New tools for management of phosphine resistance

Phosphine is the primary fumigant used to protect the majority of the world' s grain and a variety of other stored commodities from insect pests. Phosphine is playing an increasingly important role in the protection of commodities for two primary reasons. Firstly, use of the alternative fumigant, methyl bromide, has been sharply curtailed and is tightly regulated due to its role in ozone depletion, and secondly, consumers are becoming increasingly intolerant of contact pesticides. Niche alternatives to phosphine exist, but they suffer from a range of factors that limit their use, including: 1) Limited commercial adoption due to expense or slow mode of action; 2) Poor efficacy due to low toxicity, rapid sorption, limited volatility or high density; 3) Public health concerns due to toxicity to handlers or nearby residents, as well as risk of explosion; 4) Poor consumer acceptance due to toxic residues or smell. These same factors limit the prospects of quickly identifying and deploying a new fumigant. Given that resistance toward phosphine is increasing among insect pests, improved monitoring and management of resistance is a priority. Knowledge of the mode of action of phosphine as well as the mechanisms of resistance may also greatly reduce the effort and expense of identifying synergists or novel replacement compounds.

Large-scale expansion of no-take closures within the Great Barrier Reef has not enhanced fishery production

A rare opportunity to test hypotheses about potential fishery benefits of large-scale closures was initiated in July 2004 when an additional 28.4% of the 348 000 km2 Great Barrier Reef (GBR) region of Queensland, Australia was closed to all fishing. Advice to the Australian and Queensland governments that supported this initiative predicted these additional closures would generate minimal (10%) initial reductions in both catch and landed value within the GBR area, with recovery of catches becoming apparent after three years. To test these predictions, commercial fisheries data from the GBR area and from the two adjacent (non-GBR) areas of Queensland were compared for the periods immediately before and after the closures were implemented. The observed means for total annual catch and value within the GBR declined from pre-closure (2000–2003) levels of 12 780 Mg and Australian $160 million, to initial post-closure (2005–2008) levels of 8143 Mg and $102 million; decreases of 35% and 36% respectively. Because the reference areas in the non-GBR had minimal changes in catch and value, the beyond-BACI (before, after, control, impact) analyses estimated initial net reductions within the GBR of 35% for both total catch and value. There was no evidence of recovery in total catch levels or any comparative improvement in catch rates within the GBR nine years after implementation. These results are not consistent with the advice to governments that the closures would have minimal initial impacts and rapidly generate benefits to fisheries in the GBR through increased juvenile recruitment and adult spillovers. Instead, the absence of evidence of recovery in catches to date currently supports an alternative hypothesis that where there is already effective fisheries management, the closing of areas to all fishing will generate reductions in overall catches similar to the percentage of the fished area that is closed.