The influence of actions on auditory perception: cognitive and neural mechanisms

It is well known that self-generated stimuli are processed differently from externally generated stimuli. For example, many people have noticed since childhood that it is very difficult to make a self-tickling. In the auditory domain, self-generated sounds elicit smaller brain responses as compared to externally generated sounds, known as the sensory attenuation (SA) effect. SA is manifested in reduced amplitudes of evoked responses as measured through MEEG, decreased firing rates of neurons and a lower level of perceived loudness for self-generated sounds. The predominant explanation for SA is based on the idea that self-generated stimuli are predicted (e.g., the forward model account). It is the nature of their predictability that is crucial for SA. On the contrary, the sensory gating account emphasizes a general suppressive effect of actions on sensory processing, regardless of the predictability of the stimuli. Both accounts have received empirical support, which suggests that both mechanisms may exist. In chapter 2, three behavioural studies concerning the influence of motor activation on auditory perception were presented. Study 1 compared the effect of SA and attention in an auditory detection task and showed that SA was present even when substantial attention was paid to unpredictable stimuli. Study 2 compared the loudness perception of tones generated by others between Chinese and British participants. Compared to externally generated tones, a decrease in perceived loudness for others generated tones was found among Chinese but not among the British. In study 3, partial evidence was found that even when reading words that are related to action, auditory detection performance was impaired. In chapter 3, the classic SA effect of M100 suppression was replicated with MEG in study 4. With time-frequency analysis, a potential neural information processing sequence was found in auditory cortex. Prior to the onset of self-generated tones, there was an increase of oscillatory power in the alpha band. After the stimulus onset, reduced gamma power and alpha/beta phase locking were found. The three temporally segregated oscillatory events correlated with each other and with SA effect, which may be the underlying neural implementation of SA. In chapter 4, a TMS-MEG study was presented investigating the role of the cerebellum in adapting to delayed presentation of self-generated tones (study 5). It demonstrated that in sham stimulation condition, the brain can adapt to the delay (about 100 ms) within 300 trials of learning by showing a significant increase of SA effect in the suppression of M100, but not M200 component. Whereas after stimulating the cerebellum with a suppressive TMS protocol, the adaptation in M100 suppression disappeared and the pattern of M200 suppression reversed to M200 enhancement. These data support the idea that the suppressive effect of actions on auditory processing is a consequence of both motor driven sensory predictions and general sensory gating. The results also demonstrate the importance of neural oscillations in implementing SA effect and the critical role of the cerebellum in learning sensory predictions under sensory perturbation.

Neural representations of social and non-social uncertainty in human decision making

The social landscape is filled with an intricate web of species-specific desired objects and course of actions. Humans are highly social animals and, as they navigate this landscape, they need to produce adapted decision-making behaviour. Traditionally social and non-social neural mechanisms affecting choice have been investigated using different approaches. Recently, in an effort to unite these findings, two main theories have been proposed to explain how the brain might encode social and non-social motivational decision-making: the extended common currency and the social valuation specific schema (Ruff & Fehr 2014). One way to test these theories is to directly compare neural activity related to social and non-social decision outcomes within the same experimental setting. Here we address this issue by focusing on the neural substrates of social and non-social forms of uncertainty. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) we directly compared the neural representations of reward and risk prediction and errors (RePE and RiPE) in social and non- social situations using gambling games. We used a trust betting game to vary uncertainty along a social dimension (trustworthiness), and a card game (Preuschoff et al. 2006) to vary uncertainty along a non-social dimension (pure risk). The trust game was designed to maintain the same structure of the card game. In a first study, we exposed a divide between subcortical and cortical regions when comparing the way these regions process social and non-social forms of uncertainty during outcome anticipation. Activity in subcortical regions reflected social and non-social RePE, while activity in cortical regions correlated with social RePE and non-social RiPE. The second study focused on outcome delivery and integrated the concept of RiPE in non-social settings with that of fairness and monetary utility maximisation in social settings. In particular these results corroborate recent models of anterior insula function (Singer et al. 2009; Seth 2013), and expose a possible neural mechanism that weights fairness and uncertainty but not monetary utility. The third study focused on functionally defined regions of the early visual cortex (V1) showing how activity in these areas, traditionally considered only visual, might reflect motivational prediction errors in addition to known perceptual prediction mechanisms (den Ouden et al 2012). On the whole, while our results do not support unilaterally one or the other theory modeling the underlying neural dynamics of social and non-social forms of decision making, they provide a working framework where both general mechanisms might coexist.