Single camera pose estimation using Bayesian filtering and Kinect motion priors

Traditional approaches to upper body pose estimation using monocular vision rely on complex body models and a large variety of geometric constraints. We argue that this is not ideal and somewhat inelegant as it results in large processing burdens, and instead attempt to incorporate these constraints through priors obtained directly from training data. A prior distribution covering the probability of a human pose occurring is used to incorporate likely human poses. This distribution is obtained offline, by fitting a Gaussian mixture model to a large dataset of recorded human body poses, tracked using a Kinect sensor. We combine this prior information with a random walk transition model to obtain an upper body model, suitable for use within a recursive Bayesian filtering framework. Our model can be viewed as a mixture of discrete Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes, in that states behave as random walks, but drift towards a set of typically observed poses. This model is combined with measurements of the human head and hand positions, using recursive Bayesian estimation to incorporate temporal information. Measurements are obtained using face detection and a simple skin colour hand detector, trained using the detected face. The suggested model is designed with analytical tractability in mind and we show that the pose tracking can be Rao-Blackwellised using the mixture Kalman filter, allowing for computational efficiency while still incorporating bio-mechanical properties of the upper body. In addition, the use of the proposed upper body model allows reliable three-dimensional pose estimates to be obtained indirectly for a number of joints that are often difficult to detect using traditional object recognition strategies. Comparisons with Kinect sensor results and the state of the art in 2D pose estimation highlight the efficacy of the proposed approach.

Cognition from the bottom up: on biological inspiration, body morphology, and soft materials.

Traditionally, in cognitive science the emphasis is on studying cognition from a computational point of view. Studies in biologically inspired robotics and embodied intelligence, however, provide strong evidence that cognition cannot be analyzed and understood by looking at computational processes alone, but that physical system-environment interaction needs to be taken into account. In this opinion article, we review recent progress in cognitive developmental science and robotics, and expand the notion of embodiment to include soft materials and body morphology in the big picture. We argue that we need to build our understanding of cognition from the bottom up; that is, all the way from how our body is physically constructed.

Motor effort alters changes of mind in sensorimotor decision making.

After committing to an action, a decision-maker can change their mind to revise the action. Such changes of mind can even occur when the stream of information that led to the action is curtailed at movement onset. This is explained by the time delays in sensory processing and motor planning which lead to a component at the end of the sensory stream that can only be processed after initiation. Such post-initiation processing can explain the pattern of changes of mind by asserting an accumulation of additional evidence to a criterion level, termed change-of-mind bound. Here we test the hypothesis that physical effort associated with the movement required to change one's mind affects the level of the change-of-mind bound and the time for post-initiation deliberation. We varied the effort required to change from one choice target to another in a reaching movement by varying the geometry of the choice targets or by applying a force field between the targets. We show that there is a reduction in the frequency of change of mind when the separation of the choice targets would require a larger excursion of the hand from the initial to the opposite choice. The reduction is best explained by an increase in the evidence required for changes of mind and a reduced time period of integration after the initial decision. Thus the criteria to revise an initial choice is sensitive to energetic costs.