Cognitive Tomography Reveals Complex, Task-Independent Mental Representations

Humans develop rich mental representations that guide their behavior in a variety of everyday tasks. However, it is unknown whether these representations, often formalized as priors in Bayesian inference, are specific for each task or subserve multiple tasks. Current approaches cannot distinguish between these two possibilities because they cannot extract comparable representations across different tasks [1-10]. Here, we develop a novel method, termed cognitive tomography, that can extract complex, multidimensional priors across tasks. We apply this method to human judgments in two qualitatively different tasks, "familiarity" and "odd one out," involving an ecologically relevant set of stimuli, human faces. We show that priors over faces are structurally complex and vary dramatically across subjects, but are invariant across the tasks within each subject. The priors we extract from each task allow us to predict with high precision the behavior of subjects for novel stimuli both in the same task as well as in the other task. Our results provide the first evidence for a single high-dimensional structured representation of a naturalistic stimulus set that guides behavior in multiple tasks. Moreover, the representations estimated by cognitive tomography can provide independent, behavior-based regressors for elucidating the neural correlates of complex naturalistic priors. © 2013 The Authors.

Neural mechanisms of belief inference during cooperative games.

Humans have the arguably unique ability to understand the mental representations of others. For success in both competitive and cooperative interactions, however, this ability must be extended to include representations of others' belief about our intentions, their model about our belief about their intentions, and so on. We developed a "stag hunt" game in which human subjects interacted with a computerized agent using different degrees of sophistication (recursive inferences) and applied an ecologically valid computational model of dynamic belief inference. We show that rostral medial prefrontal (paracingulate) cortex, a brain region consistently identified in psychological tasks requiring mentalizing, has a specific role in encoding the uncertainty of inference about the other's strategy. In contrast, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex encodes the depth of recursion of the strategy being used, an index of executive sophistication. These findings reveal putative computational representations within prefrontal cortex regions, supporting the maintenance of cooperation in complex social decision making.

Flexible representations of dynamics are used in object manipulation.

To manipulate an object skillfully, the brain must learn its dynamics, specifying the mapping between applied force and motion. A fundamental issue in sensorimotor control is whether such dynamics are represented in an extrinsic frame of reference tied to the object or an intrinsic frame of reference linked to the arm. Although previous studies have suggested that objects are represented in arm-centered coordinates [1-6], all of these studies have used objects with unusual and complex dynamics. Thus, it is not known how objects with natural dynamics are represented. Here we show that objects with simple (or familiar) dynamics and those with complex (or unfamiliar) dynamics are represented in object- and arm-centered coordinates, respectively. We also show that objects with simple dynamics are represented with an intermediate coordinate frame when vision of the object is removed. These results indicate that object dynamics can be flexibly represented in different coordinate frames by the brain. We suggest that with experience, the representation of the dynamics of a manipulated object may shift from a coordinate frame tied to the arm toward one that is linked to the object. The additional complexity required to represent dynamics in object-centered coordinates would be economical for familiar objects because such a representation allows object use regardless of the orientation of the object in hand.