The XMM deep survey in the CDF-S. VI. Obscured AGN selected as infrared power-law galaxies

Context. Accretion onto supermassive black holes is believed to occur mostly in obscured active galactic nuclei (AGN). Such objects are proving rather elusive in surveys of distant galaxies, including those at X-ray energies. Aims. Our main goal is to determine whether the revised IRAC criteria of Donley et al. (2012, ApJ, 748, 142; objects with an infrared (IR) power-law spectral shape), are effective at selecting X-ray type-2 AGN (i.e., absorbed N_H > 10^22 cm^-2). Methods. We present the results from the X-ray spectral analysis of 147 AGN selected by cross-correlating the highest spectral quality ultra-deep XMM-Newton and the Spitzer/IRAC catalogues in the Chandra Deep Field South. Consequently it is biased towards sources with high S/N X-ray spectra. In order to measure the amount of intrinsic absorption in these sources, we adopt a simple X-ray spectral model that includes a power-law modified by intrinsic absorption at the redshift of each source and a possible soft X-ray component. Results. We find 21/147 sources to be heavily absorbed but the uncertainties in their obscuring column densities do not allow us to confirm their Compton-Thick nature without resorting to additional criteria. Although IR power-law galaxies are less numerous in our sample than IR non-power-law galaxies (60 versus 87 respectively), we find that the fraction of absorbed (N_H^intr > 10^22 cm^-2) AGN is significantly higher (at about 3 sigma level) for IR-power-law sources (similar to 2/3) than for those sources that do not meet this IR selection criteria (~1/2). This behaviour is particularly notable at low luminosities, but it appears to be present, although with a marginal significance, at all luminosities. Conclusions. We therefore conclude that the IR power-law method is efficient in finding X-ray-absorbed sources. We would then expect that the long-sought dominant population of absorbed AGN is abundant among IR power-law spectral shape sources not detected in X-rays.

Auctioning versus grandfathering in cap-and-trade systems with market power and incomplete information

We compare auctioning and grandfathering as allocation mechanisms of emission permits when there is a secondary market with market power and firms have private information on their own abatement technologies. Based on real-life cases such as the EU ETS, we consider a multi-unit, multi-bid uniform auction. At the auction, each firm anticipates its role in the secondary market, either as a leader or a follower. This role affects each firms’ valuation of the permits (which are not common across firms) as well as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it occurs in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms’ abatement cost functions are sufficiently different from one another, especially if the follower has lower abatement costs than the leader and the dispersion of the marginal costs is large enough.