced to symbolic tools in a public military imaginary which constructs military trauma into politically manageable categories, while disciplining and silencing the nation from critically examining war and militarism. In this way, this thesis argues that veterans serve a vital function in U.S. society by absorbing and containing the violence of the state, which then becomes unspeakable, unhearable, and inescapable. This thesis shows how a small number of soldiers and veterans are pushing back against this narrative. In sum, this thesis seeks to challenge the disciplinary effects of militarism upon trauma and support veteran voices to speak their own truths.

A cyber exercise post assessment framework: In Malaysia perspectives

Critical infrastructures are based on complex systems that provide vital services to the nation. The complexities of the interconnected networks, each managed by individual organisations, if not properly secured, could offer vulnerabilities that threaten other organisations’ systems that depend on their services. This thesis argues that the awareness of interdependencies among critical sectors needs to be increased. Managing and securing critical infrastructure is not isolated responsibility of a government or an individual organisation. There is a need for a strong collaboration among critical service providers of public and private organisations in protecting critical information infrastructure. Cyber exercises have been incorporated in national cyber security strategies as part of critical information infrastructure protection. However, organising a cyber exercise involved multi sectors is challenging due to the diversity of participants’ background, working environments and incidents response policies. How well the lessons learned from the cyber exercise and how it can be transferred to the participating organisations is still a looming question. In order to understand the implications of cyber exercises on what participants have learnt and how it benefits participants’ organisation, a Cyber Exercise Post Assessment (CEPA) framework was proposed in this research. The CEPA framework consists of two parts. The first part aims to investigate the lessons learnt by participants from a cyber exercise using the four levels of the Kirkpatrick Training Model to identify their perceptions on reaction, learning, behaviour and results of the exercise. The second part investigates the Organisation Cyber Resilience (OCR) of participating sectors. The framework was used to study the impact of the cyber exercise called X Maya in Malaysia. Data collected through interviews with X Maya 5 participants were coded and categorised based on four levels according to the Kirkpatrick Training Model, while online surveys distributed to ten Critical National Information Infrastructure (CNII) sectors participated in the exercise. The survey used the C-Suite Executive Checklist developed by World Economic Forum in 2012. To ensure the suitability of the tool used to investigate the OCR, a reliability test conducted on the survey items showed high internal consistency results. Finally, individual OCR scores were used to develop the OCR Maturity Model to provide the organisation cyber resilience perspectives of the ten CNII sectors.