FBS Linkage ontology and technique to support engineering change management

© 2014, Springer-Verlag London. Engineering changes are essential for any product development, and their management has become a crucial discipline. Research in engineering change management has brought about some methods and tools to support dealing with changes. This work extends the change prediction method through incorporation of a function–behaviour–structure (FBS) scheme. These additional levels of detail provide the rationales for change propagation and allow a more proactive management of changes. First, we develop the ontology of this method based on a comprehensive comparison of three seminal functional reasoning schemes. Then, we demonstrate the FBS Linkage technique by applying it to a diesel engine. Finally, we evaluate the method.

Buyer-supplier partnerships during product design and development in the global automotive sector: Who invests, in what and when?

This paper explores the concept of partnerships between buyers and suppliers in the global automotive sector during product design and development. Partnerships are often the goal in a shift away from adversarial arms-length relationships. The objective of this research is to provide empirical evidence to explain the levels of mutual investment expected and achieved in partnerships from both buyer and supplier perspectives. During this research, 25 employees from 12 global supplier organisations who were in partnership with a specific vehicle manufacturer (VM) were interviewed. Twelve employees from this VM were also interviewed. The research showed the differences between partnerships and non-partnerships and the disparities in the expectations of investment from each partner. For suppliers and buyers to get the most out of partnerships, clear expectations and investments needed over time should be understood and agreed early in the relationship. © 2009 Elsevier B.V.All rights reserved.

Opt-out options in new product co-development partnerships

We study three contractual arrangements—co-development, licensing, and co-development with opt-out options—for the joint development of new products between a small and financially constrained innovator firm and a large technology company, as in the case of a biotech innovator and a major pharma company. We formulate our arguments in the context of a two-stage model, characterized by technical risk and stochastically changing cost and revenue projections. The model captures the main disadvantages of traditional co-development and licensing arrangements: in co-development the small firm runs a risk of running out of capital as future costs rise, while licensing for milestone and royalty (M&R) payments, which eliminates the latter risk, introduces inefficiency, as profitable projects might be abandoned. Counter to intuition we show that the biotech's payoff in a licensing contract is not monotonically increasing in the M&R terms. We also show that an option clause in a co-development contract that gives the small firm the right but not the obligation to opt out of co-development and into a pre-agreed licensing arrangement avoids the problems associated with fully committed co-development or licensing: the probability that the small firm will run out of capital is greatly reduced or completely eliminated and profitable projects are never abandoned.