Politics and protestant Lordship in North East Scotland during the reign of James VI: The life of George Keith, fourth Earl Marischal, 1554-1623

George Keith, fourth Earl Marischal is a case study of long-term, quietly successful and stable lordship through the reign of James VI. Marischal’s life provides a wholly underrepresented perspective on this era, where the study of rebellious and notorious characters has dominated. He is also a counter-example to the notion of a general crisis among the European nobility, at least in the Scottish context, as well as to the notion of a ‘conservative’ or ‘Catholic’ north east. In 1580 George inherited the richest earldom in Scotland, with a geographical extent stretching along the east coast from Caithness to East Lothian. His family came to be this wealthy as a long term consequence of the Battle of Flodden (1513) where a branch of the family, the Inverugie Keiths had been killed. The heiress of this branch was married to the third earl and this had concentrated a large number of lands, and consequently wealth, in the hands of the earls. This had, however, also significantly decreased the number of members and hence power of the Keith kindred. The third earl’s conversion to Protestantism in 1544 and later his adherence to the King’s Party during the Marian Civil War forced the Keiths into direct confrontation with their neighbours in the north east, the Gordons (led by the Earls of Huntly), a Catholic family and supporters of the Queen’s Party. Although this feud was settled for a time at the end of the war, the political turmoil caused by a succession of short-lived factional regimes in the early part of the personal reign of James VI (c.1578-1585) led the new (fourth) Earl Marischal into direct confrontation with the new (sixth) Earl of Huntly. Marischal was outclassed, outmanoeuvred and outgunned at both court and in the locality in this feud, suffering considerably. However, Huntly’s over-ambition in wider court politics meant that Marischal was able to join various coalitions against his rival, until Huntly was exiled in 1595. Marischal also came into conflict briefly with Chancellor John Maitland of Thirlestane as a consequence of Marischal’s diplomatic mission to Denmark in 1589-1590, but was again outmatched politically and briefly imprisoned. Both of these feuds reveal Marischal to be relatively cautious and reactionary, and both reveal the limitations of his power. Elsewhere, the study of Marischal’s activities in the centre of Scottish politics reveal him to be unambitious. He was ready to serve King James, the two men having a healthy working relationship, but Marischal showed no ambition as a courtier, to woo the king’s favour or patronage, instead delegating interaction with the monarch to his kinsmen. Likewise, in government, Marischal rarely attended any of the committees he was entitled to attend, such as the Privy Council, although he did keep a keen eye on the land market and the business conducted under the Great Seal. Although personally devout and a committed Protestant, the study of Marischal’s interaction with the national Kirk and the parishes of which he was patron reveal that he was at times a negligent patron and exercised his right of ministerial presentation as lordly, not godly patronage. The notion of a ‘conservative North East’ is, however, rejected. Where Marischal was politically weak at court and weak in terms of force in the locality, we see him pursuing sideways approaches to dealing with this. Thus he was keen to build up his general influence in the north and in particular with the burgh of Aberdeen (one result of this being the creation of Marischal College in 1593), pursued disputes through increasing use of legal methods rather than bloodfeud (thus exploiting his wealth and compensating for his relative lack of force) and developed a sophisticated system of maritime infrastructure, ultimately expressed through the creating of the burghs of Peterhead and Stonehaven. Although his close family caused him a number of problems over his lifetime, he was able to pass on a stable and enlarged lordship to his son in 1623.

Warfare in the West Highlands and Isles of Scotland, c. 1544-1615

Warfare has long been associated with Scottish Highlanders and Islanders, especially in the period known in Gaelic tradition as ‘Linn nan Creach’ (the ‘Age of Forays’), which followed the forfeiture of the Lordship of the Isles in 1493. The sixteenth century in general is remembered as a particularly tumultuous time within the West Highlands and Isles, characterised by armed conflict on a seemingly unprecedented scale. Relatively little research has been conducted into the nature of warfare however, a gap filled by this thesis through its focus on a series of interconnected themes and in-depth case studies spanning the period c. 1544-1615. It challenges the idea that the sixteenth century and early seventeenth century was a time of endless bloodshed, and explores the rationale behind the distinctive mode of warfare practised in the West Highlands and Isles. The first part of the thesis traces the overall ‘Process of War’. Chapter 1 focuses on the mentality of the social elite in the West Highlands and Isles and demonstrates that warfare was not their raison d'être, but was tied inextricably to chiefs’ prime responsibility of protecting their lands and tenants. Chapter 2 assesses the causation of warfare and reveals that a recurrent catalyst for armed conflict was the assertion of rights to land and inheritance. There were other important causes however, including clan expectation, honour culture, punitive government policies, and the use of proxy warfare by prominent magnates. Chapter 3 takes a fresh approach to the military capacity of the region through analysis of armies and soldiers, and the final thematic chapter tackles the conduct of warfare in the West Highlands and Isles, with analysis of the tactics and strategy of militarised personnel. The second part of this thesis comprises five case studies: the Clanranald, 1544-77; the Colquhouns of Luss and the Lennox, 1592-1603; the MacLeods of Harris and MacDonalds of Sleat, 1594-1601; the Camerons, 1569-1614; and the ‘Islay Rising’, 1614-15. This thesis adopts a unique approach by contextualising the political background of warfare in order to instil a deeper understanding of why early modern Gaelic Scots resorted to bloodshed. Overall, this period was defined by a sharp rise in military activity, followed by an even sharper decline, a trajectory that will be evidenced vividly in the final case study on the ‘Islay Rising’. Although warfare was widespread, it was not unrestrained or continuous, and the traditional image of a region riven by perpetual bloodshed has been greatly exaggerated.

The Scottish Parliament in the 15th and 16th centuries

Earlier histories of the Scottish parliament have been somewhat constitutional in emphasis and have been exceedingly critical of what was understood to be parliament's subservience to the crown. Estimates by constitutional historians of the extreme weakness of parliament rested on an assessment of the constitutional system. The argument was that many of its features were not consistent with a reasonably strong parliament. Because the 'constitution' is apparently fragmented, with active roles played by bodies such as the lords of articles, the general council and the convention of estates, each apparently suggesting that parliament was inadequate, historians have sometimes failed to appreciate the positive role played by the estates in the conduct of national affairs. The thesis begins with a discussion of the reliability of the printed text of APS and proceeds to an examination of selected aspects of the work of parliament in a period from c 1424-c 1625. The belief of constitutional historians such as Rait that conditions In Scotland proved unfavourable to the interests and. effectiveness of parliament in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, is also examined. Chapter 1 concludes that APS is a less than reliable text, particularly for the reign of James I. Numerous statutes were excluded from the printed text and they are offered below for the first time. These statutes have been a useful addition to our understanding of the reign of James I. Chapter 2 analyses the motives behind the schemes for shire representation and concludes that neither constitutional theory nor political opportunism explains the support which James I and James VI gave to these measures. Both these monarchs were motivated by the realisation that their particular ambitions were dependent on winning the support of the estates whose ranks should include representatives from the shires. Chapter 3 examines the method of electing the lords of articles, the composition of this committee, and some aspects of its operation. The conclusion is that in the main the estates were the deciding force in the choice of the lords of articles. The committee's composition was more a reflection of a desire for a balance between representatives from north and south of the Forth and for the most important burghs and clergy to be selected than an attempt at electing government favourites. The articles did exercise a significant control over the items which came before parliament but this control was not absolute and applied to government as well as private legislation. Chapter 4 questions the traditional view that the general council and convention of estates were the same body. It is argued that they were two different institutions with different powers, but that they nevertheless worked within certain limits and were careful not to usurp the authority of parliament. Chapter 5 concedes that taxation was sometimes decided outside parliament; that the irregularity of taxation certainly weakened the bargaining power of the estates and that the latter did not appear to capitalise on these occasions when taxation was an issue. But the tendency was to ensure that, whether in or out of parliament, the decision to impose taxation was taken by a large number of each estate. The infrequency of taxation was a direct consequence of an unwillingness among the estates to agree to a regular taxation and their preference to ensure for the crown an alternative source of income. Moreover taxation was one issue, which more than any other, would be subject to contentious opposition by the estates, and could lead to the crown's defeat. Chapter 6 is concerned with ecclesiastical representation after the Reformation and the church's attitudes to the possibility of ministerial representation. Some ministers had doctrinal misgivings but the majority came to believe that the church's absence from parliament bad severely reduced. the influence of the church. That no agreement was forthcoming on a system of ministerial representation, particularly after 1597, is attributable to the estates' unwillingness to compromise and, not to the strength of opposition in the church. Chapter 7 examines the institutions which are sometime seen as 'rivals' of parliament and concludes that institutions such as the privy council were generally very careful in matters which needed the approval of parliament, and seemed aware of the greater authority of parliament. Chapter 8 which illustrates how parliament had the right to be consulted in all important matters of state, brings together the main points of the earlier chapters and offers further illustrations of the essential role which parliament played in the conduct of national affairs. Whether or not the system can be regarded as constitutionally sound, the estates in Scotland could observe parliament's day-to-day operation with some satisfaction. All in all, there is little convincing evidence that parliament was as weak as some historians would have us believe.