Crisis and Welfare Society in Spain

Some arguments are briefly presented about the negative consequences of the deep global economic and financial crisis of 2008 on the economic activity and the social situation in Spain. Reformulation, sustainability and financial viability of social welfare in Spain require a new management through resource efficiency, increasing market presence and initiative of stakeholders as a whole. In this sense, the main credible argument of the welfare social in Spain depends on a new perspective on socialization and generosity of social protection system. Specifically, the solution to the crisis must come through economic growth, increased productivity, employment and competitiveness and not by the way of increasing levels of social protection.

Incentive based policies on climate change: taxes and tradable emssions permits

The reduction of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) plays a central role in the environmental policies considered by countries for implementation not only at its own level but also at supranational levels. This thesis is dedicated to investigate some aspects of two of the most relevant climate change policies. The first part is dedicated to emission permit markets and the second part to optimal carbon taxes. On emission permit markets we explore the strategic behavior of oligopolistic firms operating in polluting industrial sectors that are regulated by cap and trade systems. Our aim is to identify how market power influences the main results obtained under perfect competition assumptions and to understand how actions taken in one market affects the outcome of the other related market. A partial equilibrium model is developed for this purpose with specific abatement cost functions. In Chapter 2 we use the model to explain some of the most relevant literature results. In Chapter 3 the model is used to analyze different oligopolistic structures in the product market under the assumption of competitive permits market. There are two significant findings. Firstly, under the assumption of a Stackelberg oligopoly, firms have no incentives for lobbying in order to manipulate permit prices up, as they have under Cournot competition...