Neural activity associated with the passive prediction of ambiguity and risk for aversive events.

In economic decision making, outcomes are described in terms of risk (uncertain outcomes with certain probabilities) and ambiguity (uncertain outcomes with uncertain probabilities). Humans are more averse to ambiguity than to risk, with a distinct neural system suggested as mediating this effect. However, there has been no clear disambiguation of activity related to decisions themselves from perceptual processing of ambiguity. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, we contrasted ambiguity, defined as a lack of information about outcome probabilities, to risk, where outcome probabilities are known, or ignorance, where outcomes are completely unknown and unknowable. We modified previously learned pavlovian CS+ stimuli such that they became an ambiguous cue and contrasted evoked brain activity both with an unmodified predictive CS+ (risky cue), and a cue that conveyed no information about outcome probabilities (ignorance cue). Compared with risk, ambiguous cues elicited activity in posterior inferior frontal gyrus and posterior parietal cortex during outcome anticipation. Furthermore, a similar set of regions was activated when ambiguous cues were compared with ignorance cues. Thus, regions previously shown to be engaged by decisions about ambiguous rewarding outcomes are also engaged by ambiguous outcome prediction in the context of aversive outcomes. Moreover, activation in these regions was seen even when no actual decision is made. Our findings suggest that these regions subserve a general function of contextual analysis when search for hidden information during outcome anticipation is both necessary and meaningful.

Differentiable neural substrates for learned and described value and risk.

Studies of human decision making emerge from two dominant traditions: learning theorists [1-3] study choices in which options are evaluated on the basis of experience, whereas behavioral economists and financial decision theorists study choices in which the key decision variables are explicitly stated. Growing behavioral evidence suggests that valuation based on these different classes of information involves separable mechanisms [4-8], but the relevant neuronal substrates are unknown. This is important for understanding the all-too-common situation in which choices must be made between alternatives that involve one or another kind of information. We studied behavior and brain activity while subjects made decisions between risky financial options, in which the associated utilities were either learned or explicitly described. We show a characteristic effect in subjects' behavior when comparing information acquired from experience with that acquired from description, suggesting that these kinds of information are treated differently. This behavioral effect was reflected neurally, and we show differential sensitivity to learned and described value and risk in brain regions commonly associated with reward processing. Our data indicate that, during decision making under risk, both behavior and the neural encoding of key decision variables are strongly influenced by the manner in which value information is presented.

Choosing to make an effort: the role of striatum in signaling physical effort of a chosen action.

The possibility that we will have to invest effort influences our future choice behavior. Indeed deciding whether an action is actually worth taking is a key element in the expression of human apathy or inertia. There is a well developed literature on brain activity related to the anticipation of effort, but how effort affects actual choice is less well understood. Furthermore, prior work is largely restricted to mental as opposed to physical effort or has confounded temporal with effortful costs. Here we investigated choice behavior and brain activity, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, in a study where healthy participants are required to make decisions between effortful gripping, where the factors of force (high and low) and reward (high and low) were varied, and a choice of merely holding a grip device for minimal monetary reward. Behaviorally, we show that force level influences the likelihood of choosing an effortful grip. We observed greater activity in the putamen when participants opt to grip an option with low effort compared with when they opt to grip an option with high effort. The results suggest that, over and above a nonspecific role in movement anticipation and salience, the putamen plays a crucial role in computations for choice that involves effort costs.

Blocking central opiate function modulates hedonic impact and anterior cingulate response to rewards and losses.

Reward processing is linked to specific neuromodulatory systems with a dopaminergic contribution to reward learning and motivational drive being well established. Neuromodulatory influences on hedonic responses to actual receipt of reward, or punishment, referred to as experienced utility are less well characterized, although a link to the endogenous opioid system is suggested. Here, in a combined functional magnetic resonance imaging-psychopharmacological investigation, we used naloxone to block central opioid function while subjects performed a gambling task associated with rewards and losses of different magnitudes, in which the mean expected value was always zero. A graded influence of naloxone on reward outcome was evident in an attenuation of pleasure ratings for larger reward outcomes, an effect mirrored in attenuation of brain activity to increasing reward magnitude in rostral anterior cingulate cortex. A more striking effect was seen for losses such that under naloxone all levels of negative outcome were rated as more unpleasant. This hedonic effect was associated with enhanced activity in anterior insula and caudal anterior cingulate cortex, areas implicated in aversive processing. Our data indicate that a central opioid system contributes to both reward and loss processing in humans and directly modulates the hedonic experience of outcomes.

Confidence in beliefs about pain predicts expectancy effects on pain perception and anticipatory processing in right anterior insula.

Psychological factors play a major role in exacerbating chronic pain. Effective self-management of pain is often hindered by inaccurate beliefs about the nature of pain which lead to a high degree of emotional reactivity. Probabilistic models of perception state that greater confidence (certainty) in beliefs increases their influence on perception and behavior. In this study, we treat confidence as a metacognitive process dissociable from the content of belief. We hypothesized that confidence is associated with anticipatory activation of areas of the pain matrix involved with top-down modulation of pain. Healthy volunteers rated their beliefs about the emotional distress that experimental pain would cause, and separately rated their level of confidence in this belief. Confidence predicted the influence of anticipation cues on experienced pain. We measured brain activity during anticipation of pain using high-density EEG and used electromagnetic tomography to determine neural substrates of this effect. Confidence correlated with activity in right anterior insula, posterior midcingulate and inferior parietal cortices during the anticipation of pain. Activity in the right anterior insula predicted a greater influence of anticipation cues on pain perception, whereas activity in right inferior parietal cortex predicted a decreased influence of anticipatory cues. The results support probabilistic models of pain perception and suggest that confidence in beliefs is an important determinant of expectancy effects on pain perception.

When fear is near: threat imminence elicits prefrontal-periaqueductal gray shifts in humans.

Humans, like other animals, alter their behavior depending on whether a threat is close or distant. We investigated spatial imminence of threat by developing an active avoidance paradigm in which volunteers were pursued through a maze by a virtual predator endowed with an ability to chase, capture, and inflict pain. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found that as the virtual predator grew closer, brain activity shifted from the ventromedial prefrontal cortex to the periaqueductal gray. This shift showed maximal expression when a high degree of pain was anticipated. Moreover, imminence-driven periaqueductal gray activity correlated with increased subjective degree of dread and decreased confidence of escape. Our findings cast light on the neural dynamics of threat anticipation and have implications for the neurobiology of human anxiety-related disorders.

Modulation of pain ratings by expectation and uncertainty: Behavioral characteristics and anticipatory neural correlates.

Expectations about the magnitude of impending pain exert a substantial effect on subsequent perception. However, the neural mechanisms that underlie the predictive processes that modulate pain are poorly understood. In a combined behavioral and high-density electrophysiological study we measured anticipatory neural responses to heat stimuli to determine how predictions of pain intensity, and certainty about those predictions, modulate brain activity and subjective pain ratings. Prior to receiving randomized laser heat stimuli at different intensities (low, medium or high) subjects (n=15) viewed cues that either accurately informed them of forthcoming intensity (certain expectation) or not (uncertain expectation). Pain ratings were biased towards prior expectations of either high or low intensity. Anticipatory neural responses increased with expectations of painful vs. non-painful heat intensity, suggesting the presence of neural responses that represent predicted heat stimulus intensity. These anticipatory responses also correlated with the amplitude of the Laser-Evoked Potential (LEP) response to painful stimuli when the intensity was predictable. Source analysis (LORETA) revealed that uncertainty about expected heat intensity involves an anticipatory cortical network commonly associated with attention (left dorsolateral prefrontal, posterior cingulate and bilateral inferior parietal cortices). Relative certainty, however, involves cortical areas previously associated with semantic and prospective memory (left inferior frontal and inferior temporal cortex, and right anterior prefrontal cortex). This suggests that biasing of pain reports and LEPs by expectation involves temporally precise activity in specific cortical networks.

Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others.

The neural processes underlying empathy are a subject of intense interest within the social neurosciences. However, very little is known about how brain empathic responses are modulated by the affective link between individuals. We show here that empathic responses are modulated by learned preferences, a result consistent with economic models of social preferences. We engaged male and female volunteers in an economic game, in which two confederates played fairly or unfairly, and then measured brain activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging while these same volunteers observed the confederates receiving pain. Both sexes exhibited empathy-related activation in pain-related brain areas (fronto-insular and anterior cingulate cortices) towards fair players. However, these empathy-related responses were significantly reduced in males when observing an unfair person receiving pain. This effect was accompanied by increased activation in reward-related areas, correlated with an expressed desire for revenge. We conclude that in men (at least) empathic responses are shaped by valuation of other people's social behaviour, such that they empathize with fair opponents while favouring the physical punishment of unfair opponents, a finding that echoes recent evidence for altruistic punishment.

Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain.

Our ability to have an experience of another's pain is characteristic of empathy. Using functional imaging, we assessed brain activity while volunteers experienced a painful stimulus and compared it to that elicited when they observed a signal indicating that their loved one--present in the same room--was receiving a similar pain stimulus. Bilateral anterior insula (AI), rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem, and cerebellum were activated when subjects received pain and also by a signal that a loved one experienced pain. AI and ACC activation correlated with individual empathy scores. Activity in the posterior insula/secondary somatosensory cortex, the sensorimotor cortex (SI/MI), and the caudal ACC was specific to receiving pain. Thus, a neural response in AI and rostral ACC, activated in common for "self" and "other" conditions, suggests that the neural substrate for empathic experience does not involve the entire "pain matrix." We conclude that only that part of the pain network associated with its affective qualities, but not its sensory qualities, mediates empathy.

Encoding of marginal utility across time in the human brain.

Marginal utility theory prescribes the relationship between the objective property of the magnitude of rewards and their subjective value. Despite its pervasive influence, however, there is remarkably little direct empirical evidence for such a theory of value, let alone of its neurobiological basis. We show that human preferences in an intertemporal choice task are best described by a model that integrates marginally diminishing utility with temporal discounting. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we show that activity in the dorsal striatum encodes both the marginal utility of rewards, over and above that which can be described by their magnitude alone, and the discounting associated with increasing time. In addition, our data show that dorsal striatum may be involved in integrating subjective valuation systems inherent to time and magnitude, thereby providing an overall metric of value used to guide choice behavior. Furthermore, during choice, we show that anterior cingulate activity correlates with the degree of difficulty associated with dissonance between value and time. Our data support an integrative architecture for decision making, revealing the neural representation of distinct subcomponents of value that may contribute to impulsivity and decisiveness.

Striatal activity underlies novelty-based choice in humans.

The desire to seek new and unfamiliar experiences is a fundamental behavioral tendency in humans and other species. In economic decision making, novelty seeking is often rational, insofar as uncertain options may prove valuable and advantageous in the long run. Here, we show that, even when the degree of perceptual familiarity of an option is unrelated to choice outcome, novelty nevertheless drives choice behavior. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we show that this behavior is specifically associated with striatal activity, in a manner consistent with computational accounts of decision making under uncertainty. Furthermore, this activity predicts interindividual differences in susceptibility to novelty. These data indicate that the brain uses perceptual novelty to approximate choice uncertainty in decision making, which in certain contexts gives rise to a newly identified and quantifiable source of human irrationality.

Frames, biases, and rational decision-making in the human brain.

Human choices are remarkably susceptible to the manner in which options are presented. This so-called "framing effect" represents a striking violation of standard economic accounts of human rationality, although its underlying neurobiology is not understood. We found that the framing effect was specifically associated with amygdala activity, suggesting a key role for an emotional system in mediating decision biases. Moreover, across individuals, orbital and medial prefrontal cortex activity predicted a reduced susceptibility to the framing effect. This finding highlights the importance of incorporating emotional processes within models of human choice and suggests how the brain may modulate the effect of these biasing influences to approximate rationality.