Empirical studies on share issuance and repurchase decisions

Financial constraints influence corporate policies of firms, including both investment decisions and external financing policies. The relevance of this phenomenon has become more pronounced during and after the recent financial crisis in 2007/2008. In addition to raising costs of external financing, the effects of financial crisis limited the availability of external financing which had implications for employment, investment, sale of assets, and tech spending. This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the effects of financial constraints on share issuance and repurchases decisions. Financial constraints comprise both internal constraints reflecting the demand for external financing and external financial constraints that relate to the supply of external financing. The study also examines both operating performance and stock market reactions associated with equity issuance methods. The first empirical chapter explores the simultaneous effects of financial constraints and market timing on share issuance decisions. Internal financing constraints limit firms’ ability to issue overvalued equity. On the other hand, financial crisis and low market liquidity (external financial constraints) restrict availability of equity financing and consequently increase the costs of external financing. Therefore, the study explores the extent to which internal and external financing constraints limit market timing of equity issues. This study finds that financial constraints play a significant role in whether firms time their equity issues when the shares are overvalued. The conclusion is that financially constrained firms issue overvalued equity when the external equity market or the general economic conditions are favourable. During recessionary periods, costs of external finance increase such that financially constrained firms are less likely to issue overvalued equity. Only unconstrained firms are more likely to issue overvalued equity even during crisis. Similarly, small firms that need cash flows to finance growth projects are less likely to access external equity financing during period of significant economic recessions. Moreover, constrained firms have low average stock returns compared to unconstrained firms, especially when they issue overvalued equity. The second chapter examines the operating performance and stock returns associated with equity issuance methods. Firms in the UK can issue equity through rights issues, open offers, and private placement. This study argues that alternative equity issuance methods are associated with a different level of operating performance and long-term stock returns. Firms using private placement are associated with poor operating performance. However, rights issues are found empirically to be associated with higher operating performance and less negative long-term stock returns after issuance in comparison to counterpart firms that issue private placements and open offers. Thus, rights issuing firms perform better than open offers and private placement because the favourable operating performance at the time of issuance generates subsequent positive long-run stock price response. Right issuing firms are of better quality and outperform firms that adopt open offers and private placement. In the third empirical chapter, the study explores the levered share repurchase of internally financially unconstrained firms. Unconstrained firms are expected to repurchase their shares using internal funds rather than through external borrowings. However, evidence shows that levered share repurchases are common among unconstrained firms. These firms display this repurchase behaviour when they have bond ratings or investment grade ratings that allow them to obtain cheap external debt financing. It is found that internally financially unconstrained firms borrow to finance their share repurchase when they invest more. Levered repurchase firms are associated with less positive abnormal returns than unlevered repurchase firms. For the levered repurchase sample, high investing firms are associated with more positive long-run abnormal stock returns than low investing firms. It appears the market underreact to the levered repurchase in the short-run regardless of the level of investments. These findings indicate that market reactions reflect both undervaluation and signaling hypotheses of positive information associated with share repurchase. As the firms undertake capital investments, they generate future cash flows, limit the effects of leverage on financial distress and ultimately reduce the risk of the equity capital.

Corporate governance and cost of capital: evidence from Pakistani listed firms

This thesis investigates the effectiveness of Corporate Governance (CG) reforms in Pakistan. Using a sample of 160 Pakistani firms from 2003 to 2013 and governance data collected manually from the annual reports, this thesis investigates seven closely related and important corporate issues that are related to the compliance of governance rules. Specifically, it aims to : (i) investigate the degree of CG compliance with 2002 Pakistani Code of CG (PCCG); (ii) determine whether the introduction of 2002 PCCG has improved Pakistani CG practices; (iii) investigate the determinants of CG compliance and disclosure for Pakistani listed firms; (iv) test the nexus between CG compliance with the 2002 PCCG and firms’ cost of capital (COC); (v) investigate the impact of different individual CG mechanisms on listed firms COC; (vi) examine how different ownership structures impact on firms’ COC; and (vii) analyse relationship between CG structures and Cost of Equity (COE) as well as Cost of Debt (COD) for Pakistani listed firms. These empirical investigations report some important results. First, the reported findings suggest that Pakistani firms have responded positively to governance disclosure requirements over the eleven year period from 2003 to 2013. The results also show that the introduction of the PCCG in 2002 has improved CG standards by Pakistani listed firms. Second, the reported results related to the determinants of CG compliance demonstrate that significant and positive association between institutional, government and foreign ownership with CG compliance. However, findings relating to the determinants of CG compliance show a negative and significant association between board size and block ownership with CG compliance and disclosure. The study finds no significant relationship between director ownership, audit firm size and the presence of female board members with the constructed Pakistan Corporate Governance Index (PCGI). Third, the investigation on the relationship between CG and COC report a significantly negative nexus between PCGI and firms’ COC. The investigation on the association between ownership structures and COC report a negative and significant nexus between block ownership with firms’ COC. Further, a number of robustness analyses performed in this study suggest that the empirical results reported in this study are generally robust to the alternative CG variables, alternative COC variables and potential endogeneity problems.