Opt-out options in new product co-development partnerships

We study three contractual arrangements—co-development, licensing, and co-development with opt-out options—for the joint development of new products between a small and financially constrained innovator firm and a large technology company, as in the case of a biotech innovator and a major pharma company. We formulate our arguments in the context of a two-stage model, characterized by technical risk and stochastically changing cost and revenue projections. The model captures the main disadvantages of traditional co-development and licensing arrangements: in co-development the small firm runs a risk of running out of capital as future costs rise, while licensing for milestone and royalty (M&R) payments, which eliminates the latter risk, introduces inefficiency, as profitable projects might be abandoned. Counter to intuition we show that the biotech's payoff in a licensing contract is not monotonically increasing in the M&R terms. We also show that an option clause in a co-development contract that gives the small firm the right but not the obligation to opt out of co-development and into a pre-agreed licensing arrangement avoids the problems associated with fully committed co-development or licensing: the probability that the small firm will run out of capital is greatly reduced or completely eliminated and profitable projects are never abandoned.

Steering manufacturing firms towards service business model innovation

Increasingly, manufacturing firms are turning to services as a new way of creating and capturing value. Despite its potential benefits, many new product-service providers struggle to deploy service activities effectively, not least because they fail to refect the presence of service activities in their performance management systems. This article reports the results of an in-depth case study, which examines how manufacturers can steer the transition towards services. It shows that manufacturing firms need to emphasize two separate but related dimensions of the market performance of service activities: "service adoption," refecting the proportion of customers who purchase the manufacturer's services; and "service coverage," signaling the range of service elements or the comprehensiveness of the service contract that customers opt for. These two indicators, refecting service market performance, should be supplemented with a "complementarity index" designed to disclose whether the relationship between products and services is reinforcing or substitutive. When combined, these indicators allow manufacturing firms to deploy a service-based business model in an integrated and sustainable manner. © 2013 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.