Auctioning versus grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and firms have private information on their own abatement technologies. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction. At the auction, each firm anticipates its role in the secondary market, either as a leader or a follower. This role affects each firms’ valuation of the permits (which are not common across firms) as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it occurs in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms’ abatement cost functions are sufficiently different from one another, especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and the dispersion of the marginal costs is large enough.

Groups, information theory, and Einstein's likelihood principle

We propose a unifying picture where the notion of generalized entropy is related to information theory by means of a group-theoretical approach. The group structure comes from the requirement that an entropy be well defined with respect to the composition of independent systems, in the context of a recently proposed generalization of the Shannon-Khinchin axioms. We associate to each member of a large class of entropies a generalized information measure, satisfying the additivity property on a set of independent systems as a consequence of the underlying group law. At the same time, we also show that Einstein's likelihood function naturally emerges as a byproduct of our informational interpretation of (generally nonadditive) entropies. These results confirm the adequacy of composable entropies both in physical and social science contexts.