The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 or the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008: corporate killing and the law

This thesis examines the regulatory and legislative approach taken in the United Kingdom to deal with deaths arising from work related activities and, in particular, deaths that can be directly attributed to the behaviour of corporations and other organisations. Workplace health and safety has traditionally been seen in the United Kingdom as a regulatory function which can be traced to the very earliest days of the Industrial Revolution. With an emphasis on preventing workplace accidents and ill-health through guidance, advice and support, the health and safety legislation and enforcement regime which had evolved over the best part of two centuries was considered inadequate to effectively punish corporations considered responsible for deaths caused by their activities following a series of disasters in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. To address this apparent inadequacy, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 was introduced creating the offence of corporate manslaughter and corporate homicide. Based on a gross breach of a relevant duty of care resulting in the death of a person, the Act effectively changed what had previously considered a matter of regulation, an approach that had obvious weaknesses and shortcomings, to one of crime and criminal law. Whether this is the best approach to dealing with deaths caused by an organisation is challenged in this thesis and the apparent distinction between ‘criminal’ and ‘regulatory’ offences is also examined. It was found that an amended Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 to include a specific offence of corporate killing, in conjunction with the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008 would almost certainly have resulted in a more effective approach to dealing with organisations responsible for causing deaths as consequence of their activities. It was also found that there was no substantive difference between ‘regulatory’ and ‘criminal’ law other than the stigma associated with the latter, and that distinction would almost certainly disappear, at least in the context of worker safety, as a consequence of the penalties available following the introduction of the Health and Safety (Offences) Act 2008.

Is the legal protection for the foetus adequate in clinical trials?

In 2009 and 2010, the major drug regulatory bodies, the European Medicines Agency and the Food and Drug Administration in the USA, issued requests for the generation of information relating to the absorption, distribution, metabolism, excretion, efficacy and safety of investigational drugs in pregnant women prior to approval. In the wake of thalidomide, research involving pregnant women other than for obstetric or gynaecologic purposes became rare, and studies of investigational drugs practically unknown. Consequently, none of the legislation applicable in the UK and few of the guidelines introduced in the last 40 years properly addresses the conduct of clinical trials of investigational drugs in this population. This thesis questions whether the legal protection for the foetus is adequate in clinical trials. The answer appears to be a qualified “no”. Arguments persist regarding the moral standing of the foetus, particularly regarding abortion. That will not be the intent of such trials, and a moral case is made for the conduct of clinical trials in this population by analogy with the neonate, and the pregnant woman’s autonomy. Legally, we already recognise the foetus has ‘interests’ which crystallise upon live birth, and that compensation is recoverable for harm inflicted in utero manifesting as congenital injury. The essence of research is quite different from medical practice, and the extent to which this is understood by trial participants is unclear. The approvals processes contain a number of inadequacies which have the potential to expose the foetus to harm and affect the consent of the pregnant woman. The recovery of compensation in the event of children born injured following clinical trials during pregnancy in many ways may be more complex than other personal injury cases.. The conclusions of this thesis are that the existence of a foetus does merit recognition by the law in this setting and that morally such studies are justifiable. However, the present legislation and approval processes potentially expose the foetus to avoidable risk and may not be appropriate to enable the recovery of compensation, thereby creating potential to deter future trial participants. A proposal is made regarding an approach to simplify the process for recovery of compensation, and thereby strengthen the approval and consent processes.