Comparing crowding in human and ideal observers.

A visual target is more difficult to recognize when it is surrounded by other, similar objects. This breakdown in object recognition is known as crowding. Despite a long history of experimental work, computational models of crowding are still sparse. Specifically, few studies have examined crowding using an ideal-observer approach. Here, we compare crowding in ideal observers with crowding in humans. We derived an ideal-observer model for target identification under conditions of position and identity uncertainty. Simulations showed that this model reproduces the hallmark of crowding, namely a critical spacing that scales with viewing eccentricity. To examine how well the model fits quantitatively to human data, we performed three experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, we measured observers' perceptual uncertainty about stimulus positions and identities, respectively, for a target in isolation. In Experiment 3, observers identified a target that was flanked by two distractors. We found that about half of the errors in Experiment 3 could be accounted for by the perceptual uncertainty measured in Experiments 1 and 2. The remainder of the errors could be accounted for by assuming that uncertainty (i.e., the width of internal noise distribution) about stimulus positions and identities depends on flanker proximity. Our results provide a mathematical restatement of the crowding problem and support the hypothesis that crowding behavior is a sign of optimality rather than a perceptual defect.

Contingency awareness in human aversive conditioning involves the middle frontal gyrus.

In contrast to the wealth of data describing the neural mechanisms underlying classical conditioning, we know remarkably little about the mechanisms involved in acquisition of explicit contingency awareness. Subjects variably acquire contingency awareness in classical conditioning paradigms, in which they are able to describe the temporal relationship between a conditioned cue and its outcome. Previous studies have implicated the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex in the acquisition of explicit knowledge, although their specific roles remain unclear. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to track the trial-by-trial acquisition of explicit knowledge in a concurrent trace and delay conditioning paradigm. We show that activity in bilateral middle frontal gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus correlates with the accuracy of explicit contingency awareness on each trial. In contrast, amygdala activation correlates with conditioned responses indexed by skin conductance responses (SCRs). These results demonstrate that brain regions known to be involved in other aspects of learning and memory also play a specific role, reflecting on each trial the acquisition and representation of contingency awareness.