Essays on internationalization in the context of heterogeneous firms

The significant increase in global trade flows in last decades has been one of the main features of the globalization process that started in the 1950s. In general, the main factors behind this increase were linked to (i) the significant reductions of trade costs and technical barriers; (ii) the improvements in transport infrastructure and telecommunications; (iii) the progress of the international financial system and the increasing legal certainty; and (iv) the development of a corporate culture that promotes the internationalization of firms as a strategic tool in order to survive and to grow. The remarkable increase of trade openness has also been observed in the Spanish economy. In this regard, it is clear that the entry into force of the Treaty of Accession of Spain to the European Economic Community (now the European Union) in 1986 played a main role in this dramatic increase. In addition, and because of the deep depression of domestic demand caused by the global financial and economic crisis that started in 2008, the external trade has become a key driver in the economic recovery of the Spanish economy...

Auctioning versus grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and firms have private information on their own abatement technologies. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction. At the auction, each firm anticipates its role in the secondary market, either as a leader or a follower. This role affects each firms’ valuation of the permits (which are not common across firms) as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it occurs in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms’ abatement cost functions are sufficiently different from one another, especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and the dispersion of the marginal costs is large enough.