Politics and protestant Lordship in North East Scotland during the reign of James VI: The life of George Keith, fourth Earl Marischal, 1554-1623

George Keith, fourth Earl Marischal is a case study of long-term, quietly successful and stable lordship through the reign of James VI. Marischal’s life provides a wholly underrepresented perspective on this era, where the study of rebellious and notorious characters has dominated. He is also a counter-example to the notion of a general crisis among the European nobility, at least in the Scottish context, as well as to the notion of a ‘conservative’ or ‘Catholic’ north east. In 1580 George inherited the richest earldom in Scotland, with a geographical extent stretching along the east coast from Caithness to East Lothian. His family came to be this wealthy as a long term consequence of the Battle of Flodden (1513) where a branch of the family, the Inverugie Keiths had been killed. The heiress of this branch was married to the third earl and this had concentrated a large number of lands, and consequently wealth, in the hands of the earls. This had, however, also significantly decreased the number of members and hence power of the Keith kindred. The third earl’s conversion to Protestantism in 1544 and later his adherence to the King’s Party during the Marian Civil War forced the Keiths into direct confrontation with their neighbours in the north east, the Gordons (led by the Earls of Huntly), a Catholic family and supporters of the Queen’s Party. Although this feud was settled for a time at the end of the war, the political turmoil caused by a succession of short-lived factional regimes in the early part of the personal reign of James VI (c.1578-1585) led the new (fourth) Earl Marischal into direct confrontation with the new (sixth) Earl of Huntly. Marischal was outclassed, outmanoeuvred and outgunned at both court and in the locality in this feud, suffering considerably. However, Huntly’s over-ambition in wider court politics meant that Marischal was able to join various coalitions against his rival, until Huntly was exiled in 1595. Marischal also came into conflict briefly with Chancellor John Maitland of Thirlestane as a consequence of Marischal’s diplomatic mission to Denmark in 1589-1590, but was again outmatched politically and briefly imprisoned. Both of these feuds reveal Marischal to be relatively cautious and reactionary, and both reveal the limitations of his power. Elsewhere, the study of Marischal’s activities in the centre of Scottish politics reveal him to be unambitious. He was ready to serve King James, the two men having a healthy working relationship, but Marischal showed no ambition as a courtier, to woo the king’s favour or patronage, instead delegating interaction with the monarch to his kinsmen. Likewise, in government, Marischal rarely attended any of the committees he was entitled to attend, such as the Privy Council, although he did keep a keen eye on the land market and the business conducted under the Great Seal. Although personally devout and a committed Protestant, the study of Marischal’s interaction with the national Kirk and the parishes of which he was patron reveal that he was at times a negligent patron and exercised his right of ministerial presentation as lordly, not godly patronage. The notion of a ‘conservative North East’ is, however, rejected. Where Marischal was politically weak at court and weak in terms of force in the locality, we see him pursuing sideways approaches to dealing with this. Thus he was keen to build up his general influence in the north and in particular with the burgh of Aberdeen (one result of this being the creation of Marischal College in 1593), pursued disputes through increasing use of legal methods rather than bloodfeud (thus exploiting his wealth and compensating for his relative lack of force) and developed a sophisticated system of maritime infrastructure, ultimately expressed through the creating of the burghs of Peterhead and Stonehaven. Although his close family caused him a number of problems over his lifetime, he was able to pass on a stable and enlarged lordship to his son in 1623.

State-narco networks and the ‘War on Drugs’ in post-transition Bolivia, with special reference to 1989-1993

This thesis examines the development of state-narco networks in post-transition Bolivia. Mainstream discourses of drugs tend to undertheorise such relationships, holding illicit economies, weak states and violence as synergistic phenomena. Such assumptions fail to capture the nuanced relations that emerge between the state and the drug trade in different contexts, their underlying logics and diverse effects. As an understudied case, Bolivia offers novel insights into these dynamics. Bolivian military authoritarian governments (1964-1982), for example, integrated drug rents into clientelistic systems of governance, helping to establish factional coalitions and reinforce regime authority. Following democratic transition in 1982 and the escalation of US counterdrug efforts, these stable modes of exchange between the state and the coca-cocaine economy fragmented. Bolivia, though, continued to experience lower levels of drug-related violence than its Andean neighbours, and sustained democratisation despite being a major drug producer. Focusing on the introduction of the Andean Initiative (1989-1993), I explore state-narco interactions during this period of flux: from authoritarianism to (formal) democracy, and from Cold War to Drug War. As such, the thesis transcends the conventional analyses of the drugs literature and orthodox readings of Latin American narco-violence, providing insights into the relationship between illicit economies and democratic transition, the regional role of the US, and the (unintended) consequences of drug policy interventions. I utilise a mixed methods approach to offer discrete perspectives on the object of study. Drawing on documentary and secondary sources, I argue that state-narco networks were interwoven with Bolivia’s post-transition political settlement. Uneven democratisation ensured pockets of informalism, as clientelistic and authoritarian practices continued. This included police and military autonomy, and tolerance of drug corruption within both institutions. Non-enforcement of democratic norms of accountability and transparency was linked to the maintenance of fragile political equilibrium. Interviews with key US and Bolivian elite actors also revealed differing interpretations of state-narco interactions. These exposed competing agendas, and were folded into alternative paradigms and narratives of the ‘war on drugs’. The extension of US Drug War goals and the targeting of ‘corrupt’ local power structures, clashed with local ambivalence towards the drug trade, opposition to destabilising, ‘Colombianised’ policies and the claimed ‘democratising mission’ of the Bolivian government. In contrasting these US and Bolivian accounts, the thesis shows how real and perceived state-narco webs were understood and navigated by different actors in distinct ways. ‘Drug corruption’ held significance beyond simple economic transaction or institutional failure. Contestation around state-narco interactions was enmeshed in US-Bolivian relations of power and control.