Politics and protestant Lordship in North East Scotland during the reign of James VI: The life of George Keith, fourth Earl Marischal, 1554-1623

George Keith, fourth Earl Marischal is a case study of long-term, quietly successful and stable lordship through the reign of James VI. Marischal’s life provides a wholly underrepresented perspective on this era, where the study of rebellious and notorious characters has dominated. He is also a counter-example to the notion of a general crisis among the European nobility, at least in the Scottish context, as well as to the notion of a ‘conservative’ or ‘Catholic’ north east. In 1580 George inherited the richest earldom in Scotland, with a geographical extent stretching along the east coast from Caithness to East Lothian. His family came to be this wealthy as a long term consequence of the Battle of Flodden (1513) where a branch of the family, the Inverugie Keiths had been killed. The heiress of this branch was married to the third earl and this had concentrated a large number of lands, and consequently wealth, in the hands of the earls. This had, however, also significantly decreased the number of members and hence power of the Keith kindred. The third earl’s conversion to Protestantism in 1544 and later his adherence to the King’s Party during the Marian Civil War forced the Keiths into direct confrontation with their neighbours in the north east, the Gordons (led by the Earls of Huntly), a Catholic family and supporters of the Queen’s Party. Although this feud was settled for a time at the end of the war, the political turmoil caused by a succession of short-lived factional regimes in the early part of the personal reign of James VI (c.1578-1585) led the new (fourth) Earl Marischal into direct confrontation with the new (sixth) Earl of Huntly. Marischal was outclassed, outmanoeuvred and outgunned at both court and in the locality in this feud, suffering considerably. However, Huntly’s over-ambition in wider court politics meant that Marischal was able to join various coalitions against his rival, until Huntly was exiled in 1595. Marischal also came into conflict briefly with Chancellor John Maitland of Thirlestane as a consequence of Marischal’s diplomatic mission to Denmark in 1589-1590, but was again outmatched politically and briefly imprisoned. Both of these feuds reveal Marischal to be relatively cautious and reactionary, and both reveal the limitations of his power. Elsewhere, the study of Marischal’s activities in the centre of Scottish politics reveal him to be unambitious. He was ready to serve King James, the two men having a healthy working relationship, but Marischal showed no ambition as a courtier, to woo the king’s favour or patronage, instead delegating interaction with the monarch to his kinsmen. Likewise, in government, Marischal rarely attended any of the committees he was entitled to attend, such as the Privy Council, although he did keep a keen eye on the land market and the business conducted under the Great Seal. Although personally devout and a committed Protestant, the study of Marischal’s interaction with the national Kirk and the parishes of which he was patron reveal that he was at times a negligent patron and exercised his right of ministerial presentation as lordly, not godly patronage. The notion of a ‘conservative North East’ is, however, rejected. Where Marischal was politically weak at court and weak in terms of force in the locality, we see him pursuing sideways approaches to dealing with this. Thus he was keen to build up his general influence in the north and in particular with the burgh of Aberdeen (one result of this being the creation of Marischal College in 1593), pursued disputes through increasing use of legal methods rather than bloodfeud (thus exploiting his wealth and compensating for his relative lack of force) and developed a sophisticated system of maritime infrastructure, ultimately expressed through the creating of the burghs of Peterhead and Stonehaven. Although his close family caused him a number of problems over his lifetime, he was able to pass on a stable and enlarged lordship to his son in 1623.

A study on the effect of functional distribution of income on aggregate demand

In this thesis, we study the causal relationship between functional distribution of income and economic growth. In particular, we focus on some of the aspects that might alter the effect of the profit share on growth. After a brief introduction and literature review, the empirical contributions will be presented in Chapters 3,4 and 5. Chapter 3 analyses the effect of a contemporaneous decrease in the wage share among countries that are major trade partners. Falling wage share and wage moderation are a global phenomenon which are hardly opposed by governments. This is because lower wages are associated with lower export prices and, therefore, have a positive effect on net-exports. There is, however, a fallacy of composition problem: not all countries can improve their balance of payments contemporaneously. Studying the country members of the North America Free Trade Agreement, we find that the effect on export of a contemporaneous decrease in the wage share in Mexico, Canada and the United States, is negative in all countries. In other words, the competitive advantage that each country gains because of a reduction in its wage share (to which is associated a decrease in export prices), is offset by a contemporaneous increase in competitiveness in the other two countries. Moreover, we find that NAFTA is overall wage-led: the profit share has a negative effect on aggregate demand. Chapter 4 tests whether it is possible that the effect of the profit share on growth is different in the long run and in the short run. Following Blecker (2014) our hypothesis is that in the short run the growth regime is less wage-led than it is in the long run. The results of our empirical investigation support this hypothesis, at least for the United States over the period 1950-2014. The effect of wages on consumption increases more than proportionally compared to the effect of profits on consumption from the short to the long run. Moreover, consumer debt seem to have only a short-run effect on consumption indicating that in the long run, when debt has to be repaid, consumption depends more on the level of income and on how it is distributed. Regarding investment, the effect of capacity utilization is always larger than the effect of the profit share and that the difference between the two effects is higher in the long run than in the short run. This confirms the hypothesis that in the long run, unless there is an increase in demand, it is likely that firms are not going to increase investments even in the presence of high profits. In addition, the rentier share of profits – that comprises dividends and interest payments – has a long-run negative effect on investment. In the long run rentiers divert firms’ profits from investment and, therefore, it weakens the effect of profits on investment. Finally, Chapter 5 studies the possibility of structural breaks in the relationship between functional distribution of income and growth. We argue that, from the 1980s, financialization and the European exchange rate agreements weakened the positive effect of the profit share on growth in Italy. The growth regime is therefore becoming less profit-led and more wage-led. Our results confirm this hypothesis and also shed light on the concept of cooperative and conflictual regimes as defined by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990).