16 resultados para repeated game

em Cambridge University Engineering Department Publications Database


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Most tribological pairs carry their service load not just once but for a very large number of repeated cycles. During the early stages of this life, protective residual stresses may be developed in the near surface layers which enable loads which are of sufficient magnitude to cause initial plastic deformation to be accommodated purely elastically in the longer term. This is an example of the phenomenon of 'shakedown' and when its effects are incorporated into the design and operation schedule of machine components this process can lead to significant increases in specific loading duties or improvements in material utilization. Although the underlying principles can be demonstrated by reference to relatively simple stress systems, when a moving Hertzian pressure distribution in considered, which is the form of loading applicable to many contact problems, the situation is more complex. In the absence of exact solutions, bounding theorems, adopted from the theory of plasticity, can be used to generate appropriate load or shakedown limits so that shakedown maps can be drawn which delineate the boundaries between potentially safe and unsafe operating conditions. When the operating point of the contact lies outside the shakedown limit there will be an increment of plastic strain with each application of the load - these can accumulate leading eventually to either component failure or the loss of material by wear. © 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Players cooperate in experiments more than game theory would predict. We introduce the ‘returns-based beliefs’ approach: the expected returns of a particular strategy in proportion to total expected returns of all strategies. Using a decision analytic solution concept, Luce’s (1959) probabilistic choice model, and ‘hyperpriors’ for ambiguity in players’ cooperability, our approach explains empirical observations in various classes of games including the Prisoner’s and Traveler’s Dilemmas. Testing the closeness of fit of our model on Selten and Chmura (2008) data for completely mixed 2 × 2 games shows that with loss aversion, returns-based beliefs explain the data better than other equilibrium concepts.