Designing Efficient Subsidy Policies in a Regional Economy: A Multicriteria Decision-Making (MCDM)-Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Approach

Since policy-makers usually pursue several conflicting objectives, policy-making can be understood as a multicriteria decision problem. Following the methodological proposal by André and Cardenete (2005) André, F. J. and Cardenete, M. A. 2005. Multicriteria Policy Making. Defining Efficient Policies in a General Equilibrium Model, Seville: Centro de Estudios Andaluces. Working Paper No. E2005/04, multi-objective programming is used in connection with a computable general equilibrium model to represent optimal policy-making and to obtain so-called efficient policies in an application to a regional economy (Andalusia, Spain). This approach is applied to the design of subsidy policies under two different scenarios. In the first scenario, it is assumed that the government is concerned just about two objectives: ensuring the profitability of a key strategic sector and increasing overall output. Finally, the scope of the exercise is enlarged by solving a problem with seven policy objectives, including both general and sectorial objectives. It is concluded that the observed policy could have been Pareto-improved in several directions.

Incentive based policies on climate change: taxes and tradable emssions permits

The reduction of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) plays a central role in the environmental policies considered by countries for implementation not only at its own level but also at supranational levels. This thesis is dedicated to investigate some aspects of two of the most relevant climate change policies. The first part is dedicated to emission permit markets and the second part to optimal carbon taxes. On emission permit markets we explore the strategic behavior of oligopolistic firms operating in polluting industrial sectors that are regulated by cap and trade systems. Our aim is to identify how market power influences the main results obtained under perfect competition assumptions and to understand how actions taken in one market affects the outcome of the other related market. A partial equilibrium model is developed for this purpose with specific abatement cost functions. In Chapter 2 we use the model to explain some of the most relevant literature results. In Chapter 3 the model is used to analyze different oligopolistic structures in the product market under the assumption of competitive permits market. There are two significant findings. Firstly, under the assumption of a Stackelberg oligopoly, firms have no incentives for lobbying in order to manipulate permit prices up, as they have under Cournot competition...