An econometric analysis of ETF and ETF futures in financial and energy markets using generated regressors

It is well known that that there is an intrinsic link between the financial and energy sectors, which can be analyzed through their spillover effects, which are measures of how the shocks to returns in different assets affect each other’s subsequent volatility in both spot and futures markets. Financial derivatives, which are not only highly representative of the underlying indices but can also be traded on both the spot and futures markets, include Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), which is a tradable spot index whose aim is to replicate the return of an underlying benchmark index. When ETF futures are not available to examine spillover effects, “generated regressors” may be used to construct both Financial ETF futures and Energy ETF futures. The purpose of the paper is to investigate the covolatility spillovers within and across the US energy and financial sectors in both spot and futures markets, by using “generated regressors” and a multivariate conditional volatility model, namely Diagonal BEKK. The daily data used are from 1998/12/23 to 2016/4/22. The data set is analyzed in its entirety, and also subdivided into three subset time periods. The empirical results show there is a significant relationship between the Financial ETF and Energy ETF in the spot and futures markets. Therefore, financial and energy ETFs are suitable for constructing a financial portfolio from an optimal risk management perspective, and also for dynamic hedging purposes.

Auctioning versus grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and firms have private information on their own abatement technologies. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction. At the auction, each firm anticipates its role in the secondary market, either as a leader or a follower. This role affects each firms’ valuation of the permits (which are not common across firms) as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it occurs in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms’ abatement cost functions are sufficiently different from one another, especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and the dispersion of the marginal costs is large enough.