Trial by market: the Brightstar incubation experiment

Established firms accumulate a significant body of knowledge, expertise and capabilities that are often secondary to their central revenue generating activities. How do they leverage this expertise in non-core technology into future value creation opportunities? In this paper we examine an attempt by the telecommunications firm BT to create value from the accumulated knowledge within its laboratories by setting up an incubator. While conceived by the board as a mechanism for leveraging the value of non-core technology into the workplace, corporate support for the incubator was withdrawn after only three years and prompted the incubator to partner with a venture capital firm, NVP, in the spin-out of ventures. Through analysis of this single case we observe how entering into such a relationship reduces the transaction costs of accessing complementary resources, capabilities and competences, while simultaneously reducing a number of the risks associated with venturing for both parties. Partnering with the venture capitalist allows the established firm to get its intellectual property into the market, for it to be tested by the market and further developed. © 2010 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.

Opt-out options in new product co-development partnerships

We study three contractual arrangements—co-development, licensing, and co-development with opt-out options—for the joint development of new products between a small and financially constrained innovator firm and a large technology company, as in the case of a biotech innovator and a major pharma company. We formulate our arguments in the context of a two-stage model, characterized by technical risk and stochastically changing cost and revenue projections. The model captures the main disadvantages of traditional co-development and licensing arrangements: in co-development the small firm runs a risk of running out of capital as future costs rise, while licensing for milestone and royalty (M&R) payments, which eliminates the latter risk, introduces inefficiency, as profitable projects might be abandoned. Counter to intuition we show that the biotech's payoff in a licensing contract is not monotonically increasing in the M&R terms. We also show that an option clause in a co-development contract that gives the small firm the right but not the obligation to opt out of co-development and into a pre-agreed licensing arrangement avoids the problems associated with fully committed co-development or licensing: the probability that the small firm will run out of capital is greatly reduced or completely eliminated and profitable projects are never abandoned.