3 resultados para Risk society and identity
em eResearch Archive - Queensland Department of Agriculture
Resumo:
Over 1 billion ornamental fish comprising more than 4000 freshwater and 1400 marine species are traded internationally each year, with 8-10 million imported into Australia alone. Compared to other commodities, the pathogens and disease translocation risks associated with this pattern of trade have been poorly documented. The aim of this study was to conduct an appraisal of the effectiveness of risk analysis and quarantine controls as they are applied according to the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement in Australia. Ornamental fish originate from about 100 countries and hazards are mostly unknown; since 2000 there have been 16-fold fewer scientific publications on ornamental fish disease compared to farmed fish disease, and 470 fewer compared to disease in terrestrial species (cattle). The import quarantine policies of a range of countries were reviewed and classified as stringent or non-stringent based on the levels of pre-border and border controls. Australia has a stringent policy which includes pre-border health certification and a mandatory quarantine period at border of 1-3 weeks in registered quarantine premises supervised by government quarantine staff. Despite these measures there have been many disease incursions as well as establishment of significant exotic viral, bacterial, fungal, protozoal and metazoan pathogens from ornamental fish in farmed native Australian fish and free-living introduced species. Recent examples include Megalocytivirus and Aeromonas salmonicida atypical strain. In 2006, there were 22 species of alien ornamental fish with established breeding populations in waterways in Australia and freshwater plants and molluscs have also been introduced, proving a direct transmission pathway for establishment of pathogens in native fish species. Australia's stringent quarantine policies for imported ornamental fish are based on import risk analysis under the SPS agreement but have not provided an acceptable level of protection (ALOP) consistent with government objectives to prevent introduction of pests and diseases, promote development of future aquaculture industries or maintain biodiversity. It is concluded that the risk analysis process described by the Office International des Epizooties under the SPS agreement cannot be used in a meaningful way for current patterns of ornamental fish trade. Transboundary disease incursions will continue and exotic pathogens will become established in new regions as a result of the ornamental fish trade, and this will be an international phenomenon. Ornamental fish represent a special case in live animal trade where OIE guidelines for risk analysis need to be revised. Alternatively, for countries such as Australia with implied very high ALOP, the number of species traded and the number of sources permitted need to be dramatically reduced to facilitate hazard identification, risk assessment and import quarantine controls. Lead papers of the eleventh symposium of the International Society for Veterinary Epidemiology and Economics (ISVEE), Cairns, Australia
Resumo:
The threat and management of glyphosate# resistant weeds are major issues facing northern region growers. At present five weeds are confirmed glyphosate-resistant: barnyard grass, liverseed grass, windmill grass, annual ryegrass and flaxleaf fleabane. This project used 25 experiments to investigate the ecology of the grass weeds, plus new or improved chemical and non-chemical control tactics for them. The refined glyphosate resistance model developed in this project used the experiments' findings to predict the long-term impacts on evolution of resistance and on seed bank numbers of resistant weeds. These data led to revised management and resistance avoidance strategies, which were published in the Reporter newsletter, and via an on-line risk assessment tool. - See more at: http://finalreports.grdc.com.au/UQ00054#sthash.oTkCN4Sk.dpuf
Resumo:
Hendra virus is a highly pathogenic novel paramyxovirus causing sporadic fatal infection in horses and humans in Australia. Species of fruit-bats (genus Pteropus), commonly known as flying-foxes, are the natural host of the virus. We undertook a survey of horse owners in the states of Queensland and New South Wales, Australia to assess the level of adoption of recommended risk management strategies and to identify impediments to adoption. Survey questionnaires were completed by 1431 respondents from the target states, and from a spectrum of industry sectors. Hendra virus knowledge varied with sector, but was generally limited, with only 13% of respondents rating their level of knowledge as high or very high. The majority of respondents (63%) had seen their state’s Hendra virus information for horse owners, and a similar proportion found the information useful. Fifty-six percent of respondents thought it moderately, very or extremely likely that a Hendra virus case could occur in their area, yet only 37% said they would consider Hendra virus if their horse was sick. Only 13% of respondents stabled their horses overnight, although another 24% said it would be easy or very easy to do so, but hadn’t done so. Only 13% and 15% of respondents respectively had horse feed bins and water points under solid cover. Responses varied significantly with state, likely reflecting different Hendra virus history. The survey identified inconsistent awareness and/or adoption of available knowledge, confusion in relation to Hendra virus risk perception, with both over-and under-estimation of true risk, and lag in the uptake of recommended risk minimisation strategies, even when these were readily implementable. However, we also identified frustration and potential alienation by horse owners who found the recommended strategies impractical, onerous and prohibitively expensive. The insights gained from this survey have broader application to other complex risk-management scenarios.