14 resultados para Key Agreement Protocol
em Chinese Academy of Sciences Institutional Repositories Grid Portal
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Natl Univ Defen Technol, China & Nanyang Technol Univ, NUDT
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针对用于移动通信的可证安全的双向认证密钥协商协议MAKAP给出了一种有效攻击,指出谊协议存在安全缺陷,它不能抵抗未知密钥共享攻击.分析了这些安全缺陷产生的原因,并给出了一种改进的协议MAKAP-I.改进后的MAKAP-I协议不但是可证安全的,而且无论从计算开销、通信开销、存储开销以及实现成本等方面,都比原MAKAP协议更高效、更实用.
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群组密钥协商是群组通信中非常重要的基本工具,如何得到一个安全有效的密钥协商协议是当前密码学研究中的一个重要问题。基于双线性对和随机预言模型,针对移动网络提出了一个动态群组密钥协商方案。此方案就计算复杂度和通信复杂度而言都是高效的,而且满足密钥协商所需耍的安全要求。
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提出一种新的无线局域网认证密钥协商协议,可以提供双方相互认证及密钥确认.该协议在密钥设置上基于挑战响应协议和KAS方案,在密钥预分配上基于Diffie-Hellman协议,可以提供完美前向安全性,抵抗被动攻击、字典攻击、中间人攻击、假冒攻击等.并对协议的计算代价和通信代价进行分析.
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IEEE Computer Society
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为了实现网络安全,一个重要的方法是网络用户传送加密和可鉴定的消息.此时,用来加密和鉴定的密钥应该由网络中的用户协商得到.提出了3个基于Weil对的成对密钥协商协议.在协议中,所有用户共享一个秘密信息,通过较少的步骤,同时实现密钥协商和用户认证.提出的协议满足如下的安全特性:部分密钥泄漏的安全性、完备的前向安全性、个人密钥泄漏的安全性、无不明的密钥共享和无法控制密钥等.
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在串空间理论模型引入了描述DH问题的方法以及分析猜测攻击的攻击者能力,对基于口令认证的密钥交换协议的安全性进行了形式化分析.提出一个对DH-EKE协议的简化,并证明了该协议的安全性:口令的秘密性,认证性,以及会话密钥的秘密性.根据分析给出基于口令认证的密钥交换协议抵抗猜测攻击的基本条件.将分析方法应用到基于口令的三方密钥交换协议上,给出单纯基于口令进行密钥交换协议的安全性需要满足的一个必要条件.
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零知识集是一种新的具有零知识性质的集合.这种集合的构造使得证明者对于任意元素都可以给出一个证明,证明该元素属于这个集合或者不属于这个集合,同时不泄漏额外的信息.本文基于Pedersen承诺设计一种新的群组密钥分配方案,利用零知识集的性质实现密钥分配.协议不仅保证了组成员可以安全动态的获得组密钥,而且保证了组成员除了获取组密钥,不会得到群组中其它成员的相关信息.与先前工作相比,本文提出的方案提供了更高的安全特性,适合应用于一些较特殊的网络应用,如网络秘密会议.
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该文提出了一个通用可组合框架下的组密钥交换理想函数,并在防篡改硬件令牌的基础上,利用部分隔离状态下证据不可区分知识证明,设计了一个组密钥交换协议,安全地实现了这个理想函数.和采用CRS模型的协议相比,降低了把整个信任集中于一处带来的风险.提出的组密钥交换协议经过证明具有AKE安全,并且能够抵抗适应性敌手攻击和恶意参与者攻击.
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The RSA-based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols have been proposed to realize both mutual authentication and generation of secure session keys where a client is sharing his/her password only with a server and the latter should generate its RSA public/private key pair (e, n), (d, n) every time due to the lack of PKI (Public-Key Infrastructures). One of the ways to avoid a special kind of off-line (so called e-residue) attacks in the RSA-based PAKE protocols is to deploy a challenge/response method by which a client verifies the relative primality of e and φ(n) interactively with a server. However, this kind of RSA-based PAKE protocols did not give any proof of the underlying challenge/response method and therefore could not specify the exact complexity of their protocols since there exists another security parameter, needed in the challenge/response method. In this paper, we first present an RSA-based PAKE (RSA-PAKE) protocol that can deploy two different challenge/response methods (denoted by Challenge/Response Method1 and Challenge/Response Method2). The main contributions of this work include: (1) Based on the number theory, we prove that the Challenge/Response Method1 and the Challenge/Response Method2 are secure against e-residue attacks for any odd prime e; (2) With the security parameter for the on-line attacks, we show that the RSA-PAKE protocol is provably secure in the random oracle model where all of the off-line attacks are not more efficient than on-line dictionary attacks; and (3) By considering the Hamming weight of e and its complexity in the RSA-PAKE protocol, we search for primes to be recommended for a practical use. We also compare the RSA-PAKE protocol with the previous ones mainly in terms of computation and communication complexities.