The Bayesian view of extreme events

The Bayesian perspective of designing for the consequences of hazard is discussed. Structural engineers should be educated in Bayesian theory and its underlying philosophy, and about the centrality to the prediction problem of the predictive distribution. The primary contribution that Bayesianism can make to the debate about extreme possibilities is its clarification of the language of and thinking about risk. Frequentist methodologies are the wrong approach to the decisions that engineers need to make, decisions that involve assessments of abstract future possibilities based on incomplete and abstract information.

Real-time block flow tracking of atrial septal defect motion in 4D cardiac ultrasound

Real-time cardiac ultrasound allows monitoring the heart motion during intracardiac beating heart procedures. Our application assists atrial septal defect (ASD) closure techniques using real-time 3D ultrasound guidance. One major image processing challenge is the processing of information at high frame rate. We present an optimized block flow technique, which combines the probability-based velocity computation for an entire block with template matching. We propose adapted similarity constraints both from frame to frame, to conserve energy, and globally, to minimize errors. We show tracking results on eight in-vivo 4D datasets acquired from porcine beating-heart procedures. Computing velocity at the block level with an optimized scheme, our technique tracks ASD motion at 41 frames/s. We analyze the errors of motion estimation and retrieve the cardiac cycle in ungated images. © 2007 IEEE.

Neural activity associated with the passive prediction of ambiguity and risk for aversive events.

In economic decision making, outcomes are described in terms of risk (uncertain outcomes with certain probabilities) and ambiguity (uncertain outcomes with uncertain probabilities). Humans are more averse to ambiguity than to risk, with a distinct neural system suggested as mediating this effect. However, there has been no clear disambiguation of activity related to decisions themselves from perceptual processing of ambiguity. In a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, we contrasted ambiguity, defined as a lack of information about outcome probabilities, to risk, where outcome probabilities are known, or ignorance, where outcomes are completely unknown and unknowable. We modified previously learned pavlovian CS+ stimuli such that they became an ambiguous cue and contrasted evoked brain activity both with an unmodified predictive CS+ (risky cue), and a cue that conveyed no information about outcome probabilities (ignorance cue). Compared with risk, ambiguous cues elicited activity in posterior inferior frontal gyrus and posterior parietal cortex during outcome anticipation. Furthermore, a similar set of regions was activated when ambiguous cues were compared with ignorance cues. Thus, regions previously shown to be engaged by decisions about ambiguous rewarding outcomes are also engaged by ambiguous outcome prediction in the context of aversive outcomes. Moreover, activation in these regions was seen even when no actual decision is made. Our findings suggest that these regions subserve a general function of contextual analysis when search for hidden information during outcome anticipation is both necessary and meaningful.