Nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.

Social interactions in classic cognitive games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner's dilemma typically lead to Nash equilibria when multiple competitive decision makers with perfect knowledge select optimal strategies. However, in evolutionary game theory it has been shown that Nash equilibria can also arise as attractors in dynamical systems that can describe, for example, the population dynamics of microorganisms. Similar to such evolutionary dynamics, we find that Nash equilibria arise naturally in motor interactions in which players vie for control and try to minimize effort. When confronted with sensorimotor interaction tasks that correspond to the classical prisoner's dilemma and the rope-pulling game, two-player motor interactions led predominantly to Nash solutions. In contrast, when a single player took both roles, playing the sensorimotor game bimanually, cooperative solutions were found. Our methodology opens up a new avenue for the study of human motor interactions within a game theoretic framework, suggesting that the coupling of motor systems can lead to game theoretic solutions.

Motor coordination: when two have to act as one.

Trying to pass someone walking toward you in a narrow corridor is a familiar example of a two-person motor game that requires coordination. In this study, we investigate coordination in sensorimotor tasks that correspond to classic coordination games with multiple Nash equilibria, such as "choosing sides," "stag hunt," "chicken," and "battle of sexes". In these tasks, subjects made reaching movements reflecting their continuously evolving "decisions" while they received a continuous payoff in the form of a resistive force counteracting their movements. Successful coordination required two subjects to "choose" the same Nash equilibrium in this force-payoff landscape within a single reach. We found that on the majority of trials coordination was achieved. Compared to the proportion of trials in which miscoordination occurred, successful coordination was characterized by several distinct features: an increased mutual information between the players' movement endpoints, an increased joint entropy during the movements, and by differences in the timing of the players' responses. Moreover, we found that the probability of successful coordination depends on the players' initial distance from the Nash equilibria. Our results suggest that two-person coordination arises naturally in motor interactions and is facilitated by favorable initial positions, stereotypical motor pattern, and differences in response times.

Linear quadratic game and non-cooperative predictive methods for potential application to modelling driver-AFS interactive steering control

This paper is concerned with the modelling of strategic interactions between the human driver and the vehicle active front steering (AFS) controller in a path-following task where the two controllers hold different target paths. The work is aimed at extending the use of mathematical models in representing driver steering behaviour in complicated driving situations. Two game theoretic approaches, namely linear quadratic game and non-cooperative model predictive control (non-cooperative MPC), are used for developing the driver-AFS interactive steering control model. For each approach, the open-loop Nash steering control solution is derived; the influences of the path-following weights, preview and control horizons, driver time delay and arm neuromuscular system (NMS) dynamics are investigated, and the CPU time consumed is recorded. It is found that the two approaches give identical time histories as well as control gains, while the non-cooperative MPC method uses much less CPU time. Specifically, it is observed that the introduction of weight on the integral of vehicle lateral displacement error helps to eliminate the steady-state path-following error; the increase in preview horizon and NMS natural frequency and the decline in time delay and NMS damping ratio improve the path-following accuracy. © 2013 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.