Central America: Labor Reports and Child Labor Reports Pursuant to the Trade Act of 2002, Section 2102(c)(8)-(9)

[Excerpt] These comments are in response to the “Request for Information Concerning Labor Rights in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua and their Laws Governing Exploitative Child Labor” published at 68 Fed. Reg. 19580 (April 21, 2003). This Request for Information was issued pursuant to Section 2102(c)(8) and (9) of the Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-210, which requires the President, with respect to any proposed trade agreement, to submit to Congress a “meaningful labor rights report” and a “report describing the extent to which the country or countries that are parties to the agreement have in effect laws governing exploitative child labor.”

The Eligibility Definition Used in the Social Security Administration’s Disability Programs Needs to be Changed

In its October 2003 report on the definition of disability used by the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) disability programs [i.e., Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) for people with disabilities], the Social Security Advisory Board raises the issue of whether this definition is at odds with the concept of disability embodied in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and, more importantly, with the aspirations of people with disabilities to be full participants in mainstream social activities and lead fulfilling, productive lives. The Board declares that “the Nation must face up to the contradictions created by the existing definition of disability.” I wholeheartedly agree. Further, I have concluded that we have to make fundamental, conceptual changes to both how we define eligibility for economic security benefits, and how we provide those benefits, if we are ever to fulfill the promise of the ADA. To convince you of that proposition, I will begin by relating a number of facts that paint a very bleak picture – a picture of deterioration in the economic security of the population that the disability programs are intended to serve; a picture of programs that purport to provide economic security, but are themselves financially insecure and subject to cycles of expansion and cuts that undermine their purpose; a picture of programs that are facing their biggest expenditure crisis ever; and a picture of an eligibility determination process that is inefficient and inequitable -- one that rations benefits by imposing high application costs on applicants in an arbitrary fashion. I will then argue that the fundamental reason for this bleak picture is the conceptual definition of eligibility that these programs use – one rooted in a disability paradigm that social scientists, people with disabilities, and, to a substantial extent, the public have rejected as being flawed, most emphatically through the passage of the ADA. Current law requires eligibility rules to be based on the premise that disability is medically determinable. That’s wrong because, as the ADA recognizes, a person’s environment matters. I will further argue that programs relying on this eligibility definition must inevitably: reward people if they do not try to help themselves, but not if they do; push the people they serve out of society’s mainstream, fostering a culture of isolation and dependency; relegate many to a lifetime of poverty; and undermine their promise of economic security because of the periodic “reforms” that are necessary to maintain taxpayer support. I conclude by pointing out that to change the conceptual definition for program eligibility, we also must change our whole approach to providing for the economic security of people with disabilities. We need to replace our current “caretaker” approach with one that emphasizes helping people with disabilities help themselves. I will briefly describe features that such a program might require, and point out the most significant challenges we would face in making the transition.

Illegal Immigration and the U.S. Labor Market of the 1990s

Public testimony by Prof. Briggs given before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, April 5, 1995.

The Apparel Industry and Codes of Conduct: A Solution to the International Child Labor Problem?

This report is the third volume in ILAB’s international child labor series. It focuses on the use of child labor in the production of apparel for the U.S. market, and reviews the extent to which U.S. apparel importers have established and are implementing codes of conduct or other business guidelines prohibiting the use of child labor in the production of the clothing they sell. The report was mandated by the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, P.L. 104-134.

Labor Regulations and Unionization Trends: Comparative Analysis of Latin American Countries

This paper discusses the influences of labor regulations on unionization rates through the comparative analysis of Argentina, Chile and Mexico, expecting to contribute to the understanding of the determinants of unionization in Latin America. These regulations, though only one of the factors determining unionization levels, have a crucial role, their influence being at least threefold: they define entitlements to and exclusions from the right to unionize, affect union recruitment strategies and, by generating incentives and disincentives, contribute to shape individual membership decisions. After discussing historical aspects of unionization in the three countries, the analysis centers successively in two periods in which the countries compared showed both similarities and contrasts relevant to the analysis of unionization trends. In the first, the comparison is between Argentina (1976-83) and Chile (1973-89), both under military regimes that had much in common, but with contrasting unionization trends. In the second, the focus is in Argentina (1991-2001) and Mexico (1984-2000), where the reforms implemented to liberalize the economy and ensuing social-economic and labor market transformations were similar, but unionization trends differed. It is argued that, in each case, the divergent behavior of unionization, in spite of the similar economic and sociopolitical contexts, may at least partly be attributed to differences in key labor institutions.

The Municipal Budgetary Response to Changing Labor Costs: The Case of San Francisco

"This paper analyzes how expenditures of the city of San Francisco were altered in response to changes in municipal labor costs over the period 1945 through 1976. A hybrid of the "demands" and the "organizational" models of budgeting is used to measure the budgetary response to changes in the relative prices of labor inputs. Descriptive and econometric evidence reveals significant adjustments both among and within departments in reaction to changes in relative labor costs. The empirical evidence demonstrates that the city's budgetary process is guided by simple allocative rules modified by price-responsive adjustments."

Institute for Community College Development Addresses Leadership Crisis

[Excerpt] It is projected that between 2001 and 2007, 47 percent of community college presidents will have left their positions. At a time when challenges are growing more complex, the senior administrators who typically moved into presidencies are also "aging out," leaving fewer qualified individuals in the pipeline. The Institute for Community College Development (ICCD), a partnership between the State University of New York (SUNY) and Cornell, was founded by a group of community college presidents to respond to this leadership crisis. ICCD has been part of ILR since 2001.

Labor-Management Cooperation

[Excerpt] In analyzing labor-management cooperation, it is important to be clear on what it is not. It is not an absence of strikes or conflict. Cooperation is not synonymous with industrial peace. Cooperation may take place even when bargaining leads to work stoppages; conversely, the mere absence of strikes is no evidence that there is labor-management cooperation. In the current period, there is a tendency to equate concessionary bargaining with labor-management cooperation. Demand for and acceptance of "givebacks" reflect economic pressures and relative bargaining strength and ought not to be interpreted as evidence of a cooperative relationship.