Robust multiplexed MPC for distributed multi-agent systems

This paper extends the authors' earlier work which adapted robust multiplexed MPC for application to distributed control of multi-agent systems with non-interacting dynamics and coupled constraint sets in the presence of persistent unknown, but bounded disturbances. Specifically, we propose exploiting the single agent update nature of the multiplexed approach, and fix the update sequence to enable input move-blocking and increased discretisation rates. This permits a higher rate of individual policy update to be achieved, whilst incurring no additional computational cost in the corresponding optimal control problems to be solved. A disturbance feedback policy is included between updates to facilitate finding feasible solutions. The new formulation inherits the property of rapid response to disturbances from multiplexing the control and numerical results show that fixing the update sequence does not incur any loss in performance. © 2011 IFAC.

Quantitative convergence analysis of multi-agent systems

We introduce a characterization of contraction for bounded convex sets. For discrete-time multi-agent systems we provide an explicit upperbound on the rate of convergence to a consensus under the assumptions of contractiveness and (weak) connectedness (across an interval.) Convergence is shown to be exponential when either the system or the function characterizing the contraction is linear. Copyright © 2007 IFAC.

Nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.

Social interactions in classic cognitive games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner's dilemma typically lead to Nash equilibria when multiple competitive decision makers with perfect knowledge select optimal strategies. However, in evolutionary game theory it has been shown that Nash equilibria can also arise as attractors in dynamical systems that can describe, for example, the population dynamics of microorganisms. Similar to such evolutionary dynamics, we find that Nash equilibria arise naturally in motor interactions in which players vie for control and try to minimize effort. When confronted with sensorimotor interaction tasks that correspond to the classical prisoner's dilemma and the rope-pulling game, two-player motor interactions led predominantly to Nash solutions. In contrast, when a single player took both roles, playing the sensorimotor game bimanually, cooperative solutions were found. Our methodology opens up a new avenue for the study of human motor interactions within a game theoretic framework, suggesting that the coupling of motor systems can lead to game theoretic solutions.