Generalized isotropic Lipkin-Meshkov-Glick models: ground state entanglement and quantum entropies

We introduce a new class of generalized isotropic Lipkin–Meshkov–Glick models with su(m+1) spin and long-range non-constant interactions, whose non-degenerate ground state is a Dicke state of su(m+1) type. We evaluate in closed form the reduced density matrix of a block of Lspins when the whole system is in its ground state, and study the corresponding von Neumann and Rényi entanglement entropies in the thermodynamic limit. We show that both of these entropies scale as a log L when L tends to infinity, where the coefficient a is equal to (m  −  k)/2 in the ground state phase with k vanishing magnon densities. In particular, our results show that none of these generalized Lipkin–Meshkov–Glick models are critical, since when L-->∞ their Rényi entropy R_q becomes independent of the parameter q. We have also computed the Tsallis entanglement entropy of the ground state of these generalized su(m+1) Lipkin–Meshkov–Glick models, finding that it can be made extensive by an appropriate choice of its parameter only when m-k≥3. Finally, in the su(3) case we construct in detail the phase diagram of the ground state in parameter space, showing that it is determined in a simple way by the weights of the fundamental representation of su(3). This is also true in the su(m+1) case; for instance, we prove that the region for which all the magnon densities are non-vanishing is an (m  +  1)-simplex in R^m whose vertices are the weights of the fundamental representation of su(m+1).

Rational choice, social identity, and beliefs about oneself

Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. However, internalist theorists tend to reduce identity to desire—the desire of a person to express his or her social being. From an internalist point of view, that is, from a viewpoint in which not only desires but also beliefs play a key role in social explanations as mental entities, this article rejects externalist reductionism and proposes a redefinition of social identity as a net of beliefs about oneself, beliefs that are indexical, robust, and socially shaped.