A reason for unreason: returns-based beliefs in game theory

Players cooperate in experiments more than game theory would predict. We introduce the ‘returns-based beliefs’ approach: the expected returns of a particular strategy in proportion to total expected returns of all strategies. Using a decision analytic solution concept, Luce’s (1959) probabilistic choice model, and ‘hyperpriors’ for ambiguity in players’ cooperability, our approach explains empirical observations in various classes of games including the Prisoner’s and Traveler’s Dilemmas. Testing the closeness of fit of our model on Selten and Chmura (2008) data for completely mixed 2 × 2 games shows that with loss aversion, returns-based beliefs explain the data better than other equilibrium concepts.

The most persistent soft-clique in a set of sampled graphs

When searching for characteristic subpatterns in potentially noisy graph data, it appears self-evident that having multiple observations would be better than having just one. However, it turns out that the inconsistencies introduced when different graph instances have different edge sets pose a serious challenge. In this work we address this challenge for the problem of finding maximum weighted cliques. We introduce the concept of most persistent soft-clique. This is subset of vertices, that 1) is almost fully or at least densely connected, 2) occurs in all or almost all graph instances, and 3) has the maximum weight. We present a measure of clique-ness, that essentially counts the number of edge missing to make a subset of vertices into a clique. With this measure, we show that the problem of finding the most persistent soft-clique problem can be cast either as: a) a max-min two person game optimization problem, or b) a min-min soft margin optimization problem. Both formulations lead to the same solution when using a partial Lagrangian method to solve the optimization problems. By experiments on synthetic data and on real social network data we show that the proposed method is able to reliably find soft cliques in graph data, even if that is distorted by random noise or unreliable observations. Copyright 2012 by the author(s)/owner(s).

Linear quadratic game and non-cooperative predictive methods for potential application to modelling driver-AFS interactive steering control

This paper is concerned with the modelling of strategic interactions between the human driver and the vehicle active front steering (AFS) controller in a path-following task where the two controllers hold different target paths. The work is aimed at extending the use of mathematical models in representing driver steering behaviour in complicated driving situations. Two game theoretic approaches, namely linear quadratic game and non-cooperative model predictive control (non-cooperative MPC), are used for developing the driver-AFS interactive steering control model. For each approach, the open-loop Nash steering control solution is derived; the influences of the path-following weights, preview and control horizons, driver time delay and arm neuromuscular system (NMS) dynamics are investigated, and the CPU time consumed is recorded. It is found that the two approaches give identical time histories as well as control gains, while the non-cooperative MPC method uses much less CPU time. Specifically, it is observed that the introduction of weight on the integral of vehicle lateral displacement error helps to eliminate the steady-state path-following error; the increase in preview horizon and NMS natural frequency and the decline in time delay and NMS damping ratio improve the path-following accuracy. © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.