Confidence in beliefs about pain predicts expectancy effects on pain perception and anticipatory processing in right anterior insula.

Psychological factors play a major role in exacerbating chronic pain. Effective self-management of pain is often hindered by inaccurate beliefs about the nature of pain which lead to a high degree of emotional reactivity. Probabilistic models of perception state that greater confidence (certainty) in beliefs increases their influence on perception and behavior. In this study, we treat confidence as a metacognitive process dissociable from the content of belief. We hypothesized that confidence is associated with anticipatory activation of areas of the pain matrix involved with top-down modulation of pain. Healthy volunteers rated their beliefs about the emotional distress that experimental pain would cause, and separately rated their level of confidence in this belief. Confidence predicted the influence of anticipation cues on experienced pain. We measured brain activity during anticipation of pain using high-density EEG and used electromagnetic tomography to determine neural substrates of this effect. Confidence correlated with activity in right anterior insula, posterior midcingulate and inferior parietal cortices during the anticipation of pain. Activity in the right anterior insula predicted a greater influence of anticipation cues on pain perception, whereas activity in right inferior parietal cortex predicted a decreased influence of anticipatory cues. The results support probabilistic models of pain perception and suggest that confidence in beliefs is an important determinant of expectancy effects on pain perception.

Modulation of pain ratings by expectation and uncertainty: Behavioral characteristics and anticipatory neural correlates.

Expectations about the magnitude of impending pain exert a substantial effect on subsequent perception. However, the neural mechanisms that underlie the predictive processes that modulate pain are poorly understood. In a combined behavioral and high-density electrophysiological study we measured anticipatory neural responses to heat stimuli to determine how predictions of pain intensity, and certainty about those predictions, modulate brain activity and subjective pain ratings. Prior to receiving randomized laser heat stimuli at different intensities (low, medium or high) subjects (n=15) viewed cues that either accurately informed them of forthcoming intensity (certain expectation) or not (uncertain expectation). Pain ratings were biased towards prior expectations of either high or low intensity. Anticipatory neural responses increased with expectations of painful vs. non-painful heat intensity, suggesting the presence of neural responses that represent predicted heat stimulus intensity. These anticipatory responses also correlated with the amplitude of the Laser-Evoked Potential (LEP) response to painful stimuli when the intensity was predictable. Source analysis (LORETA) revealed that uncertainty about expected heat intensity involves an anticipatory cortical network commonly associated with attention (left dorsolateral prefrontal, posterior cingulate and bilateral inferior parietal cortices). Relative certainty, however, involves cortical areas previously associated with semantic and prospective memory (left inferior frontal and inferior temporal cortex, and right anterior prefrontal cortex). This suggests that biasing of pain reports and LEPs by expectation involves temporally precise activity in specific cortical networks.

Opponent appetitive-aversive neural processes underlie predictive learning of pain relief.

Termination of a painful or unpleasant event can be rewarding. However, whether the brain treats relief in a similar way as it treats natural reward is unclear, and the neural processes that underlie its representation as a motivational goal remain poorly understood. We used fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) to investigate how humans learn to generate expectations of pain relief. Using a pavlovian conditioning procedure, we show that subjects experiencing prolonged experimentally induced pain can be conditioned to predict pain relief. This proceeds in a manner consistent with contemporary reward-learning theory (average reward/loss reinforcement learning), reflected by neural activity in the amygdala and midbrain. Furthermore, these reward-like learning signals are mirrored by opposite aversion-like signals in lateral orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex. This dual coding has parallels to 'opponent process' theories in psychology and promotes a formal account of prediction and expectation during pain.

Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain.

Our ability to have an experience of another's pain is characteristic of empathy. Using functional imaging, we assessed brain activity while volunteers experienced a painful stimulus and compared it to that elicited when they observed a signal indicating that their loved one--present in the same room--was receiving a similar pain stimulus. Bilateral anterior insula (AI), rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem, and cerebellum were activated when subjects received pain and also by a signal that a loved one experienced pain. AI and ACC activation correlated with individual empathy scores. Activity in the posterior insula/secondary somatosensory cortex, the sensorimotor cortex (SI/MI), and the caudal ACC was specific to receiving pain. Thus, a neural response in AI and rostral ACC, activated in common for "self" and "other" conditions, suggests that the neural substrate for empathic experience does not involve the entire "pain matrix." We conclude that only that part of the pain network associated with its affective qualities, but not its sensory qualities, mediates empathy.

Uncertainty increases pain: evidence for a novel mechanism of pain modulation involving the periaqueductal gray.

Predictions about sensory input exert a dominant effect on what we perceive, and this is particularly true for the experience of pain. However, it remains unclear what component of prediction, from an information-theoretic perspective, controls this effect. We used a vicarious pain observation paradigm to study how the underlying statistics of predictive information modulate experience. Subjects observed judgments that a group of people made to a painful thermal stimulus, before receiving the same stimulus themselves. We show that the mean observed rating exerted a strong assimilative effect on subjective pain. In addition, we show that observed uncertainty had a specific and potent hyperalgesic effect. Using computational functional magnetic resonance imaging, we found that this effect correlated with activity in the periaqueductal gray. Our results provide evidence for a novel form of cognitive hyperalgesia relating to perceptual uncertainty, induced here by vicarious observation, with control mediated by the brainstem pain modulatory system.

Prices need no preferences: social trends determine decisions in experimental markets for pain relief.

OBJECTIVE: A standard view in health economics is that, although there is no market that determines the "prices" for health states, people can nonetheless associate health states with monetary values (or other scales, such as quality adjusted life year [QALYs] and disability adjusted life year [DALYs]). Such valuations can be used to shape health policy, and a major research challenge is to elicit such values from people; creating experimental "markets" for health states is a theoretically attractive way to address this. We explore the possibility that this framework may be fundamentally flawed-because there may not be any stable values to be revealed. Instead, perhaps people construct ad hoc values, influenced by contextual factors, such as the observed decisions of others. METHOD: The participants bid to buy relief from equally painful electrical shocks to the leg and arm in an experimental health market based on an interactive second-price auction. Thirty subjects were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions where the bids by "others" were manipulated to follow increasing or decreasing price trends for one, but not the other, pain. After the auction, a preference test asked the participants to choose which pain they prefer to experience for a longer duration. RESULTS: Players remained indifferent between the two pain-types throughout the auction. However, their bids were differentially attracted toward what others bid for each pain, with overbidding during decreasing prices and underbidding during increasing prices. CONCLUSION: Health preferences are dissociated from market prices, which are strongly referenced to others' choices. This suggests that the price of health care in a free-market has the capacity to become critically detached from people's underlying preferences.

Pain relativity in motor control.

Motivational theories of pain highlight its role in people's choices of actions that avoid bodily damage. By contrast, little is known regarding how pain influences action implementation. To explore this less-understood area, we conducted a study in which participants had to rapidly point to a target area to win money while avoiding an overlapping penalty area that would cause pain in their contralateral hand. We found that pain intensity and target-penalty proximity repelled participants' movement away from pain and that motor execution was influenced not by absolute pain magnitudes but by relative pain differences. Our results indicate that the magnitude and probability of pain have a precise role in guiding motor control and that representations of pain that guide action are, at least in part, relative rather than absolute. Additionally, our study shows that the implicit monetary valuation of pain, like many explicit valuations (e.g., patients' use of rating scales in medical contexts), is unstable, a finding that has implications for pain treatment in clinical contexts.