Nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.

Social interactions in classic cognitive games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner's dilemma typically lead to Nash equilibria when multiple competitive decision makers with perfect knowledge select optimal strategies. However, in evolutionary game theory it has been shown that Nash equilibria can also arise as attractors in dynamical systems that can describe, for example, the population dynamics of microorganisms. Similar to such evolutionary dynamics, we find that Nash equilibria arise naturally in motor interactions in which players vie for control and try to minimize effort. When confronted with sensorimotor interaction tasks that correspond to the classical prisoner's dilemma and the rope-pulling game, two-player motor interactions led predominantly to Nash solutions. In contrast, when a single player took both roles, playing the sensorimotor game bimanually, cooperative solutions were found. Our methodology opens up a new avenue for the study of human motor interactions within a game theoretic framework, suggesting that the coupling of motor systems can lead to game theoretic solutions.

Multiple object tracking using evolutionary MCMC-based particle algorithms

Algorithms are presented for detection and tracking of multiple clusters of co-ordinated targets. Based on a Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling mechanization, the new algorithms maintain a discrete approximation of the filtering density of the clusters' state. The filters' tracking efficiency is enhanced by incorporating various sampling improvement strategies into the basic Metropolis-Hastings scheme. Thus, an evolutionary stage consisting of two primary steps is introduced: 1) producing a population of different chain realizations, and 2) exchanging genetic material between samples in this population. The performance of the resulting evolutionary filtering algorithms is demonstrated in two different settings. In the first, both group and target properties are estimated whereas in the second, which consists of a very large number of targets, only the clustering structure is maintained. © 2009 IFAC.

SuperJunction IGBTS: An evolutionary step of silicon power devices with high impact potential

15 years ago the vertical SuperJunction (SJ) concept conceived for SJ power MOSFETs was the last, major breakthrough in the field of silicon power devices. Today, the SuperJunction MOSFET technologies have reached a mature stage characterized by gradual performance improvements. SuperJunction Insulated Gate Bipolar Transistors (SJ IGBTs) could interrupt this stagnation holding promise to revitalize voltage classes from 600 up to 1200 V. Such SJ IGBTs surpass by a very significant margin their SJ MOSFET counterparts both in terms of power handling capability, on-state and turn-off losses, all at the same time. On the higher end of the voltage class, SJ IGBTs would top the performance of 1.2 kV IGBTs by a similar margin. © 2012 IEEE.

Neural mechanisms of belief inference during cooperative games.

Humans have the arguably unique ability to understand the mental representations of others. For success in both competitive and cooperative interactions, however, this ability must be extended to include representations of others' belief about our intentions, their model about our belief about their intentions, and so on. We developed a "stag hunt" game in which human subjects interacted with a computerized agent using different degrees of sophistication (recursive inferences) and applied an ecologically valid computational model of dynamic belief inference. We show that rostral medial prefrontal (paracingulate) cortex, a brain region consistently identified in psychological tasks requiring mentalizing, has a specific role in encoding the uncertainty of inference about the other's strategy. In contrast, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex encodes the depth of recursion of the strategy being used, an index of executive sophistication. These findings reveal putative computational representations within prefrontal cortex regions, supporting the maintenance of cooperation in complex social decision making.

Altruistic learning.

The origin of altruism remains one of the most enduring puzzles of human behaviour. Indeed, true altruism is often thought either not to exist, or to arise merely as a miscalculation of otherwise selfish behaviour. In this paper, we argue that altruism emerges directly from the way in which distinct human decision-making systems learn about rewards. Using insights provided by neurobiological accounts of human decision-making, we suggest that reinforcement learning in game-theoretic social interactions (habitisation over either individuals or games) and observational learning (either imitative of inference based) lead to altruistic behaviour. This arises not only as a result of computational efficiency in the face of processing complexity, but as a direct consequence of optimal inference in the face of uncertainty. Critically, we argue that the fact that evolutionary pressure acts not over the object of learning ('what' is learned), but over the learning systems themselves ('how' things are learned), enables the evolution of altruism despite the direct threat posed by free-riders.