3 resultados para public good game
em eResearch Archive - Queensland Department of Agriculture
Resumo:
This paper describes adoption rates of environmental assurance within meat and wool supply chains, and discusses this in terms of market interest and demand for certified 'environmentally friendly' products, based on phone surveys and personal interviews with pastoral producers, meat and wool processors, wholesalers and retailers, and domestic consumers. Members of meat and wool supply chains, particularly pastoral producers, are both aware of and interested in implementing various forms of environmental assurance, but significant costs combined with few private benefits have resulted in low adoption rates. The main reason for the lack of benefits is that the end user (the consumer) does not value environmental assurance and is not willing to pay for it. For this reason, global food and fibre supply chains, which compete to supply consumers with safe and quality food at the lowest price, resist public pressure to implement environmental assurance. This market failure is further exacerbated by highly variable environmental and social production standards required of primary producers in different countries, and the disparate levels of government support provided to them. Given that it is the Australian general public and not markets that demand environmental benefits from agriculture, the Australian government has a mandate to use public funds to counter this market failure. A national farm environmental policy should utilise a range of financial incentives to reward farmers for delivering general public good environmental outcomes, with these specified and verified through a national environmental assurance scheme.
Resumo:
This paper outlines the expectations of a wide range of stakeholders for environmental assurance in the pastoral industries and agriculture generally. Stakeholders consulted were domestic consumers, rangeland graziers, members of environmental groups, companies within meat and wool supply chains, and agricultural industry, environmental and consumer groups. Most stakeholders were in favour of the application of environmental assurance to agriculture, although supply chains and consumers had less enthusiasm for this than environmental and consumer groups. General public good benefits were more important to environmental and consumer groups, while private benefits were more important to consumers and supply chains. The 'ideal' form of environmental assurance appears to be a management system that provides for continuous improvement in environmental, quality and food safety outcomes, combined with elements of ISO 14024 eco-labelling such as life-cycle assessment, environmental performance criteria, third-party certification, labelling and multi-stakeholder involvement. However, market failure prevents this from being implemented and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. In the short term, members of supply chains (the people that must implement and fund environmental assurance) want this to be kept simple and low cost, to be built into their existing industry standards and to add value to their businesses. As a starting point, several agricultural industry organisations favour the use of a basic management system, combining continuous improvement, risk assessment and industry best management practice programs, which can be built on over time to meet regulator, market and community expectations.
Resumo:
Standards for farm animal welfare are variously managed at a national level by government-led regulatory control, by consumer-led welfare economics and co-regulated control in a partnership between industry and government. In the latter case the control of research to support animal welfare standards by the relevant industry body may lead to a conflict of interest on the part of researchers, who are dependent on industry for continued research funding. We examine this dilemma by reviewing two case studies of research published under an Australian co-regulated control system. Evidence of unsupported conclusions that are favourable to industry is provided, suggesting that researchers do experience a conflict of interest that may influence the integrity of the research. Alternative models for the management of research are discussed, including the establishment of an independent research management body for animal welfare because of its public good status and the use of public money derived from taxation, with representation from government, industry, consumers, and advocacy groups.