Human-humanoid interaction: Is a humanoid robot perceived as a human?

As humanoid robots become more commonplace in our society, it is important to understand the relation between humans and humanoid robots. In human face-to-face interaction, the observation of another individual performing an action facilitates the execution of a similar action, and interferes with the execution of different action. This phenomenon has been explained by the existence of shared internal representations for the execution and perception of actions, which would be automatically activated by the perception of another individual's action. In one interference experiment, null interference was reported when subjects observed a robotic arm perform the incongruent task, suggesting that this effect may be specific to interacting with other humans. This experimental paradigm, designed to investigate motor interference in human interactions, was adapted to investigate how similar the implicit perception of a humanoid robot is to a human agent. Subjects performed rhythmic arm movements while observing either a human agent or humanoid robot performing either congruent or incongruent movements. The variance of the executed movements was used as a measure of the amount of interference in the movements. Both the human and humanoid agents produced significant interference effect. These results suggest that observing the action of humanoid robot and human agent may rely on similar perceptual processes. Furthermore, the ratio of the variance in incongruent to congruent conditions varied between the human agent and humanoid robot. We speculate this ratio describes how the implicit perception of a robot is similar to that of a human, so that this paradigm could provide an objective measure of the reaction to different types of robots and be used to guide the design of humanoid robots interacting with humans. © 2004 IEEE.

Choosing to make an effort: the role of striatum in signaling physical effort of a chosen action.

The possibility that we will have to invest effort influences our future choice behavior. Indeed deciding whether an action is actually worth taking is a key element in the expression of human apathy or inertia. There is a well developed literature on brain activity related to the anticipation of effort, but how effort affects actual choice is less well understood. Furthermore, prior work is largely restricted to mental as opposed to physical effort or has confounded temporal with effortful costs. Here we investigated choice behavior and brain activity, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, in a study where healthy participants are required to make decisions between effortful gripping, where the factors of force (high and low) and reward (high and low) were varied, and a choice of merely holding a grip device for minimal monetary reward. Behaviorally, we show that force level influences the likelihood of choosing an effortful grip. We observed greater activity in the putamen when participants opt to grip an option with low effort compared with when they opt to grip an option with high effort. The results suggest that, over and above a nonspecific role in movement anticipation and salience, the putamen plays a crucial role in computations for choice that involves effort costs.

Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others.

The neural processes underlying empathy are a subject of intense interest within the social neurosciences. However, very little is known about how brain empathic responses are modulated by the affective link between individuals. We show here that empathic responses are modulated by learned preferences, a result consistent with economic models of social preferences. We engaged male and female volunteers in an economic game, in which two confederates played fairly or unfairly, and then measured brain activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging while these same volunteers observed the confederates receiving pain. Both sexes exhibited empathy-related activation in pain-related brain areas (fronto-insular and anterior cingulate cortices) towards fair players. However, these empathy-related responses were significantly reduced in males when observing an unfair person receiving pain. This effect was accompanied by increased activation in reward-related areas, correlated with an expressed desire for revenge. We conclude that in men (at least) empathic responses are shaped by valuation of other people's social behaviour, such that they empathize with fair opponents while favouring the physical punishment of unfair opponents, a finding that echoes recent evidence for altruistic punishment.

Motor effort alters changes of mind in sensorimotor decision making.

After committing to an action, a decision-maker can change their mind to revise the action. Such changes of mind can even occur when the stream of information that led to the action is curtailed at movement onset. This is explained by the time delays in sensory processing and motor planning which lead to a component at the end of the sensory stream that can only be processed after initiation. Such post-initiation processing can explain the pattern of changes of mind by asserting an accumulation of additional evidence to a criterion level, termed change-of-mind bound. Here we test the hypothesis that physical effort associated with the movement required to change one's mind affects the level of the change-of-mind bound and the time for post-initiation deliberation. We varied the effort required to change from one choice target to another in a reaching movement by varying the geometry of the choice targets or by applying a force field between the targets. We show that there is a reduction in the frequency of change of mind when the separation of the choice targets would require a larger excursion of the hand from the initial to the opposite choice. The reduction is best explained by an increase in the evidence required for changes of mind and a reduced time period of integration after the initial decision. Thus the criteria to revise an initial choice is sensitive to energetic costs.